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Working from the paradigm of 'stateless citizenship' as a looking glass, or a heuristic 
device, this study examines the particular logic of exclusion in the Israeli constitutional 
order. To this end, the Thesis is composed of two central analytical tracks. It begins by 
outlining the manner in which the State of Israel mobilizes structures and arrangements 
of citizenship in the actual exclusion. It is through the bestowal of Israeli citizenship that 
non-Jews are ‘made’ stateless; it is through inclusion within the Israeli citizenship regime 
that they are excluded. Using extensive documents and original materials from archives 
in Jerusalem, London and Geneva, the study holds that the modern paradigm of 
citizenship, traditionally a mechanism for inclusion, is transformed in Israel. The relation 
of exception in the classical liberal model of citizenship is placed on its head and 
inclusive exclusionary mechanisms are inverted. This is because the Israeli incorporation 
regime has displaced the central figure of the ‘citizen’ in the body politic, vesting it with 
features of the less stable and capricious ‘immigrant’. Building on this, the study goes on 
to consider what these findings elucidate about broader transformations in citizenship 
restriction and revocation. It examines what the interrogation of the citizen within Israel 
can detect and reveal core and troubling directions in which the exclusionary policies 
embedded in Western liberal citizenship regimes are headed. Using citizenship in the 
Jewish State as a microcosm of broader developments around inclusion and exclusion, 
the study posits that questions as to who is a real or a desired citizen on the part of 
ostensibly liberal democratic nation-states have shifted their gaze of exclusion onto the 
figure of the citizen. With this shift, it is argued that we are witnessing a rising political 
trajectory where the citizen is assuming features closer to the more unstable figure of the 
‘immigrant.’ Overall, in the discussions and assessments of the Thesis, the interrogation 
of the figure of the citizen in Israel is used to illuminate broader shifts in citizenship 
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This study is a product of first-hand fieldwork and research I have conducted in historic 
Palestine for the past 12 years into the logic of exclusion that shapes the Israeli 
incorporation regime.  
 
Working from my previous writing on the exclusionary dynamics of Palestinian-Arab 
existence in Israel, I was curious to determine how the analytical paradigm of ‘stateless 
citizenship’ that I had designed may illuminate broader transformations in citizenship 
occurring today. For me, the notion that stateless citizenship could be a kind of looking 
glass or lens through which to examine the closure of citizenship more broadly was 
intriguing. Meanwhile, the realization that practices in other liberal-democratic states was 
reminiscent of the Israeli logic of exclusion was terrifying.  
 
My work in Palestine as a researcher and instructor has, over the years, taught me how to 
see power and how to read power. The settler-colonial and racialized organization of 
human life and death by the Israeli incorporation regime heightened my understanding of 
the violence that shapes the discourse of law and rights. I learned how to think from a 
political space where refugee camps act like cities, citizenship becomes statelessness, 
borders constantly appear and disappear, temporariness feels permanent, exclusion is 
delivered through inclusion, and where the reality of slow death pushes a celebration of life 
to the surface. Such a space and climate makes one question the basic units of politics.  
 
Importantly, my analysis of the Israeli citizenship and nationality regime in this study has 
also been informed by the generous expressions of daily experiences, struggles, and 
insight of Palestinians, which have throughout the years been shared with me by 
members of the community. If this project is able to capture even part of the political 
spirit and intention of these friends and dear ones then it will have been worth the effort. 
 
Gaza City, Palestine 
April 7, 2018 
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Introduction | ‘Stateless Citizenship’ as a Looking Glass 
1. States, citizenships and modes of incorporation 
The past few decades have revealed the advancement of efforts by Western democratic 
states to delimit their national identities, moral frontiers and territorial borders against the 
‘unwanted’ or ‘undesirable’. These efforts include the broadening and intensification of 
various intra-national and trans-national techniques of restriction, expulsion, revocation 
and containment. This tightening and redrawing of the boundaries of inclusion by 
sovereign power has taken shape, insofar as it has succeeded, through the active 
application of the principles, tools and discourse of citizenship. While directed toward the 
presence and migration of unwanted, undesirable and unknown populations, these efforts 
by Western democracies have largely resulted in the fortification of citizenship 
restrictions. In other words, the multifaceted endeavor to reallocate and reconstitute 
political subjects to their preferred sovereigns has, in the process, re-incorporated the 
figure of the citizen into the body politic. The gaze toward ‘undesirable outsiders’ has 
been widened to include ‘undesirable insiders’. Against this backdrop, I argue that the 
un-rooting of citizenship reveals the ways the relation of exclusion is being internalized; 
shifting the gaze of exclusion onto the figure of the citizen. Using the Israeli 
incorporation regime as an analytical and political paradigm, in this study I examine a 
broader political trajectory where the figure of the ‘citizen’ is being vested with features 
of the less stable and capricious ‘immigrant’ in the body politic. 
The mode of incorporation, combining both formally written or legal principles 
and informal political practices, is defined by Yasemin Soysal as an incorporation 
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regime.1 The incorporation regime, Soysal writes, refers to “patterns of institutional 
practices and more or less explicit cultural norms that define the membership of 
individuals and/or groups in the society and differentially allocate entitlements, 
obligations and domination.”2 An incorporation regime is a regime of social, political, 
economic, and cultural institutions that stratify the assumed equal or universalist 
citizenship of the state through a differential dispensing of rights, benefits, and 
obligations to various communities. The dynamic of incorporation is neither limited to 
the actual interaction of civic subjects with the policies and practices of the nation-state 
nor to the extent of their integration. Instead, incorporation refers to the actual 
organizational arrangement of membership and the institutional modes within which the 
civic subject is placed. Thus, every host-state maintains specific juridico-political policy 
regulations according to which the condition and status of the civic subject is defined. 
Taken together, the degree of incorporation into a society depends not only on the socio-
cultural attributes of an ethno-national community, a minority group, or an immigrant 
collective, but certainly also on the ideological foundations, and complex norms and 
practices (i.e. the incorporation regime) of the host society. It is the interaction between 
these two forces that constitutes the particular kind of incorporation – or exclusion – that 
is realized. 
It is from this analytical position where my examination of the Israeli 
incorporation regime commences in the forthcoming excursus. Similar to other nation-
states, the nature of the State of Israel translates into the character of its citizenship. As 
we will see, the ideological, conceptual and symbolic emphasis on its Jewish and Zionist 
                                                
1 Yasemin Soysal, Limits of Citizenship, Migration and Post-National Citizenship in Europe (Chicago: 
 Chicago University Press, 1994), 36. 
2 Ibid. 
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character shapes the kind of citizenship it provides to non-Jewish communities, along 
with how this citizenship is formulated, structured, and arranged. Importantly, this 
produces intense legal, political, socio-cultural and economic mechanisms of exclusion 
within the Israeli citizenship regime.3 These multifaceted racialized frameworks that are 
embedded within what I will examine as the Zionist incorporation regime – relations and 
categories of inclusion and exclusion shaped by a Zionist ideology – work in conjunction, 
intersect, and fuel one another. Hence the treatment of these frameworks in isolation from 
one another is ineffective as the various relations of exclusion within minority citizenship 
in Israel is not solely the result of a single feature of state-citizen relations, but the 
product of all of these elements. The examination of Israel’s formal and informal 
practices in the following chapters exposes the dynamics and structure of this Zionist 
incorporation regime. From here, the sophisticated policies of exclusion and their 
respective systems of control that underpin non-Jewish citizenship within this 
incorporation regime will begin to emerge. With this, we can delve into the two core 
considerations of this study: what the application and appropriation of liberal principles 
of citizenship in the Jewish State over half a century reveals about the figure of the 
‘citizen’ within its constitutional order, and second, what this indicates about broader 
transformations in citizenship occurring today in the context of and migration and a 
perceived rise in transnational terrorism.  
 
                                                
3 See Shourideh C. Molavi, Stateless Citizenship: The Palestinian-Arab Citizens of Israel (Leiden: 
 Brill, 2013), Chapter Two. In the section titled “A Multifaceted Discrimination” I outline the ways in 
 which multifaceted discrimination against non-Jewish citizens pervades every corner of Israeli 
 society: from the private to the public sphere, and at social, civil, legal and political levels. In this 
 work I have analyzed, in great detail, the ways in which Israel’s policy of Jewish dominance is 
 channeled at the declarative level, the structural level, and the operational level. This book was the 
 product of my M.A. thesis, completed in 2010. 
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 2. ‘Stateless citizenship’ as the Israeli logic of exclusion 
Today discrimination against Palestinian-Arab citizens penetrates to every corner of 
Israeli society, from the private to the public sphere, and at social, civil, legal and 
political levels. That non-Jewish citizens of Israel are not placed on an equal conceptual, 
ideological, political or even legal footing with their Jewish counterparts is no longer 
uncharted academic or political territory. In my previous writing on Palestinian-Arab 
citizenship in Israel, I have outlined at length the entrenched and multifaceted 
discrimination against non-Jewish citizens at the formal and declarative, structural and 
institutional, operational and budgetary, and legislative levels.4 While legal and 
operational policies exist in Israel that aim at alleviating the depraved circumstances of 
marginalized groups and civic collectives within its society, existing multifaceted 
discrimination against Palestinian-Arabs indicate that these measures have largely been 
fruitless. At best, policies aimed at reducing marginalization are both insufficient and 
ineffective and, at worst, they are rendered inapplicable to the case of non-Jewish Arab 
citizens.  
My previous study on the topic of Israeli citizenship outlined at length the 
intellectual arguments, historical absences and conceptual frameworks of liberal-Zionist 
writings on the political situation and claims of the Arab citizenry.5 Yet, the approach I 
adopt to outline the salient aspects of the particular framework of exclusion within which 
Palestinian citizens of Israel are placed has differed significantly from that of the existing 
scholarship. My examinations worked from, and moved beyond what is deficient or 
wanting in their provided citizenship rights (beyond the what of citizenship) and focused 




more on how this Palestinian citizenship came to embody its existing exclusionary 
dynamics. My concern had been to elucidate how deficient citizenship for non-Jewish 
subjects is produced and maintained, along with the way in which its relations of 
inclusion and exclusion are created. Throughout my analysis, it was emphasized that an 
elemental feature of how Palestinian citizenship is formed and reproduced is that the 
means, the actual medium, through which, by which, and from which peripheral and 
limited Palestinian existence is maintained in Israel has been citizenship itself. 
My examinations on this topic have shown that the mechanisms of control and 
exclusion developing out of the Zionist incorporation regime are shaped by the changing 
settler-colonial boundaries of the Israeli polity and, by extension, form its hierarchical 
citizenship framework.6 As expressed by Shafir, 
[c]itizenship has never been simple or unitary in form in Israel – a situation it 
shares with many other colonial and postcolonial societies. There has always 
been a multiplicity of hierarchically stacked citizenships …. The full complement 
of rights in Israel … [is] only available to those who were part of the colonization 
of Palestinian land.7 
 
Contemporary colonial contradictions in Israeli society, democracy and, by extension, in 
its citizenship regime therefore render genuine Palestinian-Arab inclusion an 
impossibility. This is because the institutions and claim-making processes are 
deliberately designed to exclude the non-Jewish community on the basis of their 
inclusion into this regime. As a result, the legal ensconcing of Jewish dominance – and 
the absence of constitutional equality – as part of the self-definition of the state compels 
Israel constantly to (re)position itself in opposition to the Palestinian-Arab community. 
                                                
6 Ibid., 183. 
7 Gershon Shafir, “Settler Citizenship in the Jewish Colonization of Palestine,” in Settler Colonialism in 
 the Twentieth Century: Project, Practices, Legacies, ed. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (New 
 York: Routledge, 2005), 55. 
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To clarify and explain this unique relation of exclusion Israeli citizenship regime, I have 
proposed and extensively outlined the paradigm of stateless citizenship. With the 
analytical model of stateless citizenship, I show how the design of Israel’s incorporation 
regime demarcates Arab access to citizenship rights and representation while repudiating 
their status as citizens of that state, thus rendering this community stateless citizens.  
As I have explained in previous writing, the notion of a ‘stateless’ citizenship for 
Arabs in Israel does not superficially conceptualize their statelessness alongside that of 
other parts of the Palestinian nation. It is not an indistinguishable or interchangeable 
legal, political or socio-economic condition. Of course, students and observers familiar 
with the Israel-Palestine conflict understand that, at a very elementary level, the 
Palestinian nation as a whole – whether citizens or non-citizens of other states – are a 
stateless people. They do not have an established and independent state that agrees (or is 
able) to represent them, their needs, rights and aspirations, as a people.8 At the same time, 
the statelessness of the Arab citizens of Israel differs both conceptually and substantively 
from the rest of the Palestinian nation.  
In contrast to the state of exception, where those in the camp are excluded by not 
belonging to the state, as stateless citizens, Palestinian-Arabs are excluded in the Israeli 
regime by being included. Palestinian-Arabs are not denationalized; they are not stripped 
of their Israeli citizenship, they do not exist outside of the law, and there is no suspension 
of the validity of the juridico-political order. It is the reverse. Since they are recognized 
as Israeli citizens, international and domestic laws apply, and they have (limited) access 
                                                
8 Despite the UN General Assembly vote on November 29, 2012 to recognize the State of Palestine 
 within the 1967 borders as a non-member state with observer status, Israel remains an occupying 
 power. It holds complete military control and decision-making power over policies and practices 
 concerning the environmental, economic and political development in the OPT, certainly in the West 
 Bank and East Jerusalem, and to a great extent in the Gaza Strip. 
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to the institutions of the Israeli civic community. This makes their relation to the state 
that of exclusive-inclusion.9 As it stands, these non-Jewish citizens of Israel do have a 
particular political and legal relationship with the Israeli regime that other Palestinians do 
not have. However limited, and the internal contradictions aside, there are benefits 
granted to the Palestinian-Arab citizenry through their inclusion in the discourse of rights 
as citizens of Israel. These privileges are denied to the rest of the Palestinian population, 
such as mobility rights and the right to vote, among others. What this indicates is that 
while all Arabs are excluded from the Israeli incorporation regime, the logic of the 
relation of exclusion faced by Palestinian citizens differs from that of non-citizen 
Palestinians. Essentially, the difference is between the inclusive-exclusion of the broader 
Palestinian nation and the exclusive-inclusion of non-Jewish Arab citizens. 
The statelessness of these Arab citizens is characterized by the fact that though 
they possess a recognized and legally supported citizenship status in Israel, they are not 
represented by it at an ideological, existential, institutional and political level. The State 
of Israel is, by its self-definition, not theirs. This makes them stateless in that they have 
formal membership but, as non-Jews, are not a part of the self-definition of nor are they 
included in the body politic of the Israeli State. The granting of citizenship, the actual 
inclusion within the Israeli citizenship regime, produces the inherent contradictions and 
paradoxes in any Arab membership in the Israeli political and social regime. It is through 
the bestowal of Israeli citizenship that Arabs are ‘made’ stateless; it is through inclusion 
within the Israeli citizenship regime that they are excluded. Here the modern paradigm of 
citizenship, traditionally a mechanism for inclusion, is reversed. The relation of exception 
in the classical liberal model of citizenship is placed on its head and inclusive 
                                                
9 Molavi, Stateless Citizenship, Chapter Six. 
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exclusionary mechanisms are inverted. Far from a strict exclusion absent of a citizenship 
that places the Palestinian citizen outside and forever peripheral to the Israeli regime, it is 
their very inclusion within what is essentially an exclusionary political condition that 
generates their exclusion from state membership – thereby rendering them stateless 
citizens.  
For this reason, and an important consideration that I have stressed, the only way 
in which non-Jewish citizen membership within a Zionist state (one that is built on the 
pre-existing rejection and exclusion of the Palestinian subject) is realized is through the 
logic of stateless citizenship. Worthy of emphasis, the exclusive-inclusion of non-Jewish 
subjects into its citizen regime is the only way whereby the racialized exclusions and 
settler-colonial frameworks of Israel examined in this study, can remain internally 
coherent and intact. Short of deconstructing itself, stateless citizenship is the only kind of 
relationship the Israeli incorporation regime can allow itself to have with its Palestinian-
Arab constituents.  
Building from my examinations of Israeli citizenship, the analytical focus of this 
project differs. My previous writing focused on the specific and multifaceted exclusions 
of Palestinian-Arab citizens in the Israeli incorporation regime, as a national non-
immigrant indigenous community. To examine the particular logic of exclusive-inclusion 
to which this indigenous citizen population is faced, I developed the aforementioned 
paradigm of stateless citizenship. In this study, I work from the model of stateless 
citizenship that is provided to Palestinian-Arabs as non-Jews, to examine the figure of the 
‘citizen’ in Israel more broadly. Specifically, my primary analytical concern pertains to 
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the particular legal and political placement of the figure of the citizen in relation to that of 
the ‘immigrant’ in the Israeli constitutional equation.  
My second core consideration is whether this inversion placing the ‘immigrant’ at 
the center of the Israeli body politic is reminiscent of a rising logic of exclusion practiced 
in Western citizenship structures. To this end, the current study employs stateless 
citizenship as a ‘looking glass’ or lens through which to detect and analyze the closure or 
thinning down of citizenship more broadly. By this I mean that the paradigm of stateless 
citizenship is used as a heuristic device: as an analytical model to aid our understanding 
of liberal citizenship today. What I wish to stress is that our excursus does not claim a 
cause and effect vis-à-vis the citizenship exclusions in Western liberal-democracies and 
those that make up the Israeli incorporation regime. Nor am I arguing that the closure of 
citizenship in Israel is merely a replica of global citizenship structures, placing Israel 
alongside a family of liberal democratic nations.10 Certainly, the forthcoming chapters 
outline a myriad of structural, legal, political and ideological practices and policies that 
together place Israel apart from Western liberal democratic societies; not least its 
racialized parameters for inclusion and its active settler-colonial constitutional order. 
Instead, Israel is used as an analytical paradigm to detect, extract the particular features of 
the relation exclusion that is taking place. As such, while Israeli stateless citizenship and 
the Western practices of citizenship revocation and restriction are practicing a shared 
interrogation of the figure of the citizen, these practices nevertheless remain a different 
type of interrogation.   
                                                
10  My previous writing has critiqued liberal-Zionist arguments that equate and seek to normalize Israeli 
practices of racialized exclusion with constitutional orders in Western democratic states. See my 
critique of Alexander Yakobson and Amnon Rubinstein’s Israel and the Family of Nations: The 
Jewish Nation-State and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 2009), in Stateless Citizenship, 
Chapter Four. 
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With this aim, and to reiterate, the model of stateless citizenship is the preliminary 
analysis upon which I will build two central analytical tracks in this study. Working from 
the relation of exclusive-inclusion and the use of citizenship structures and mechanisms 
to exclude by actually including the political subject, I first examine the function of the 
figure of the ‘citizen’ vis-à-vis that of the ‘immigrant’ within the Israeli incorporation 
regime. And building on this, the study goes on to consider how the interrogation of the 
citizen within Israel reveals core directions in which the exclusionary policies embedded 
in Western liberal citizenship regimes are headed. 
3. Israeli inclusion: Inverting the ‘citizen’ with the ‘immigrant’ 
The first and major contribution of this study is to work from the dynamics of non-Jewish 
citizenship in Israel, and examine what the parameters of stateless citizenship implies 
about the figure of the ‘citizen’ in the Israeli incorporation regime. With reference to 
extensive archival documentation gathered first-hand at the League of Nations Archives 
at the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland, and the Israel State Archives and 
the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem, I examine the placement of the ‘citizen’ and 
the ‘immigrant’ in the Israeli constitutional order. The study begins by mapping out the 
colonial foundations of the Jewish citizenship and nationality regime, and how this 
historical matrix laid a legal, political and normative blueprint both the configuration and 
constitution of the Jewish State. In particular, I consider how these foundations laid the 
basis for the differential citizenship regime that today continues to exist to in Israel. 
Indeed, the bulk of this study aims to reveal that, since its inception, the Israeli 
incorporation regime has been structured in a manner that broadens the category of the 
‘Jewish immigrant’, placing this figure on the top of the constitutional process. Close 
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analysis of the Law of Return (1950) shows how as a country primarily aimed at the 
ingathering of Jewish exiles, has taken steps to legally and politically place the immigrant 
placed at the center of the Israeli constitutional equation. What I argue, therefore, is that 
the ‘desired’ citizen in Israel has become the figure of the Jewish immigrant. This is the 
newcomer or ‘guest’ who having left their place of birth, residence and protection arrives 
to congregate in the Jewish State and thereby reproduces and maintains both its identity 
and existence as an automatic ‘host’. These findings account for the relation of exclusive-
inclusion that forms stateless citizenship. They indicate that the reason why Israel has 
been able to employ citizenship structures to exclude non-Jewish Arabs is because the 
matrix of inclusion in Israel is less geared toward the citizen, and more towards 
determining immigration in a manner that enables Jewish entry and settlement. 
Within this core analytical track, the paradigm of stateless citizenship points our 
analytical gaze in the direction of two additional related political and theoretical notions 
informing the current study. These two points are important not only because they are 
features particular to the Israeli citizenship regime, but also because they are reminiscent 
of broader transformations in citizenship occurring today within Western liberal 
democracies.  
The first point emerging out of the notion of stateless citizenship concerns the 
inherent exclusionary foundations of citizenship. In some ways, the exclusion of non-
Jewish Arabs from Israeli citizenship is not only a problem of the Zionist-Palestinian 
conflict, but can be sourced in the reality that citizenship is in itself a relation of 
exclusion. Rather than focusing on the Other that resides outside or on the margins of the 
citizenship regime, the stateless citizenship of Palestinians in Israel reveals the dynamic 
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of Otherizing that occurs within and through inclusion in the citizenship regime. This 
paradigm examines the exclusionary frameworks and dynamics generated through actual 
inclusion and membership in a citizenship regime; as opposed to exclusion from a 
citizenship regime. Understanding modern liberal citizenship as exclusion, and focusing 
on the exclusions that exist within it, will enable us to make sense of the ways in which 
the figure of the citizen has been relegated to a marginal figure of politics. Through the 
Israeli case study, I will point to a rising political trajectory where the citizen is being 
stretched and inverted with what I describe as the more ‘temporary’, ‘capricious’, and 
‘fluid’ figure of the ‘immigrant’. Here I mean that state practices of exclusive-inclusion 
are shaking and undoing the framework of inclusion and protection in liberal citizenship. 
And so, building from the concept of stateless citizenship, the first theoretical 
consideration to which the present study on citizenship points is whether citizenship is, or 
can be, genuinely inclusive, even of its own subjects. 
Developing from this question is a second concern regarding the relationship 
between the dynamics of exclusion in liberal theory and those in Zionism. Shown in the 
forthcoming chapters, the Judaization project that lies at the root of Zionism is, by 
definition, a project of colonial exclusion. It cannot genuinely coexist with the promise of 
classical liberal principles of equality, representation, common possession, democratic 
participation and inclusion. Of course, each of these liberal principles contain their own 
respective exclusionary frameworks. They are often fraught with problematic realizations 
in the form, among other divisive issues, of racially configured government policies, 
practices and nationalistic discourse around who ‘belongs’ to the common, who is the 
‘real’ citizen, and what it means to be equal within increasingly multicultural societies. 
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For this reason, the stateless citizenship of non-Jews in Israel is also a problem of liberal 
citizenship itself, its exclusionary dynamics and relations which, when enmeshed in 
numbing and vague liberal terminology, can have violent realizations. However, these 
violent effects of and exclusions within liberal discourse and practices are stimulated 
when employed within the Israeli incorporation regime. The racialized parameters of 
modern Zionism that underpin contemporary Israeli society and policies are an enhanced 
or accentuated version of the existing relations of exclusion in liberal citizenship and 
discourse. For this reason, the Israeli citizenship regime becomes a particularly suitable 
lens for us to examine the existing dynamics embedded in modern liberal citizenship as 
the inherent exclusions and racialist configurations of citizenship are exaggerated in the 
case of Israel. Therefore, when we begin our analysis from the condition of Arabs with 
Israeli citizenship, we realize that the problem extends from the existing relations of 
exclusion in classical liberal citizenship to the ways in which they are applied, reversed 
and enhanced by the racialized tenets of Zionism that underpin the Israeli incorporation 
regime.  
4. Israel as a looking glass for broader trends in citizenship 
The second major track of my study considers how the historical and contemporary 
practices and dynamics of the colonial logic of Israeli democracy and citizenship informs 
current examinations of European and North American drives toward national and 
cultural homogeneity.11 I look forward from the implications of stateless citizenship in 
                                                
11 Comparisons between the Jewish nationalist movement and Hindu nationalism can also be interesting 
 in this regard. As close regional partners, India and Israel both have a history of British colonial rule, 
 are strong American allies and regional military powers, and are understood broadly as ‘liberal 
 democracies’. The figure of the ‘Hindu secular’, namely a kind of secular nationalism that mobilizes a 
 traditionally religious identity is comparable with that of the Jewish secular, or Zionist nationalist, 
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Israel, and make broader observations on the closure of citizenship in Western states in 
the context of migration and a perceived rise in transnational terrorism. The global trends 
of citizenship restrictions examined here are limited to those in Europe and North 
America, broadly described and imagined as the geographic ‘West’ in this study, given 
their particular historical relationship with the Middle East and North Africa. Explained 
in detail in the proceeding chapters, in the case of Israel-Palestine, contemporary juridico-
political exclusions have been shaped and designed in the historical context of largely 
European colonial territorial, economic and ideological expansion and subjection. 
Reflecting on changes in France, Britain and Canada, with references to recent 
developments around citizenship restriction in Denmark, Australia, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, my study points to the ways in which the structures, logics and discourses of 
liberal citizenship are mobilized to exclude citizens from within. Continued inclusion in 
the arrangements of citizenship has become increasingly conditional to the multi-formed 
reaffirmation of state loyalty and national belonging. With this, the application of the 
exclusive-inclusive Israeli logic of stateless citizenship to core directions of 
transformations in Western citizenship begins to surface. This provides us with a useful 
analytical lens for contextualizing and illustrating the troubling forms contemporary 
restrictions in the structures, logics and discourse of citizenship can assume. In this way, 
                                                                                                                                            
 who despite not being a religious or practicing Jew, will mobilize a traditionally religious identity. 
 Interesting however are the large differences between the Hindu and Jewish nationalist movements, 
 primarily that of the notion of ‘the people’. Whereas in the Hindu case the ‘people’ is a more open 
 concept where Muslims, Christian and other minorities are invited by nationalists to convert and join 
 the ‘Hindu people,’ in the case of Israel, as we will learn in Chapters Three and Four below, ‘the 
 people’ is a closed category that goes beyond the borders of the state to include the Jewish people en 
 genera, even to the point of excluding Palestinian-Arab citizens of the state. For more on Hindu 
 nationalism, see Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in 
 Modern India (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1999), and Uday Chandra and Atreyee 
 Majumder, “Introduction. Selves and Society in Postcolonial India,” South Asia Multidisciplinary 
 Academic Journal, 7 (2013): 1-14. 
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the current study both builds on and moves beyond the work I have already conducted on 
Israeli citizenship. 
As we will see, contemporary processes of globalization and increased social 
interconnectedness and migration produce complex relationships between home societies 
(or homelands) and host societies. These developments problematize the classical notion 
of national citizenship and often result in a rise of recognized identities and practices 
upon which claims are made. With a weakened national hold on citizenship, citizen-
subjects will often go beyond state institutions for claims to rights, representation and 
protection. Complications in the traditional role, location, and practice of citizenship as 
connecting a citizen-subject to a nation-state, coupled with the rise of acceptable 
identities and practices as a basis for claim-making, has done its part to fuel calls from 
European countries (and to a great extent from Canada and the United States) for 
increased national homogeneity. To counter calls for a re-definition of state institutions 
and discourses surrounding citizenship, and to refrain from recognizing new claims for 
rights and representation, modern nation-states in the West are struggling to attain and 
maintain culturally homogenous identities. These efforts are often revealed in a range of 
racist and nationalist legal and political agendas. Needless to say, such campaigns for 
homogeneity are working against the trends of increasingly socially, economically, 
culturally, technologically and politically interconnected global communities.  
Reactionary and often xenophobic debates around cultural homogeneity along 
with its associated questions as to who is a ‘real’ or a ‘desired’ citizen can all be informed 
by events in Israel. The concept of stateless citizenship points the present study towards 
recognizing that what has unfolded in Israel over half a century on the periphery 
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provides a window on what may be developing in the core. Of course, practices of 
exclusion in the Israeli incorporation regime place it part from other Western liberal-
democracies. Some of these are revealed in discussions among Zionist law and policy-
makers outlined in this study around the configuration of the future Jewish State, policies 
and practices for the maintenance of a Jewish demographic majority, an exclusive 
‘Jewish’ state identity, and of institutions ensuring Jewish dominance after the 
establishment of Israel. Of course, some Western states may replicate some of these 
practices. But no other Western liberal-democracies currently replicate all of these Israeli 
structures of exclusion, and more. This illustrates major differences in the type of 
interrogation in Israel so that the master signifiers of state, nation these are in the direct 
service of an exclusive chosen people. That said, examination of these Israeli practices 
nevertheless enables us to understand and infer the implications of trends in, and 
experiments with stateless citizenship occurring more broadly in liberal democratic 
countries in the West. Through their use of citizenship discourse and structures these 
developments at the ‘core’ are reminiscent of the inflamed racialist frameworks of the 
settler-colonial project developing today in Israel. And therein lies the trouble. With this 
Israel surfaces as a useful – though, as I explain below, troubling – context for 
understanding what may be considered the internationalization of citizenship restrictions 
in Europe and North America. 
5. ‘Core’, ‘center’ and ‘periphery’ 
While traditionally used to explain the flow of migration, development and economic 
activity, models and discourses of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ are useful for mapping out the 
trajectory of political thought related to minority status within a liberal citizenship 
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regime. This model becomes particularly relevant in cases where the trajectory is mapped 
out between two areas, here Western countries and Israel, that also have separate but 
intimately related histories of (settler-)colonialism. The core-periphery model in the 
context of colonial relationships would traditionally outline a one-way process and flow 
of resources. Often with the partnership of the local elite, economic and natural resources 
were extracted from the periphery to support the industrialization and development of the 
core. While dating form colonial times, this uneven relationship is understood to continue 
into contemporary times where both underdevelopment of the periphery and the surplus 
value extracted from its cheaper resources and raw materials are needed by the Western 
world.  
The terms ‘core’ or ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ often appear in discourse about the 
urban fabric, where their application is usually constrained to their geographical position. 
Every centre is defined towards its periphery, and commencing from this exact point, one 
could say that the centre is defined by a periphery that includes or delimits it. Yet, much 
post-colonial literature has explained that the common political, sociological and cultural 
application of these binaries often implies a monolithic (mainly European) nation in the 
centre that is opposed to outside developments, cultures and peoples.12 According to this 
neat distinction, the core and periphery are involved in an unequal relationship in which 
the first term is privileged so that the colonizing centre is home to knowledge, order and 
                                                
12 See, for example, Chapters 3 and 10 on nation building and formation and post-colonialism in The 
 Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies, ed. Neil Lazarus (Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2004); Dominic Richard David Thomas, Nation-building, Propaganda, and 
 Literature in Francophone Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Linda Basch, Nina 
 Glick Schiller, Christina Szanton Blanc, eds., Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial 
 Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States (New York: Routledge, 1994); Shalini Puri, The 
 Caribbean Postcolonial: Social Equality, Post/Nationalism, and Cultural Hybridity (New York: 
 Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and, relatedly, Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The 
 World System A.D. 1250-1350 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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modernity, while the colonized periphery harbours instability, chaos and backwardness 
while constantly facing the centre.  
 Of course, the divide between the core and the periphery is not only geographic, 
and post-colonial historians have outlined colonial contexts where the colonial settler 
culturally and politically belongs to the centre, while physically living in the colonial 
periphery. And similarly, where the colonized subject who travels to the colonizing 
centre for education or employment will remain on the periphery in terms of power and 
political status regardless of the extent to which she/he may acquire or internalize the 
metropolitan culture.13 Further, numerous scholarly challenges have pointed out the 
contradictions in the binary logic of the core-periphery model, explaining that whatever 
the objective space may be, mapping the core and periphery is an immensely subjective 
and power-determined process. Much post-colonial literature has underscored the ways in 
which the centre is (and always has been) home to the supposed periphery as well, and 
how the boundaries of the two parts of this dichotomy are not at all evident.14 Critical 
scholarship has also highlighted the significant role of the cultural identity of periphery 
inhabitants and their occasional strong influence on and interaction with the centre's 
cultural development.15 Moreover, though positing that the core and periphery remain in 
a close relationship given their spatial context, concepts of centralized periphery and 
marginalized core have also been introduced. These notions detach and dislocate the two 
concepts from their rigid territorialized placement while emphasizing their fluid 
                                                
13 For instance, Benedict Anderson (1991) discusses this movement of colonized individuals from 
 the colonized margins to the colonizing centre and back again, and explains that this move is one to 
 another section of the periphery. 
14 See, for example, Bhabha (1990, 1994), Fanon (1961), Naipaul (2000), Eagleton et al (1990), Spivak 
 (1987). 
15 Edward Said (1978, 1993) has explained the binary of centre-periphery as a system that has organized 
 the colonial and post-colonial world, and that this division was also constructed by those without 
 colonial possessions or, in some cases, even pretensions. 
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theoretical parameters. Here, the concepts of a centralized periphery and a marginalized 
core indicates a (re)focus from the centre to the periphery so that, in the end, far from 
indicating a mere location, both notions instead point to a site of political discourse where 
sovereign power is practiced and displayed.  
 While pointing to the historical and etymological roots of citizenship, the city-
state and liberal democratic social orders, my discussion will aim to refrain from 
(re)producing such orientalist and occidentalist images and characterizations. As we will 
see, and without reinforcing the invented civilizational tradition pointed to by Isin in 
Chapter One, references to these ancient societies can be useful for understanding the 
historical, social and political changes in the territorialization of citizenship. Citizenship 
is, for the most part, a modern notion. Major social and revolutionary movements in the 
West such as the American War of Independence and the French Revolution have shaped 
its inclusive and exclusive dynamics.16 Theorizing the transition from ‘ancient 
citizenship’ to ‘modern citizenship’, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social contract posits an 
“abstract, universal conception of the citizen as the author of sovereignty,” pointing to a 
political shift, though not a complete break, from the past.17 This ‘break’ was put into 
practice with the French Revolution as a key intervention to form a unique substantive 
and legal definition of national citizenship as a transition from subjecthood. A 
contribution of the Revolution was the construction and abolishment of various borders. 
As a national movement, it formed the ‘nation-state’ through the removal of boundaries 
and corporate divisions inside the ‘nation’, and prompted nationalist thinking and 
                                                
16 Bryan S. Turner, “Religion and Politics: The Elementary Forms of Citizenship,” in Handbook of 
 Citizenship Studies, eds. Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 271. 
17 Peter Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After (London: Cornell 
 University Press, 2004), 3. 
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organizing by inventing borders among other nations and nation-states. In the words of 
Lucien Febvre, borders were generalized: 
The revolution makes a group of subject, vassals, and members of restricted 
communities into body of citizen of one and the same state. It abolishes internal 
barriers between them and welds them into one powerful group, which forms a 
coherent mass within clearly defined borders. Previously, people had walked 
straight across the boundary; aristocrats, men of letters, and merchants crossed it 
quite naturally. The frontière existed only for soldiers and princes, and only then 
in time of war. On the morrow of the Revolution not only did the demarcation 
line between France and the neighboring countries appear quite clearly, for better 
or for worse, but the line of the national boundaries became a sort of ditch 
between nationalities that were quite distinct from one another, and it was backed 
up by a second moral frontier.18 
 
This ‘moral frontier’ was upheld through the narrative of the birth of the citizen and the 
evolution of the modern social and political order in Western Europe. The transition is 
posited by theorists and sociologists as a “movement from status to contract… from 
hierarchy to equality, and from ascription to achievement.”19 Yet, as Peter Sahlins’s study 
on the naturalization of ‘foreigners’ in France reveals, the shift from the ‘absolute citizen’ 
in the Old Regime to this post-revolutionary figure of the citizen was not as marked. In 
Unnaturally French, Sahlins documents the pre-modern and pre-revolutionary legal 
citizenship that surfaced in the middle of the eighteenth century through the rise of 
practices following efforts by Louis XIV's in 1697 to impose ‘universal’ taxes, including 
the taxing of all foreigners.20 These practices formed the basis upon which the modern 
figure of the abstract and universal citizen subject was later formed in France by 
amending the personal and political relations between foreigners and citizens. Working 
from the contention that the vocabulary of nationhood and the citizen existed in social 
                                                
18 Quoted in Obrad Savić, “Figures of the Stranger: Citizen as a Foreigner,” Parallax Volume 11, Issue 
 1 (2005): 72. 
19 Sahlins, Unnaturally French, 4. 
20 Ibid., 14. 
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and political discourse prior to 1789, Sahlins maps the transition of the foreign citizen 
into the political citizen in the New Regime. In doing so, he is able to show that in 
addition to legal breaks and political ruptures, the process of ‘citizenship revolution’ in 
France that formed the ideological origins of modern citizenship also contained 
continuities from the old social and political order. 
Critical theoretical shifts from citizenship as membership or status to citizenship 
as political subjectivity have also revealed various practices through which marginalized 
social groups express cultural and political claims to address injustices. Isin explains: 
Over the last two decades, critical theories of citizenship have effectively 
disentangled nationality and citizenship by historically and geographically 
situating their contested and contestable institutions. In this way, it has also been 
effectively shown that the nationality–citizenship–state apparatus is undergirded 
by an orientalist assumption that citizenship is a European invention.21 
 
Here transnational anti-colonial movements have precipitated the project of re-
configuring and re-imagining citizenship as political subjectivity, and thereby making it 
difficult to maintain the orientalist assumption. Part of this project has been to change the 
language or vocabulary of citizenship to “investigate citizenship as political subjectivity 
after orientalism.”22 That said, as the key theoretical move is the emphasis on ‘after,’ it is 
important to recognize that, in the context of the Jewish State, the settler-colonial project 
is ongoing and contemporary. As such, there is a certain tension in the process of 
uprooting citizenship from its imagined occidental tradition and the placement of 
citizenship in a normative and spiritual context of post-colonialism. 
                                                
21 Engin F. Isin, “Citizenship After Orientalism: An Unfinished Project,” in Citizenship After 
 Orientalism: An Unfinished Project, ed Engin F. Isin (London: Routledge, 2014), 5. 
22 Ibid. 
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 As I reveal in Chapter Two, Israel has historically, politically, culturally and 
normatively been perceived and supported as an outpost or frontier of European 
civilization and its (settler-)colonial project. Its peripheral juridico-political institutions 
and discourse are today continuously (re)modelled after the 'European centre'; structured 
on the basis of examples drawn from the core and sometimes even simply copied from 
the Western context. While framed according to a different logic of social hierarchies and 
values, this modelling or copying of so-called core institutions and discourse in Israel has 
resulted in dysfunctional or unexpected modifications in their mode of operation when 
adjusted to Israel's peripheral context. At the same time, modifications and adjustments in 
the application of structures, norms and discourse of citizenship in the periphery can also 
reflect and reveal similar trends and broader developments around citizenship emerging 
in core European societies. With this (re)turn to the core, a certain dislocation and 
relocation of the functions of the centre and the periphery begins to surface. Indeed, 
Israel is a contemporary extension of the European (settler-)colonial project, but within 
the projected European centre and the Israeli periphery there are multiple and 
intertwining locations of cores and peripheries.  
 In this study, research concerning the emergence of Israel as a modern nation-
state and the development of its juridico-political system vis-à-vis transformations in the 
citizenship regimes of other Western countries will be theoretically informed by a critical 
reading of the core-periphery paradigm. The theoretical model discussed in this study 
makes reference to an abstract perception of the centre and periphery to correspond not 
only to a spatial organization (from the global level of intercontinental relations between 
Israel and the West, mainly Europe, to the local level of the internal structure of the 
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Israeli regime as a territorial unit) but also to the historical interaction and existing mutual 
exchange at the normative and political level among their respective civic and legal 
cultures. Put differently, this project critically applies the core-periphery model to its 
analysis of transformations in the Western and Israeli citizenship regimes with an account 
of the political, cultural, social and normative dimensions of their relations. In doing so, 
by examining the ways cultural and political practice and diffusions flow out of the non-
European sector, it will also attempt to dislodge and dislocate the otherwise fixed and 
distinct spheres and locations of the core and periphery put forward by the model. 
6. Mapping interactions on citizenship 
Placing analysis of the configurations of citizenship in Israel alongside those in the core 
will enable us to identify whether and how their socio-material and intellectual conditions 
of inception, logics, structures, social manifestations and effects are, practically speaking, 
interactive. “Nation states are,” as David Theo Goldberg reminds, “particular products of 
modernity” as they are increasingly constituted and arranged through racial 
configuration.23 Classical racisms and exclusions were shaped and designed in the 
historical context of European territorial, economic and ideological expansion and 
subjection. Founded on a self-proclaimed European superiority and fueled by the desire 
for natural resources, wealth and an enslaved labor supply, this racism developed into a 
global program with policies and practices of degradation, repression and death for the 
enslaved.24 Goldberg explains: 
                                                
23 David Theo Goldberg, The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism (Oxford: Blackwell 
 Publishing, 2009), 70. 
24 Ibid., 69. 
	 24	
The prevailing geographies of early modern racisms then – until at least the later 
eighteenth century – are projected as Europe's externality, the colonial outside, 
provincial extensions vested largely in the rural slaveries of plantation life. Here, 
the viciousness of the violent structures necessary to uphold the system were 
hidden just beneath the tranquil facade of settlement: wars, seizures, chains and 
whippings, death ships and disease, human auctions and forced intercourse. …. In 
these classic expressions of racism, race was seen always as a disruption, as the 
invader, as outsider otherness asserting itself over or inserting itself into local – 
which was to say, European – homogeneity. Race, as such, was to be kept, if 
ambivalently, enticingly, at bay.25 
 
Yet with late nineteenth century abolition, industrialization and increased migration, a 
modernized racism revealed itself through the processes of urbanization, institutionalized 
control over urban space, order, limitations on entry, access and movement and 
constraints on identity, and moral acceptability. Both globally and domestically, race 
continues to delimit “where one can go, what one can do, how one is seen and treated, 
one's social, economic, political, legal, and cultural, in short, one's daily experience and 
prospects.”26 Goldberg continues: 
As there is greater heterogeneity and multiplicity, so segregation is refined; as 
visible openness and accessibility are enlarged, exclusionary totalization is 
extended; as interaction is increased, access is monitored, traversal policed, 
intercourse surveilled. As boundaries and borders become more permeable, they 
are re-fixed in the social imaginary, shifting from the visible to the virtual, from 
the formalized to the experiential, from the legal to the cultural at a time when the 
cultural, economically and socially, has become dominant.27 
 
And so, reacting to demographic diversity and cultural hybridity, refined and reinvented 
calls for racial segregation and control of racial interactions and relations intensified and 
became increasingly entrenched in cities, which developed into “the principal sites of 
formalized segregating institutionalization.”28 With this, Goldberg asserts that “regionally 
                                                
25 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
26 Ibid., 97. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, 70. 
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prompted, parametered and promoted racisms linked to their dominant state formations” 
developed.29 Positing a set of regional models or mappings, Goldberg outlines the ways 
in which racist relations of exclusion circulate, interact, overlap and transform in regions 
relative to their particular social manifestations, historical logics and intellectual 
conditions. He maps out five dominant trends of racial expression broadly referred to as 
“regionalizations;” some of which are regions (such as Europe and Latin America), while 
others are nation-states (such as the United States and South Africa).30 Within this set-up, 
Israel-Palestine is placed, or rather, “caught between” the two territorial arrangements – 
the European and Middle Eastern (specifically Palestinian) – in various ways.31 Outlined 
in Chapter Two, Israel’s establishment within the historical context of European (settler-
)colonial projects means that discourses on its exclusionary citizenship and nationality 
regime were also functioning as sites of production of European colonial power. And so, 
using racialization as a kind of analytic category, Goldberg is able to move beyond the 
territorial confines of states to examine dominant regional techniques and arrangements 
of exclusion through race. 
The notion of race, racialized representation, and racism is integral to any 
discussion of modern Zionism and cannot be satisfied with considerations of the function 
of ethnicity and religion in Israel alone. As I explain in Chapter Two, it is this quality that 
sets the Israeli incorporation regime apart from the Ottoman and other pre-Mandate 
juridico-political regimes. Far from an accidental or passing feature of Israeli society and 
politics, racism and racial discrimination are inherent in the ideological construct of 
modern Zionism and its basic motivation for Jewish settlement, colonization, and 
                                                
29 Ibid., 66. 
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statehood. Believing in the national oneness of all Jewish people regardless of any 
political, social, legal, religious, or linguistic ties, Zionist literature and discourse make 
repeated reference to “common ancestry” and the “national fulfillment” of Jewish people 
everywhere. 32 Since taking shape as a national movement, “a dominant order of Zionism 
articulated ‘the Jewish race’ as creating coherence, artificing initially discursive 
homogeneity of and for ‘the Jewish people’ in the face of a scattered and diffuse 
‘nation’.” 33  Within such a framework, the master signifiers of the state, nation, and a 
chosen people that give shape to the Zionist incorporation regime render the continued 
existence of an indigenous non-Jewish population, citizen or otherwise, in the coveted 
territory essentially contradictory. 
Though a largely different political project, the parameters and analytical lens of 
Goldberg's oeuvre is particularly useful for my research study. Far from the arrangement 
of ideal types, generalizations of legal and political practices of exclusion are made to 
reveal the broader contours of racist citizenship structures and landscapes. When 
examining these regional articulations, separate yet connected historical logics of 
exclusion begin to surface. Part of the purpose of this study is to similarly map out these 
manifestations with respect to citizenship in Israel and Western liberal democracies by 
inverting the traditional colonial direction from the ‘periphery’ to the ‘core'.  
With Goldberg’s intellectual approach and the Israeli logic of exclusion as a 
looking glass, we see that the current troubling reality of a displaced ‘citizen’ in the 
Jewish State reveals the logic of exclusion growing in the West and the 
internationalization of citizenship reduction and revocation. As historically and 
                                                
32  See, for example, David Ben Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (New York: Philosophical 
 Library, 1954), 489. 
33  Goldberg, The Threat of Race, 115. 
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ideologically related geopolitical regions with rooted, convoluted and tortured 
connections the prevailing modalities of the liberal variant of citizenship in these two 
regions need to be disentangled and identified. The global-political circulation and 
historical interactions of discourse on the content, structures and boundaries of 
citizenship are delineated in the case of Israel, Europe and North America. This shows 
their respective and dominant characteristics and style, while also attending to their 
shared coordinates of origination. I argue that unlocking the placement of the figure of 
the citizen in the Israeli constitutional order helps us understand the implications of a 
rising contemporary political trajectory where the citizen is being stretched and inverted 
with the more temporary and fluid figure of the ‘immigrant’. The interrogated figure of 
the citizen is increasingly assuming features traditionally associated with the immigrant.  
As the final chapter concludes, today there is a transition in the practice of 
exclusion in citizenship. We are in a historical-political context where Western liberal 
democracies are redefining their citizenship frameworks by producing varied layers of 
exclusive inclusion. From this, I contend that there is a rising logic of exclusive inclusion 
for the most included figure of the body politic, namely the citizen. Transitions that, as 
pointed to in the final chapter, work together with existing legal and political practices of 
exclusion of marginalized immigrant and minority citizen communities. As such, we are 
witnessing states playing and experimenting with logics, paths and models of exclusion, 
all of which says something about what is unfolding in citizenship. Taken together, we 
see that the existing incorporation regime in Israel is a key and troubling context for 
understanding the possibilities of a global upturn in citizenship restriction and revocation. 
A problematic condition is developing where liberal citizenship in the West is starting to 
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replicate exclusive-inclusions in the paradigm of stateless citizenship.  
7. Outline of chapters 
The forthcoming chapters will build on existing scholarship arguing that citizenship in 
Palestine was a key tool for the reproduction of state territory and membership. Its pre-
state construction under the British Mandate as separate and unequal for Arabs and Jews 
was designed against the backdrop of rising international networks of recognition and 
control. The exclusions embedded within the historical matrix of Palestinian citizenship 
laid a blueprint for the differential citizenship regime that today exists in Israel. As I point 
to in this project, the citizenship and nationality regime in Israel since 1948 continues its 
interactions with global networks of restriction and control. The significance of the Israeli 
case, however, is that unlike liberal democratic states in the West, its major features of 
nation-statehood, including final territorial borders, notion of ‘peoplehood’, and 
sovereign rule largely remain incomplete and illegitimate. It is reflected in the kind of 
citizenship regime it maintains. What this implies is twofold. First, that despite 
declarations and perceptions of finalized parameters of territory and membership, all 
states require constant and active performance and reproduction of citizenship and 
national identity. And second, that because of its unresolved parameters, this process of 
constant redefinition and reconfiguration of Israeli statehood in done in a more explicit 
manner than other states. What this study explores is how the restrictions, redefinitions 
and dilution of citizenship in Israel today is reminiscent of what is happening to 
citizenship at the ‘core’. Since its establishment, the regulation and constitution of 
exclusionary citizenship and nationality in Israel have actively interacted with global 
networks and processes of restriction and control. For this reason, the discourses, 
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practices and legislation of civil and national identity in Israel since statehood can be 
used as a looking glass for understanding the growing internationalization of citizenship 
restrictions. 
Using the paradigm of stateless citizenship as a compass for this delineation, my 
current study maps out the trajectory of citizenship in modern Israel from the inter-war 
period until the present. As mentioned, as an institution and a practice, citizenship itself is 
an object of local restriction and closure. Starting from the position that liberal citizenship 
is part of the history of modern exclusion, I will look at how the discourse, content, 
structures and boundaries of liberal citizenship are changing in the contemporary context. 
Liberal debates and processes in Western societies associated with the design and 
provision of citizenship and nationality will be revealed as important sites of control and 
power. I point to the un-rooting of citizenship to reveal the ways the relation of exclusion 
is being internalized; shifting the gaze of exclusion onto the figure of the citizen. With 
this, a political trajectory surfaces where the figure of the ‘citizen’ is being vested with 
features of the less stable and capricious ‘immigrant’ in the body politic. These 
transformations are analyzed in detail in the prospective chapters in the case of Israel. As 
we will see, unlocking the ways in which the figure of the citizen is interrogated in Israel 
helps us comprehend the implications of broader changes in citizenship restrictions and 
revocation occurring today in Europe and North America in the context of migration and 
a perceived rise in transnational terrorism. Put differently, my present study departs from 
my previous writing on this topic by outlining the historical, ideological and political 
context and processes that have delineated a diluted and non-entrenched citizenship in 
Israel, and from there to posit this reality to the increasingly interrogated figure of the 
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citizen in the West.  
To this end, Chapter One begins by surveying some of the relevant existing 
literature and theories on the transformations in the institution of citizenship, focusing on 
its liberal variant. Developments in the discourse on the content, structures and 
boundaries of modern liberal citizenship are outlined to reveal how this institution is 
increasingly becoming politically informal, un-rooted, de-territorialized and 
undetermined.  
The first major analytical track of this study begins in Chapter Two and is 
examined further in Chapter Three. These sections stage our excursus into how 
citizenship in Israel came to embody its existing exclusionary dynamics, mechanisms, 
processes and features. Using both literary and historical texts, the former chapter locates 
discourses on citizenship and nationality in Mandate Palestine as sites of production of 
European colonial power. It demonstrates the colonial perceptions, experiences and 
discourses of Zionist thinkers and the framework of European hegemonic power within 
which the Jewish national movement burgeoned, and around which Arab and Jewish 
civil, political and social rights were initially framed. From here, Chapter Three outlines 
recent scholarship and cites in detail the archival documents that I have collected. These 
documents house the discussions among legal scholars and political figures in the Zionist 
leadership, the British government and the League of Nations until and immediately after 
statehood on the features of the liberal citizenship and nationality regime anticipated for 
the Jewish State.  
The above analyses begin to culminate as a core analytical contribution in 
Chapter Four, which provides an account of how the mechanisms through which the 
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colonial logic of pre-1948 Zionism resurfaces in contemporary Israeli citizenship 
structures, at the legislative, declarative, structural, and operational levels. Focusing on 
the unique and important function of the notion of return, archival records are referenced 
extensively and placed in discussion with one another to outline how the Law of Return 
(1950) acts as a legal precursor that actually shapes the Jewish State. In doing so, the 
chapter connects the configuration of the Jewish State with its eventual constitution. It 
explains that the Israeli constitutional order is structured in a manner that broadens the 
category of the ‘Jewish immigrant’, placing this figure on the top of the constitutional 
process. Here the desired, preferred, and most qualified political subject is first and 
foremost the ‘Jewish immigrant’. Importantly, the constitutional equation (whose 
elements the previous chapters outline) enables the dilution and interrogation of 
citizenship in Israel, therefore rendering the ‘desired’ citizen to the figure of the Jewish 
immigrant. In Chapter Four we are able to understand how the matrix of inclusion into 
citizenship in Israel is less geared toward the citizen, and more towards determining 
immigration in a manner that enables Jewish entry and settlement. The notion of ‘return’ 
thereby serves the function of reversing the standard practice in Western liberal 
democratic societies by rendering the ‘Jewish immigrant’ as the preeminent figure of 
Israeli politics. Taken together, the mechanisms through which Zionism forms a 
redefinition between the citizen and the immigrant becomes fully intelligible in this 
chapter when situated in the legal context of the inauguration of the Law of Return.  
 Having mapped the historical and political developments, ideological debates and 
constitutional processes and policies that shaped the contemporary Israeli citizenship 
regime, Chapter Five provides the second major analytical contribution of this study. It 
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examines how the parameters of the Israeli incorporation regime explicates the global 
logic of exclusion and the internationalization of citizenship revocation. The problematic 
parameters that maintain the inverted placement of the citizen of Israel vis-à-vis the 
figure of the immigrant in the constitutional order are considered in relation to 
comparable recent practices in Western states so as to reveal their meaning and troubling 
juridico-political implications. I argue that the interrogation of the figure of the citizen in 
Israel is part – though not a replica – of a rising political trajectory where the citizen is 
being inverted with the more temporary and capricious figure of the immigrant.  
Building on the first four sections that helped us understand the context and 
processes enabling Israeli citizenship to embody its existing exclusionary dynamics, I 
then place these events within global examples of citizenship restriction and revocation. 
Recent trends and discussions on citizenship in France, Britain and Canada are briefly 
outlined and juxtaposed as part of the above global trajectory of closure. This is a 
trajectory of closure that has two related features. First, it works in conjunction with 
existing political and legal practices of exclusion against immigrant and racialized 
minority citizen communities, and second, it actively uses discourse and structures of 
citizenship itself to exclude citizens from within. For this reason, I term this purported 
trend a desacralization of citizenship in that it encompasses two developments. It uproots 
citizenship from its classical protections, placing it in closer proximity to the more 
temporary figure of the immigrant or resident. And given this closer proximity, the 
structures and functions of citizenship have themselves become so involved in exclusion 
of the legal subject from the inside that formal suspension and revocation is not even 
necessary. Together, these global developments render the institution and status of 
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citizenship less solidified and untouchable, or desacralized. 
 
Overall, the objective of the current project is to both build on and move beyond my 
previous work on Israeli citizenship. With stateless citizenship as the analytical blueprint, 
I end this study by considering how the Israeli logic of exclusion and the placement of the 
temporary and unstable figure of the ‘immigrant’ at the center of politics surfaces as a 
microcosm of rising civic exclusions in ‘core’ liberal democratic states. Using the Israeli 
logic of exclusion as a looking glass to aid our understanding of closures in liberal 
citizenship today, my study points to the forms through which the figure of the citizen is 
being interrogated. I argue that we are in the midst of a transition in Western citizenship, 
towards a more closely examined and restricted model of liberal citizenship placing it in 
closer proximity with Israel. The problem and concern with this closer proximity 
becomes clearer from our discussions in Chapters Two, Three and Four when we 
consider the racialized frameworks of exclusion and ongoing violent settler-colonial 
practices that founded, and which today make up the Israeli incorporation regime. 
We are in a historical-political context where the proliferation of efforts we have 
been witnessing by Western liberal-democracies against ‘undesirable’ outsiders and 
minority communities have been broadened to include the figure of the citizen en genera. 
These experimentations with logics, paths and models of exclusion are all indicators of 
changes to a previously permanent, stable and distinct host-figure of citizenship. And 
these changes – what I describe as the ‘thinning, ‘dilution’ and ‘closure’ of citizenship – 
are reminiscent of the purported guest-status of the Israeli citizen in the face of the 
dominant figure of the ‘Jewish immigrant’. In the end, I analyze a troubling trajectory 
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where the changing practices of modern citizenship in ‘core’ liberal democratic states are 
slowly creating a condition where liberal citizenship in the West is starting to resemble 
exclusions in the paradigm of stateless citizenship. 
	 35	
Chapter One | Citizenship Models and Ambiguities 
“The nature of citizenship, like that of the state, is a question which is often disputed: there is no 
general agreement on a single definition.” 
Aristotle, in Politics [384-322 BC] (2004) 
 
“Beyond the conflict between citizenship and allegiance to an actual or transcendentally 
legitimate state, history still shows that this concept has no definition that is fixed for all time. It 
has always been at stake in struggles and the object of transformations.” 
        Étienne Balibar, in “Propositions on Citizenship” (1988) 
1. Introduction 
There has been an explosion of interest in the concept of citizenship among political 
theorists. With this renewed interest in citizenship has been a rise in calls for a ‘theory of 
citizenship’ that addresses both the legal-constitutional question of what it is to be a 
citizen as well as consideration of what constitutes the ‘good citizen’. In this chapter I 
survey some of the relevant existing literature and theory on the development of and 
transformations in the institution of citizenship, focusing on its liberal variant.34 The 
development of discourse on the content, structures and boundaries of citizenship in its 
liberal variant is mapped out. To set the stage for my analysis, I examine the concept of 
citizenship with a focus on the kinds of relations that can be formed among political 
subjects with minority status within a liberal citizenship regime. In doing so, I extract the 
interrelated tensions and themes of citizenship, including, among others, individual and 
group identities, legal categorization, inclusion-exclusion, and deterritorialization.  
                                                
34 The literature and discussions the field of citizenship studies that are examined in this chapter heavily 
 incorporate literature and arguments I have made previously in Chapter One of Stateless Citizenship 
 (2013). 
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The dynamics of the liberal model of citizenship discussed in this chapter will 
inform our forthcoming two-part excursus: first into its application and appropriation in 
the Jewish State over the past half a century, and thereafter into what these findings 
reveal about broader transformations in Western citizenship restriction and revocation. 
With this chapter I set the stage for the discussions on the parameters of exclusion in 
Israeli citizenship in the prospective sections. The contemporary changes to the concept 
and practice of citizenship explained below are shown to resurface in various 
problematized forms when applied to the Israeli citizenship regime. From here, using 
citizenship in the Jewish State as a microcosm of broader developments around inclusion 
and exclusion, my study shows that questions as to who is a real or a desired citizen on 
the part of ostensibly liberal democratic nation-states have shifted the gaze of exclusion 
internally, onto the figure of the citizen. I show that liberal debates and processes in 
Western societies associated with the design and provision of citizenship and nationality 
are increasingly important sites of control and power. With this shift, the citizen is being 
stretched and inverted with the more fluid figure of the ‘immigrant’. Illuminated in this 
study, the interrogation of the figure of the citizen in Israel serves as a looking glass for 
understanding the implications for broader transformations in liberal citizenship 
restrictions. 
2. (Up)rooting citizenship 
Though it is not an institutionalized field, ‘citizenship studies’ has developed into an 
important area of study in the humanities and social sciences.35 Emerging in the 1990s, 
academics and activists in this field sought to study transformations in Western politics in 
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the form of new and rising claims to liberal citizenship recognition and the distribution of 
rights. New acts and processes of citizenship made available to a broader range of 
political actors and practitioners through the forces of globalization and post-modernist 
forms of organization have expanded the way in which citizenship is manifested and 
discussed. Regional integration efforts, such as the European Union and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council to name a few, and the role of national governments and 
supranational institutions have also encouraged a reconsideration of citizenship. With 
regional integration and notions of ‘supranational rights’ member states in these unions 
are pushed to (re)shape their understanding of sovereignty and broaden access to civil 
privileges of freedom of movement, employment and residence that were previously 
reserved for their own citizens.36 The realization of these new conditions, in the form of 
“the reconfiguration of classes, the emergence of new international government regimes, 
new rationalities of government, new regimes of accumulation of different forms of 
capital, as well as new social movements” has complicated traditional readings of the 
practice and subject of citizenship by scholars in the field.37 And so, the parameters of 
what being a citizen involves, where citizenship is located, and the rights and protections 
that are meant to accompany citizenship recognition are being redrawn and reconfigured. 
The rise of interest in citizenship as a separate field of study can be sourced in 
various trends developing within our contemporary socio-political and historical context. 
These trends include, among others, the rise of global migration and statelessness, a 
phenomenon with a long history that has acquired particular scholarly and frantic 
                                                
36 See Willem Maas, “Trade, Regional Integration, and Free Movement of People,” A New Atlantic 
 Community: The European Union, the US and Latin America, ed. Joaquín Roy (Miami: European 
 Union Center of Excellence, University of Miami, 2015), 111-21. 
37  Isin and Turner Handbook of Citizenship Studies, 1. 
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political attention as of late, the dilution of collective identity and solidarity with nation-
states in the face of increasingly heterogeneous civic societies, and a strong liberal 
sensitivity in Western societies to the exclusion of particular collectives, particularly 
minorities, from the body politic. Awareness of the changing nature of nation-states as 
the exclusive site for the practice of citizenship, along with transformations in the 
organization and practice of collective identities and claims has fueled scholars in this 
field to examine the changing boundaries and interpretations of citizenship in the 
contemporary period. 
In a powerful review of the study of citizenship, Engin F. Isin outlines how it is that 
citizenship is usually approached by scholars in the field. He points out that 
… routinized academic practices, where the origins of ‘city’, ‘democracy’ and 
‘citizenship’ are etymologically traced to the ‘Greek’, ‘Roman’ and ‘medieval’ 
cities, and affinities between ‘their’ and ‘our’ practices [in contemporary Western 
liberal societies] are established, not only orient toward but also reproduce such 
images. After being ‘reminded’ that polis, politics and polity; civitas, citizenship 
and civility; and demos and democracy have ‘common roots’, we are provided 
with images of virtuous Greek citizens debating in the agora or the pnyx, austere 
Roman citizens deliberating in the republican senate, and ‘European’ citizens 
receiving their charters in front of the guildhall.38 
 
Indeed, during the Greco-Roman period, citizenship was projected as a focal point of 
democratic governance and the primary means for individuals to serve the polis, or the 
city-state. Inspired by the idea of civic virtue and seeking to counter the militaristic 
culture of the Spartan system, Plato advanced a governing model to alleviate citizens of 
economic exchange and labor and proposed the idea of a representative council or body 
of experts selected by the citizen classes. While Plato was concerned with the design of 
the ideal city-state, Aristotle adopted a more practical objective of understanding the 
                                                
38  Isin, “Religion and Politics,” 305.  
	 39	
actual, practical and everyday principles forming citizenship. He agreed that the ideal 
democratic society would combine popular rule with the governing and advice of 
experienced and wise elites. Here the privilege of citizenship becomes a natural condition 
for most human beings that does not include economic labor (this was delegated to slave 
workers) thus allowing men to commit themselves to the pursuit of citizenship and an 
engaged life in the city-state. However, struggling with the notions of civic virtue, 
political justice and governance, Aristotle also sought to outline the arrangements 
required to allow political subjects to co-exist in times of leisure, peace and war. To this 
end, he conceived of citizenship as a fundamentally ‘human’ state of mind. Explained 
below, for Aristotle, the distribution and design of rights and duties constitute the specific 
social and economic relations at the level of the individual within a political regime and 
thereby determine the ‘types of humans’ that are formed. As such, a generalizable 
definition of citizenship is for him not possible given that each citizenship regime is 
shaped by the particular political system within which it exists and its unique distribution 
of powers.  
Also concerned with the principle of civic virtue (virtus), Roman thinkers were 
similarly keen on developing a legal definition and basis of citizenship. Considering the 
declining civic participation of upper classes, the Stoics and Cicero delineated civic 
responsibilities and asserted that emphasis on the private life is a violation of the social 
life and democratic duties thereby fixing the citizen subject strictly in the public sphere. 
This public sphere had both local and global dimensions. Citizens are at first obligated to 
the commonwealth of their polity but the Stoics further conceived of the citizen as also 
responsible for civic duties connected to a greater global commonwealth, thereby 
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developing the idea of cosmopolitan or universal citizenship. Taken together, during the 
Greco-Roman period the above dictates of citizenship were the primary features of 
democratic governance and served as the key means whereby individuals interacted in the 
city-state. The rise of Christianity introduced a religious element to civic duty that depicts 
individuals as subjects of God before that of the city-state, thereby redefining civic virtue 
as religious adherence and piety rather than with the public good. In the Middle Ages, the 
rise of the importance of the Church as an institution displaced the significance of 
citizenship and civic virtue to the periphery, except in the major city states of Bologna, 
Florence, Milan, Siena, Venice, and others that had republican forms of governance and 
still maintained functioning civic councils, senates and voting rights. Later, during the 
period of feudal states and absolute monarchies, citizenship was conceived as a way of 
enhancing sovereignty and the stability of the nation-state and thereby strongly associated 
with nationhood. Civic subjects were mainly seen as the subjects of the ruler and were 
provided limited rights as a way to connect political subjects firmly to the interests and 
needs of the nation-state.  
Evidently, like other institutions of governance and identity, citizenship too has 
been repeatedly (re)shaped to account for changes in social and political power. Yet, as 
Isin noted, when the history of citizenship is recounted there is a tendency among 
scholars to package the multifaceted changes above into a one-dimensional – and one-
directional – story. With this, imagined political and conceptual links are produced by 
citizenship scholars and provoked by etymological references between ancient forms of 
citizenship and that which exists in contemporary liberal societies under conditions of 
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modern capitalism and globalization. As Isin explains, emphasis on the affinities between 
ancient and contemporary practices of citizenship in Western societies effectively: 
… mobilize and provoke an invented tradition: that we are somehow inheritors of 
an occidental tradition that is different from and superior to an oriental one. These 
images then invent not one, but two traditions.39 
 
Important to emphasize is that such perspectives of citizenship also posit an inside and an 
outside, with Europe as a given and permanent geographical center that innovates a 
largely stagnated and permanent periphery. With this, discussions of liberal citizenship 
become part of an invented occidental tradition that is structured in a manner where 
cultural and political progress is sourced in and flows out of the European sector, toward 
the passive non-European sector on the receiving end. In this study, I invert the 
traditional colonial gaze from the ‘periphery’ to the ‘core'.  By employing the Israeli logic 
of exclusion as looking glass for understanding current changes in Western liberal 
democracies, our analytical starting point for examining mechanisms of citizenship 
restriction is shifted. This recurring tendency among citizenship scholars and political 
theorists ought to be acknowledged, and the imagined political and conceptual links 
ought also to be made explicit and challenged. Otherwise our approach to the study of 
citizenship would continue to fail to capture the specific textures and dynamics unique to 
its modern realization in the twenty-first century. 
3. Framing citizenship 
Nation-states use the citizenship framework as the primary organizing relation between 
the state and its constituents, or citizens. As a “collection of citizens,” modern states 
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configuring citizenship not only seek to determine “who or what ought to be called a 
citizen” but also “who has the power to grant or take away one’s citizenship.”40 
Traditional readings of citizenship depict it as the intersection of identity and law, where 
both a national belonging and a constitutionally recognized membership in a state are 
articulated. It is conventionally conceived of as a mechanism of civic incorporation 
within a state; a form of social membership used as a basis for claim-making with which 
comes access to rights, privileges, and freedoms allocated and protected by state 
institutions. As an institution, citizenship is comprised of the social community and 
implies that access to public goods and services, as well as participation in state 
institutions, exhibit the political, civil and social rights of this collective. Citizenship has 
emerged as an issue that is central, not only to practical political notions concerning 
access to health-care systems, educational institutions, public programs, and the welfare 
state, but also to concepts of legal jurisdiction and social membership. For the most part, 
the duties and obligations of citizenship are shaped by the parameters of membership, 
rights and participation. As illustrated by Audrey Macklin, “[i]f citizenship were a home 
appliance, it would be the only one you would ever need.”41 
In Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays (1950), T. H. Marshall outlines 
his classical postwar theory of citizenship where its associated rights are divided into 
three components: the civil in the eighteenth-, the political in the nineteenth-, and the 
social broadly assigned to the twentieth-century. The civil element involves the rights 
and liberties necessary for individual freedom (such as freedom of speech, opinion and 
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thought, the right to own property, to have valid contracts, and the right to justice); the 
political element involves the right to participate in the exercise of political power; and 
the social element involves economic welfare, security and a right to a share in the social 
heritage of the community.42 Though he holds that each of these components or parts of 
citizenship rights evolved in different directions and in various degrees since the 
seventeenth century, the trajectory of Marshall’s theory of citizenship goes in the 
direction of the principles of the equality of all citizens as full members of society, 
common possession, rule of law, majority rule, democracy and parliamentary 
representation, and so forth. Seen in this manner, the institution of citizenship constitutes 
an overarching identity cloaking all other identities to produce ‘equal’ citizen subjects. 
 Absent from this classical model of social democratic citizenship is an account of 
ethnicity, culture, gender and sexuality, class, ability and religion as major sources of 
identity, claims and participation – all of which have complicated the existing problems 
of identity in increasingly globalized societies.43 For the most part, citizenship in its 
contemporary realization in liberal democratic countries in Europe and North America 
strives to be universalistic in that it does not recognize or accept familial, tribal and 
kinship ties as legitimate sources of authority, claim-making, and participation in the 
public sphere. Broadly speaking, citizens in most Western liberal democratic societies are 
at least formally conceived as rights-bearing subjects who exercise their rights equally 
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43 For more, see Bryan S. Turner, “T.H. Marshall, social rights and English national identity,” 
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with other citizens, so that no individual or collective is legally privileged insofar as they 
are citizens.44  
Most definitions of citizenship will outline a legal relation between an individual 
and a political society, the attributes and parameters of which reflect the self-definition of 
the particular state-order. We are often told that for the Greek democrats living in Athens 
under Pericles, the city-state was the only appropriate space for the fullest human 
development and flourishing. In what is considered by many to be one of the first 
treatises on citizenship, Aristotle stated: 
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature 
a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a 
state, is either above humanity or below it; he is the ‘Tribeless, lawless, hearthless 
one’, whom Homer denounces—the outcast who is a lover of war; he may be 
compared to an unprotected piece in the game of draughts.45 
 
Here there is no citizen-subject that exists prior to the city-state, and “anyone who cannot 
form a community with others, or who does not need to because he is self-sufficient, is no 
part of a city-state – he is either a beast or a god.”46 The idea that states are the principal 
locus of citizenship continues to remain prevalent among citizenship scholars,47 but the 
dynamic at play is not one-sided. For instance, Aristotle's city-state does not simply 
create viable subjects. Instead, and especially as recent constructivist literature has 
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revealed, the citizen-subject and the city-state have a mutual relationship of creation, and 
“each is a coterminous effect of the other.”48 As a set of processes for the provision of 
privileges, protection and responsibilities, citizenship rights are typically the result of 
multifaceted struggles between the citizen-subjects and identity-specific collectives and 
the state at the social and political level. For the most part, such demands for recognition 
and inclusion are often linked to the contributions of the claimant(s) to the social good 
and the welfare of the state. Cultural, ethnic, religious and racial divisions within a 
society are key ingredients in molding its model of citizenship and its particular set of 
practices. And given that citizenship does not necessarily evolve to include all individuals 
and collectives, the achievement and provision of group-based rights of citizenship can 
thereby fuel existing social, political and cultural fragmentation.49 With this, citizenship 
often becomes divided and hierarchical. Guy Ben-Porat and Bryan S. Turner explain that:  
Where existing hierarchies and divisions are challenged, citizenship becomes a 
site of negotiation, contest and contention where, on the one hand, duties and 
obligations are defined and, on the other hand, demands for rights and 
entitlements are presented. Citizenship, therefore, often delineates a hierarchy 
between and within social groups in society and consequently structures the 
opportunities afforded by the state to different people who are included, excluded 
or marginalized by the very definition of citizenship.50 
 
Contemporary nation-states have had to address the realities of their increasingly 
multicultural, multinational and multireligious constituents. Far from their oft advertised 
culturally homogenous makeup, nation-states have had to face and accept new calls for 
recognition, rights and representation, often resulting in demands for a re-definition of 
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state institutions and discourses surrounding citizenship.51 As we will see, the 
multicultural aftermath of increased and multifaceted globalization (and the resulting rise 
of demands by new immigrant minority groups) questions not only the “foundational 
assumptions of ‘ethnic states’ that provide a national home for a dominant ethnic group,” 
but it also (re)shapes the contours of liberal democratic institutions and discourse.52 
Transformations of nation-based citizenship, civic representation, state sovereignty, and 
public and private institutions emerging from increased globalization, social and 
technological interconnectedness and mobility challenges the traditional contours that 
have framed citizenship. Thus, as a political construction and practice, citizenship 
increasingly appears to be less “tied to particular states but rather exist over, under, 
around and through them.”53 Marshall’s classical model of social-democratic citizenship 
rights is increasingly complicated by scholars pointing to the declining function of states 
in a growing neo-liberal and globalized world. The privatization of major state 
institutions, dependence on a free-market economy, deregulation and market 
fundamentalism, along with the rise of transnational migration, international travel, 
global exchange, an international human rights regime infringing on the arena of 
individual civil and residency rights that include social rights previously within the 
domain of citizenship.54 These all indicate that the boundaries of the rights traditionally 
limited to citizenship within a state-framework appear to be ever more redrawn. At the 
same time, in the arena of social and political rights, the response of some states to the 
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mentioned tenets of neo-liberal globalization has been policies of effective exclusion. 
Both legal citizens and non-citizens have been denied automatic access to social services, 
including standard education, housing, forms of health care and other social benefits. 
With this surfaces a trend where even legal citizens begin to lose “some of their 
perceived or promised rights associated with their state’s definition of citizenship or the 
international community's list of unalienable rights.”55 The erosion of the perceived rights 
and protections of citizenship is part of a broader trend in Western liberal democracies, 
one whose troubling legal and political direction and implications I posit are illuminated 
with consideration of the Israeli incorporation regime. 
Overall, shared among Marshall's definition of citizenship and its post-national 
critiques is the depiction of citizenship as a collection of rights; an interpretation that is – 
as I will show in prospective chapters – being increasingly “challenged by the unbundling 
of rights accelerated by the processes of globalization.”56 Differing practices of 
citizenship in countries have resulted in a variation of socio-political rights across 
geographical boundaries along with the rise of dissonant normative principles at work in 
configuring citizen rights. An inescapable aspect of rising globalization, post-national 
critiques often point out that one no longer needs to be a citizen to have access to some 
coveted social, cultural and even political rights. Citizenship is relational, a kind of 
ongoing transaction between political actors that is historically contingent on socially 
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constructed categories, such as race, ethnicity, gender and nationality. This 
“disaggregation of rights” and the various dimensions of citizenship is argued to form 
what Seyla Benhabib calls “a trend toward ‘lean citizenship’.”57 Explained further below, 
distinctions of citizen and foreigner, refugee, asylum seeker, temporary worker and 
resident become increasingly negotiable through repeated and multifaceted processes of 
political self-creation.   
4. Theorizing liberal citizenship 
The liberal reading of citizenship underscores individual adherence to the rule of law of 
the state as well as individual liberty from state interference. In the liberal vision, the 
rational individual pursues her/his own interests without causing injury to others while 
the state’s role is seen only in minimalist terms to protect the freedom of citizens. The 
individual is implicitly viewed as emerging as a fully formed citizen who is, ‘by nature’ 
devoid of socio-cultural bonds and able to rationally pursue her/his own interests. 
Grounded in a guarantee of legal, social and political protections from other members of 
the commonwealth and arbitrary actions from a sovereign power, liberal citizenship is 
often understood as the passive and active membership of individuals in a nation-state 
with accompanying universalistic rights and responsibilities at a formally defined level of 
equality.58 Some of these characterizations of liberal citizenship deserve attention. First, 
as membership in a nation-state, citizenship requires the identification of a certain 
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personhood placed apart and in opposition to non-citizens, strangers and foreigners. 
Emerging with the modern state, liberal theories of citizenship were not designed or 
equipped to address questions of aliens. In assuming the context of a sovereign state 
liberal theories also assumed the right to exclude aliens, as well as marginalized sectors 
including women, members of the working class and minorities. Second, the distinction 
between passive rights of citizenhood and active abilities to contribute to and influence 
political and economic realities is important as both elements are necessary for genuine 
citizenship participation in a nation-state. Importantly, on this point, a liberal conception 
of citizenship that stresses the individual, universal, autonomous and equal character of a 
subject whose status and access to rights and privileges do not require an active or hands-
on engagement with their citizenship differs most heavily from a republican one.  
As a side note, part and parcel of republican citizenship is direct participation in 
and active engagement with citizenship practice and institutions. As Alexis De 
Tocqueville observed in his study of the United States in the 1830s, participation in 
public live is understood as not only a civic necessity and duty, but also something that 
provides its own personal benefits. Republicanism holds that democratic participation 
and engagement with citizenship in the form of a political and moral purpose, shared 
among all members, in reproducing, protecting and developing the common good of the 
society is required. It highlights not only the formal and legal dimension of citizenship, 
similar to liberalism, but also an ethical dimension where civic virtues are demanded of 
citizens so as to allow them to cultivate abilities making them better people in society.  
The third feature is the universalistic character of liberal citizenship rights is 
understood as formally enacted in law and equally applicable and accessible to all 
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citizens. And this brings us to the fourth feature of such a reading of citizenship, namely, 
that it is a statement of equality among its members in a manner where rights and 
responsibilities are balanced within the social order. In classical liberalism there are no 
citizens but rather distinct rights-bearing individuals who gather as political subjects to 
form a social contract. Margaret R. Somers explains that, for classical liberals, “[t]o 
attach citizenship to these autonomous rights-bearers is to graft a political membership-
centered identity onto a view of the person who originates in the prepolitical state of 
nature.”59 Opposing the very notion that human identity is entrenched in any political 
process, institution or governance, “the 'rights' in the couplet of citizenship rights are 
therefore in many ways the mirror image of citizenship.”60 The final and central feature 
of a liberal theory of citizenship is the emphasis on individualism. Emphasis on the 
individual is a bedrock of liberal theory, and is present in its approach to all other social 
arrangements. The primacy of the individual and her/his liberty is mainly realized as 
“freedom from state interference with one’s personal development and projects … [along 
with] a deep suspicion of state power over individuals.”61 With this caveat, liberal models 
of citizenship often reveal a certain tension when group or collective rights and 
obligations are introduced into social aggregations in a manner that trumps or challenges 
individual rights. Contemporary democracies are often shaped by tensions between the 
rise of individual rights and the demands of membership, including collective duties and 
obligations, within particular communities.62  
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 As subjects of citizenship, collectives marked by religious, cultural, ethnic and 
national identities can influence the process, practices and other aspects of a liberal state, 
thereby also affecting the citizen and non-citizen Others in the social order.63 Now 
despite this, liberal theories of citizenship depict a state that remains disinterested vis-à-
vis these different groups, does not take sides, and maintains a certain neutrality. Of 
course, such normative neutrality has proved impossible for liberal states in the face of 
increasing identity-specific collectivities, resulting in the “entangl[ing of] the state, 
groups and individuals in ways that may threaten the autonomy and integrity of 
individuals and groups and hence endanger the liberal project itself.”64 In the end, 
discourses and debates around the function of the state with regards to individual and 
group claims and obligations continue to (re)draw the boundaries of liberal citizenship. 
5. Citizenship beyond the state 
Manifestations of liberal citizenship also posit a certain connection between a distinct 
geographical and territorial entity, or a sovereign nation-state, and the practice, rights and 
obligations of citizenship. In this the ownership of a passport serves as the main feature 
of citizenship, allowing individuals the right of mobility in and out of the geographical 
space with the formal sanction of the state.65 But increasing globalization and post-
modernist approaches to state-citizen relations have both redefined and (re)shaped the 
key axes of liberal citizenship.66 Isin and Turner explain that 
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… various struggles based upon identity and difference … have found new ways 
of articulating their claims as claims to citizenship understood not simply as a 
legal status but as political and social recognition and economic redistribution.67 
 
As a result, modern political theories about citizenship, its processes, practices and 
consequences, in the form of liberal, republican and ethno-national citizenships are 
growing increasingly inadequate. Despite their respective differences, such typologies of 
citizenship mostly remain state-centric and dependent on that ground as the main source 
of legitimacy and authority. These models of citizenship may help us understand the 
nature and characteristics of various forms of rights, representation and responsibilities 
that exist across liberal democratic states, but they are unable to capture the inherent 
changes in the processes and practices of citizenship in the twenty-first century.68 In other 
words, the dislodging of a geographically defined territory as the sole source and 
benefactor of the acts and practices of citizenship through forces of globalization and 
post-modernist forms of organization has expanded the way in which citizenship is 
discussed and realized. This expansion of citizenship acts and practices has yet to be 
sufficiently captured by liberal, republican and ethno-national models of citizenship. 
The contemporary transformation of citizenship along with dominant trends of 
denationalization and deterritorialization of modern citizenship are ascribed to numerous 
processes both inside and outside of the state. While at present the state can be 
reasonably posited as an all-encompassing repository of citizenship, or as the locus of 
citizenship, it cannot be projected as the only one. Indeed, modern citizenship is 
composed of multiple elements many of which are associated with the state, but the 
increasing development of locations of citizenship outside of the state framework is due 
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to two main sets of transformations. The first set refers to changes inside the nation-state 
such as “deregulation, economic privatization, … changes in the law of nationality 
entailing a shift from purely formal to effective nationality, and legislation allowing 
national courts to use international instruments.”69 The second set of transformations 
refers to developments outside of the nation-state resulting mainly from globalization. 
This includes the rise of multiple actors, groups and communities that have been partly 
empowered by these developments in the state and are increasingly unwilling to 
automatically identify with a national identity as shaped by the state. Here the 
“organization of formal [citizenship] status, the protection of rights, citizenship practices 
… [and] the experience of collective identities and solidarities” have conjointly removed 
the nation-state as the exclusive site for the practice of citizenship.70 
 One’s reading of citizenship as a tool for delimitation or suppression, and/or as a 
tool for self-protection, resistance and emancipation of the political subject depends 
partly on whether citizenship is understood as a territorialized and rigid legal status, or as 
a multifaceted practice. Isin explains that a politically dynamic and historically relevant 
conception of citizenship requires a reformulation of the question ‘what is citizenship?’ to 
an inquiry into ‘what is called citizenship?’71 Such a refocus would provoke a 
consideration of the various interests and elements that serve as a catalyst for the 
interpretation of citizenship as either primarily a de jure or de facto relation. Though 
different, interpretations of citizenship as a legal status and as a practice are related. 
Scholarly readings of citizenship as formal status concentrate on the inclusive exclusive 
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dynamics and legally inscribed circumstances of residence, naturalization, deportation, 
(im)migration, detention, statelessness, and visa and passport acquirement.72 This reading 
is premised on the acquisition of citizenship through one of the three means of jus 
sanguinis (inherited citizenship through a parent), jus soli (inherited citizenship through 
birth separately from parentage) or jus domicili (citizenship through naturalization in a 
host-society).73 In contrast, interpretations of citizenship as a practice often posit social 
and political transitions such as integration, multiculturalism, coexistence, recognition, 
nationalism and trans-nationalism as a focus. Treating these as socially reproduced, 
politically driven and legally inscribed processes that develop slowly over time, readings 
of citizenship as a practice stress the diverse sites and acts of citizenship that permeate 
states undergoing such transitions. That said, and regardless of the particular 
interpretation of citizenship, most of the scholarship on citizenship: first, agrees that its 
de jure and de facto elements necessarily imply and dispute each other as important 
elements, and second, goes on to posit an essential connection to a national state.74  
The rise of state-based forms of political organization rendered nationality a 
central ingredient in the formulation of an institutionalized citizenship. As a result, while 
the terms ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ extend to different legal jurisdictions, as the 
former reflects a national sphere and the latter an international legal realm, both 
nevertheless denote a nation-state framework and bestow the individual with some form 
of state membership.75 However, scholars in the field increasingly question the inherent 
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connection between citizenship and the nation-state framework, or the territorialization of 
citizenship. Obrad Savić explains that, 
The point of the hyphen in the term nation-state is to fuse people and politics, to 
create a homogenized identity between forms of life and political and state 
power. What distinguishes the nation-state originally is not only a claim to 
sovereignty over a fixed territory, but a sovereignty of a specific ethno-political 
group, a nation that happens to be territorially located: ‘What distinguishes the 
territorial exclusivity of nationalism, in other words, is a form of republicanism, 
the ‘wedding’ of people and the state, the insertion of the one into the other with 
all the tight bounded unity of the signifier and the signified’.76 
 
Admitting that such a tight coupling of civic identity and nation-state is only an 
“approximate equation,” Savić asserts that it is this very paucity of ethno-national and 
political homogeneity within nation-centered states that drives campaigns for 
“claustrophobic ethno-national identities.”77 What surfaces is the simultaneous 
requirement of liberal democratic citizenship to both posit a heterogeneity while reducing 
or dissolving heterogeneity. Through this process a tension between the fixed and rigid 
political and legal boundaries of exclusive political membership, or citizenship, and the 
dynamic and transient compulsions of people takes shape. This renders the homogeneity 
of the nation a “principal fiction” that is seconded by borders, legal jurisdictions, and 
sovereignty which “always give the lie to this national construct.”78 
One of the key studies of contemporary migration, Soysal’s Limits of Citizenship, 
Migration and Post-National Citizenship in Europe (1994) examines the substitution of 
national civic personhood with universalized human rights and the formation of a new 
incorporation regime. A defining part of this regime is the displacement and unfastening 
of the nation-state and nationhood as a key feature of citizenship. As such, when 
                                                




examining the incorporation regimes of states, various scholars have pointed out that 
there remains an emphasis on the local in the increasingly globalized context of 
citizenship. Peter Geschiere explains that primordial forms of belonging, and 
preoccupations with notions of autochthony have given rise to localist articulations of 
national and collective identity, all of which works against forces of globalization.79 
Along with this “global obsession with belonging” surfaces radical models and practices 
of exclusion that challenge notions of national citizenship and impair values of civic 
equality and national unity.80 Geschiere holds that in these contexts, definitions of who is 
included in this belonging changes fiercely and unexpectedly creating various patterns of 
national and citizenship exclusions; or, as Soysal would term it, creating various 
incorporation regimes. On this discussion, Iris Marion Young emphasizes practices in 
contemporary liberal societies that reveal how the implicit normative ideal within the idea 
of universal citizenship has yet to be achieved. Young posits that although by the late 
twentieth century liberal understandings of citizenship included marginalized groups 
through the extension of equal political and civil rights, key groups remained excluded 
from participation in shaping the collective civic identity and denied social justice. The 
liberal notion of “differentiated citizenship” has surfaced as the ideal method for the 
inclusion and participation of all members, taking the place of a more egalitarian 
conception of full citizenship.81 She writes, “the universality of citizenship, in the sense 
of the inclusion and participation of everyone, stands in tension with the other two 
meanings of universality embedded in modern political ideas: universality as generality, 
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and universality as equal treatment.”82 But the issue is not the inability of fulfilling an 
attractive normative vision. Instead, Young argues that appeal to the liberal vision of 
universal citizenship itself is a problem in that “having a common life with and being 
treated in the same way” as other citizens is privileged over a more profound acceptance 
of difference. 
Young’s provocative intervention depicts an alternative reading of liberal 
citizenship and national identity in modern globalized societies. Notions of “equal 
treatment” are instead replaced with “articulation[s] of special rights that attend to group 
differences.”83 This counter-vision posits liberal-egalitarian citizenship as a tool of 
exclusion whose implementation of a general will and national identity imposes an 
outdated form of homogeneity. Countering the work of theorists such as Benjamin 
Barber, Young rebuffs understandings of the political life of citizens as “a moral body 
whose existence depends on the common ordering of individual needs and wants into a 
single vision of the future in which all can share.”84 Such liberal understandings of 
citizenship fail to encompass the ways our individual experiences and needs are mediated 
through group identities and belonging. And so, for Young, the notion of a unified 
citizenship experience and national identity is, in the end, an impossible liberal promise. 
Overall, Young’s call for an alternative (and more inclusive) reading of liberal citizenship 
complements Soysal’s efforts to unfasten of the nation-state and nationhood as a key 
feature of citizenship. Soysal supports the position that, for the most part, the concept of 
citizenship is comprised of various articulations of membership and its accompanying 
rights, each of which reflect an analysis of the various relations within that state. Indeed, 
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reading these two scholars along one another, we can distil that the trajectory of 
citizenship within a state reveals how self-conceptions of nationhood and belonging are 
culturally and historically inscribed. This also reflects the ways that citizenship is 
intertwined with institutional and structural realities and political changes.  
As I point to above, Soysal’s important contribution on the codification and 
expansion of rights beyond the national framework of citizenship has since generated 
new models and understandings of (state) identity and membership.85 Soysal writes: 
Historically, as the state has expanded and permeated new domains of social 
action, its responsibility has extended to different strata of society – workers, 
women, and children. The state has incorporated a larger and larger proportion of 
the population into its jurisdiction and into the public realm …. In this process, 
incorporation has affected the national citizenry through the establishment of 
citizenship rights and national institutions. However, in the postwar era, even 
foreign populations are incorporated into the institutions of the polity. In 
accordance with expanding notions of universalistic personhood, non-citizens, as 
much as citizens, are entitled (and authorized) as productive individuals wherever 
they reside.86 
 
What arises is a kind of dilution of the model of citizenship as a form of elite social 
membership used as a basis for claim-making. In outlining the conceptual and practical 
contradictions surrounding readings of citizenship as anchored in a territorialized nation-
state, Soysal shows that the bestowing of universalistic rights of personhood moves 
beyond these boundaries, rendering “national citizenship particularly less important.”87 
Soysal’s discourse is based on an observation of shifts in the social, political, legal, 
cultural and economic conditions that interrogate territorial readings of the concept of 
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citizenship. Discussed below, such a non-territorialized reading also has implications for 
the kinds of actors included in the mechanisms and processes of claim-making.   
 A similar analysis challenging the exclusionary model of citizenship as rooted in 
national sovereignty is provided by Saskia Sassen: 
[T]he destabilizing of national state-centered hierarchies of legitimate power and 
allegiance has enabled a multiplication of non-formalized or only partly 
formalized political dynamics and actors. These signal a deterritorializing of 
citizenship practices and identities, and of discourses about loyalty and 
allegiance.88 
 
Rather than a static and detached institution, citizenship instead involves a range of 
related interactions, dynamics, and tensions between the individual and the state order at 
the legal, political, cultural, and psychological level. In her analysis of the denationalizing 
and post-national developments in modern citizenship, Sassen also points to the events 
leading to the nationalizing of citizenship. Here, Sassen highlights the “formation and 
development of the national state as the key political community and [as] crucial to the 
socialization of individuals into national citizenship.”89 The evolution of political 
subjecthood and participation in conjunction with state formation generated a regime in 
Western societies where nationality serves as a fundamental part of citizenship at a 
political, cultural and psychological level. Revealed in Chapter Four, this development of 
the national character along with the formation of the institution of citizenship accounts 
for differences between the various incorporation and citizenship regimes of nation-states 
in Europe and North America. Having explained the nationalizing features of citizenship, 
Sassen goes on to distinguish between denationalizing and post-national trajectories of 
citizenship. Though “not necessarily mutually exclusive,” the former is concerned with 
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the “transformation of the national” while the latter involves “new forms that we have not 
even considered and might emerge out of the changed conditions in the world located 
outside the national.”90 Sassen’s distinction between denationalization and post-
nationalist tendencies in citizenship brings the discussion to the question of how these 
transformations in the conception of the ‘national’ (and their direct and indirect 
amendment of the particular features of the institution of citizenship) affect the kinds of 
actors of citizenship, or the citizen-subjects that arise. 
6. ‘Acting’ citizenship 
The above transformations compel many scholars of citizenship studies to lament the 
‘end of citizenship’. It has become commonplace in contemporary democracies to 
contend that increasing heterogeneity from processes of globalization and the rise of neo-
liberalism creates a disenfranchised citizenship body, converting citizens into consumers 
and taxpayers. The parameters of citizenship in this context are not defined by individual 
rights and responsibilities but rather by the provision of choice within a capitalist mode of 
production. This shift into a more consumerist citizen culture renders financial security 
and wealth a caveat for the full engagement in the practice and process of liberal 
citizenship, enabling access to institutions of power and decision-making, superior 
healthcare, education and other practices of citizenship. The privatization and 
commodification of civic spaces and political activity and the simultaneous rise of 
experienced experts of democratic governance displaces civic activity from formerly 
public arenas, giving rise to complaints of the end of citizenship. Michael Schudson 
locates the first recorded instance of this concern in the writings of Rousseau who already 
                                                
90 Ibid., 286. 
	 61	
in 1750 observed that “[w]e have physicists, geometers, chemists, astronomers, poets, 
musicians and painters; we no longer have citizens.”91 Statements warning of the end of 
citizenship re-emerge in a range of writings by scholars of democracy and citizenship 
theory, and point to the ways the boundaries of citizenship is redrawn by socio-economic 
and political and environmental transformations.92  
Importantly, the reshaping of the parameters of citizenship and civic action reveal 
that new actors in the arena of citizenship, including refugees, asylum seekers, courts, 
international courts, multinational organizations and other non-status and/or non-citizen 
agents surface as political subjects. These new actors reveal that far from the end of 
citizenship, global changes and juridico-political developments leading to changing 
definitions of the ‘national’ have instead reconfigured the traditional figures of 
citizenship. Historically located at the margins of nation-states, these ‘in-betweens’ or 
‘Others’ of civic membership have served as exceptions to a nation-state system through 
sovereign practices of policing and border control. With transformations in the institution 
of citizenship expanding forms of civic membership and political activity, these formerly 
marginal figures no longer constitute the periphery and are increasingly able to access 
key spaces of citizenship.  
These changes require us to similarly amend our treatment and study of 
citizenship. As political subjects, new and formerly marginalized actors carry demands 
and claims for inclusion, representation and justice into new fields that include a 
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multifaceted range of rights, privileges and responsibilities. At the same time, and as 
Étienne Balibar warns, the inclusion of the “dangerous classes” into the realm of 
citizenship has also been conditioned on their transformation into themselves into integral 
parts of the body politic and thus also into “real or imaginary masters (maîtres) or, more 
exactly, foremen (contremaîtres) of imperialist domination.” 93 Put differently, through 
the power of assimilation the inclusion of new actors in the arena of citizenship has also 
implicated them in the arenas of state power and heritage, and therefore of domination. 
Reflecting on this development, Isin contends: 
The rights (civil, political, social, sexual, ecological, cultural), sites (bodies, 
courts, streets, media, networks, borders), scales (urban, regional, national, 
transnational, international) and acts (voting, volunteering, blogging, protesting, 
resisting and organizing) through which subjects enact themselves (and others) as 
citizens need to be interpreted anew. …. We need a new vocabulary of 
citizenship.94 
 
This ‘new vocabulary’ of citizenship compels an examination of the “acts of citizenship” 
to sketch both “those deeds by which actors constitute themselves (and others) as subjects 
of rights,” and the manner in which new and non-traditional political subjects are 
formed.95 Here, as in his other works, Isin notes: first, that actors in the arena of 
citizenship are not defined by their status as citizens and can include a range of legal or 
quasi-legal individuals or collectives; second, that acts which produce political subjects 
generate new areas of allegiance and struggle that are separate from conventional sites of 
citizenship (i.e., voting, jury duty, military service, and more); and finally, that the acts of 
citizenship move beyond political, legal and state jurisdictions, sometimes along urban, 
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regional and international lines.96 Hence the status of the citizen can no longer be limited 
to state membership, and the practice of citizenship can no longer be circumscribed 
within the borders of the nation-state. What the focus on acts of citizenship reveals is that 
our understanding of the concept of citizenship must be able to account for its malleable 
and dynamic character.  
The interaction among the agents, sites and acts of citizenship provides access to 
rights depending on the medium through which citizenship rights are determined. This 
can include some combination of birth, wealth, ethno-national identity, language, 
religious affiliation, and political or legal status among other traits, and serve to 
illuminate the mechanisms through which the rights of citizenship are (at least formally) 
allocated. Here, the rights accompanying citizenship determine the actors in the arena of 
citizenship, and the inclusive exclusive relations that emerge as a result of their exercise. 
As a result, different rights of citizenship produce different political subjects. On the 
question of citizenship rights, Somers has gone so far as to assert that the rights of legal 
citizens in a nation-state (de jure citizens) are irrelevant in the absence of de facto 
citizenship rights.97 In many cases, Somers argues, de jure citizenship in its current form 
of official citizenship status no longer determines rights within a nation-state. This 
account is more in conjunction with Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy insofar as it 
highlights the importance of de facto rights and legal recognition. 98 Somers illuminates a 
key feature of Arendt’s understanding of citizenship, namely, that the de jure and de facto 
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elements of citizenship, or the status and practice of citizenship, are deeply intertwined. 
And to determine the actual substance of citizenship, Somers employs the language of 
rights. In theorizing about the constellation of rights that are foundational to an inclusive 
citizenship regime, including civil and political freedoms, access to justice, equality and 
political participation, Somers adopts an Arendtian reading of citizenship as “the right to 
have rights.”99 Two factors are key to this formulation of citizenship: the first is the 
presence of both de jure and de facto rights of political membership and subjectivity; and 
the second element is a range of juridico-political rights that encompass social, political, 
economic welfare, and security rights which, by extension, can include cultural, social 
heritage, indigenous, and same-sex rights, among others.100 Central to Somers’s 
formulation of citizenship is that these rights are to be widely recognized, accepted by a 
sovereign power and socio-politically and legally enshrined. While political membership 
and subjectivity act as a foundation for citizenship, and make de jure and de facto 
inclusion, identification and recognition possible, the two features of citizenship are 
inherently intertwined, and complete each other. 
7. Citizenship as a ‘zone of undecidability’ 
The term citizen is, for the most part, a modern socio-legal category. First employed in 
the fourteenth century, the notion of citizenship only referred to an inhabitant of a polity, 
and it was later in the sixteenth century when the concept was seriously affiliated with the 
notion of a right of membership in a city.101  Moreover, it was not until the eighteenth 
century when it expressed a set of responsibilities and obligations, when the citizen was 
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first rooted in modern readings of an autonomous and individual subject: “a being unto 
himself, separable from any community, the author of his own will and intentions.”102 
The modern conception of the citizen outlines a political subject capable of developing an 
understanding of itself as a political subject through the exercise of decisive political 
actions and interventions. As Nöelle McAfee explains, “[t]o this day, our notions of 
citizenship rest upon our notions of subjectivity.”103  
A historical reading of the development of the concept of citizenship requires an 
understanding of a universalizable political subject through which particular social, 
cultural and tribal affinities begin to collapse. Such a transformation initially occurred 
within the context of ancient and pre-modern cities, and later developed into state-based 
forms of political organization where social collectives struggled over the use of, and 
access to, social resources. Not an inevitable development within city-states, social rights 
in the form of citizenship rights are a product of a series of conflicts and competitions 
between different social groups, with different access to and investment in the state order. 
By the same token, previously acquired sets of social rights can also be renounced as a 
result of these social struggles. Therefore, with the development of citizenship within the 
city-state context evolved notions of freedom, autonomy, civility, and at a broader level, 
civilization.104 Migration from the township, village or countryside to the city became 
associated with the processes of civilization, acculturation and enlightenment, thus 
distinguishing the citizenized individual from her/his non-advanced non-citizen 
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counterpart.105 What surfaces from ancient, pre-modern and modern readings of 
citizenship is the necessary ‘Otherizing’ that lies at the root of the concept and process of 
citizenship: the creation and maintenance of an Other, a non-member or outsider 
excepted from the social arrangement.  
Citizenship cannot only be understood as a venue for the enjoyment of 
representation, protections, and rights, but is also an object of local restriction and 
closure. Key to the argument I posit in this study is the contention that the modern 
concept of citizenship remains rooted in a relation of exception. While depicted in the 
language of universalism and inclusion, it has simultaneously and systematically 
excluded, and sometimes even criminalized, certain individuals and collectives. Despite 
its generalization, the conceptual parameters of citizenship entrench a gap between 
human and citizen, between broader humanity and the law of the nation-state, through 
which it is able to prohibit the foreign Other from the political community of its 
subjects.106 Part of the history of modern exclusion, citizenship maintains the notion of a 
foreign Other by introducing a new kind of privilege enabled by the formalization of 
membership politics. This historical barrier is sustained by the institution of citizenship. It 
develops, acts, formulates, establishes, is reproduced by, and bestows praise, punishment, 
rights and representation against the figure of the Other; or through the process of 
Otherizing. The relation of exclusion key to the concept of citizenship continues to shape 
its vertical and horizontal peripheries where stateless persons, asylum seekers, refugees, 
foreigners, temporary workers, guests, aliens and other non-citizens subjects are located. 
It is in the margins of citizenship, in the gaps of the juridico-political order, where the 
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vulnerable and unwanted non-members of the nation-state reside. Yet, while the citizen 
and non-citizen, or the member and non-member, are characterized as juridico-political 
categories, they are not to be considered as assemblages or groups. As Jacques Rancière 
writes:    
Man [sic] and citizen do not designate collections of individuals. Man and citizen 
are political subjects. Political subjects are not definite collectivities. They are 
surplus names, names that set out a question or a dispute (litige) about who is 
included in their count.107 
 
Where the line separating one life from another is drawn is key. To Rancière, “politics is 
about that border.”108 This emphasizes that far from a separation among political subjects 
delimited simply via national borders and state memberships, social and political 
divisions within and across imagined state boundaries often form links of identity, 
experience and representation among collectives. What is present, and nominally 
representable, is then structurally shaped by what is absent within and across national 
borders. These gaps, breaches and cracks in the juridico-political continuum of state-
membership simultaneously serve as a blueprint for and affect citizenship, as both a 
status and a practice. For instance, citizenship rights belonging to the citizen are similar 
to (or, in some cases even identical to) those provided to the non-citizen, but they are not 
shared. In other words, the sphere of inclusion for the citizen is separate and autonomous 
but not detached from that of the non-citizen. Both figures are political subjects, within 
institutionalized parameters, and are co-created and Otherized by virtue of their political, 
legal, linguistic, social, economic and even psychological frameworks. 
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That said, in framing a theory of citizenship it is important not to posit the citizen 
and its Other as an 'either-or' position and instead point to the range of subjectivities, 
produced through the interactions of the elements comprising legal and social 
membership, which most individuals adopt. This would also mean that we do not to treat 
citizenship as a container that is either full or empty of rights, protections responsibilities 
and privileges.109 Citizenship and statelessness ought not be seen as opposite and 
exclusive categories. This is evident in Chapter Three where we examine the Otherizing 
effect of citizenship in the case of Israel. Rather than focusing on the Other that resides 
outside, or on the margins of, the citizenship regime, we will see how the dynamic of 
Otherizing occurs both within and through inclusion in the citizenship regime. So, while 
we can understand that the separate and autonomous sphere of inclusion for the citizen 
nevertheless remains connected with the non-citizen, we must also consider the relations 
of exclusion residing within citizenship itself. It is in this sense that statelessness, or the 
condition of the alien, foreign or strange Other serves as our conceptual reference point 
for a broader study of citizenship. 
With this, the broader question of whether citizenship is, or can be, genuinely 
inclusive – even of its own subjects – begins to surface. Useful is Giorgio Agamben’s 
writings on the paradigm of exception both as a concept and a tool to make intelligible a 
broader collection of problems. He writes that a paradigm “does not move from the 
particular to the universal, nor from the universal to the particular, but from the particular 
to the particular.”110 This means that both conceptually and methodologically, a paradigm 
involves a part with reference to a part, rather than a whole with respect to a part 
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(deductive), or a part with respect to a whole (inductive).111 Hence, to comprehend the 
way a paradigm functions, classical theoretical oppositions of “universal and particular, 
general and individual, and even also form and content” must be dislodged.112 Similarly, 
when examining the possibilities of genuine inclusion within citizenship we ought not 
posit a rigid opposition between inclusion and exclusion, but rather adopt what Agamben 
calls a “zone of undecidability” to account for the moments where citizenship is neither 
totally open nor closed. The creation of a new context within citizenship emerges, one 
that is delimited by a combination of national borders and social boundaries where 
particular inclusions within certain zones are simultaneously combined with exclusions. 
Put differently, the relation of exclusion within citizenship itself, the Otherizing that 
occurs both within and through inclusion in the citizenship regime, can be understood as 
a movement from the particular to the particular. As a relation of inclusion, the 
citizenship regime is therefore perhaps better understood as what Agamben calls “depolar 
and not dichotomic… [or] tensional and not oppositional” that together form a certain 
undecidability that nullifies strict oppositions of inclusion and exclusion.113 
8. Legal categorizations and the politics of recognition 
Recognition has become prominent as a key component of citizenship. Scholars such as 
Charles Taylor (1994) emphasize that recognition is a “vital human need” and point to 
the damage, oppression and reduced forms of the self that can be produced by the non- or 
mis-recognition of individuals and groups. Indeed, recognition points to the importance 
of political subjects to develop as autonomous individuals with self-esteem and self-
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confidence, particularly in the context of multi-ethnic subjects with cultural differences 
among civic subjects. Working from the premise that recognition marks and produces 
identity, Taylor understands recognition as existing in two realms, one intimate where 
identity is in and expected and constant exchange and tension with others and the other 
public where a politics of equal recognition enters the consideration. Viewing identity as 
constructed through open social dialogue, the rising discourse of the politics of equal 
recognition demands the equal incorporation and status of cultures, ethnicities and 
genders.114 Here we see that struggles based on identity and difference increasingly 
demand not only legal or formal status, but also comparable political and social 
recognition and economic access. 
In an attempt to systematize areas of contention in the study of minority status and 
citizenship, Isin and Turner (2002) point to the elements of: extent, having to do with 
rules and practices relating to inclusion and exclusion; content, regarding civic rights and 
responsibilities; and depth, with respect to how the identities of members should be 
understood and accommodated. Looking at the broader context of multi-ethnic state 
systems, practices arise that appear to include and accommodate the political and social 
dominance of one group with the concept of democratic citizenship. Explained by Isin 
and Turner, “what is new is the economic, social and cultural conditions that make 
possible the articulation of new claims and the content and form of these claims as 
citizenship rights.”115 Depictions of these new frameworks for rights and obligations as 
“minority rights” are limited and misleading. This is because these calls for rights and 
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representation are not put forward by distinct collectives and cultures merely because of 
their statistical minority; rather, such claims for inclusion and recognition are the result of 
a series of changes in economic, social, political and cultural processes and structures. 
An analysis of these processes also reveals the (often devastating) dynamics of the 
citizenship available to minority or marginalized communities within the state system. 
This illustrates the importance of the specific social and political milieu in determining 
the practice and relation of citizenship rights. With an examination of the kind of model 
of state-minority relations that is adopted by a society, certain complexities, 
inconsistencies, and ambiguities emerge around the formulation of the types of 
recognition and rights, for which groups, and in which contexts.116 These models often 
depend heavily on the distinction between indigenous and minority communities and 
their associated rights, argues Kymlicka, pointing to the official international legal 
position “that indigenous peoples have a right to accommodation, whereas minorities 
have a right to integration.”117 An accommodationist approach to recognition involves 
questions of self-government, self-determination and institutional pluralism, whereas an 
integrationist approach focuses on questions of non-discrimination and socio-civil rights. 
Kymlicka explains the use of these approaches to understanding the differing rationales 
behind indigenous rights and minority rights in the development and interpretation of key 
international legal texts by the United Nations Working Group on Minorities and the 
United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations.118 Three basic differences 
between minorities and indigenous peoples takes shape as a result of these initiatives: (i) 
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minorities seek institutional integration while indigenous peoples seek a degree of 
institutional separateness, (ii) minorities seek to exercise individual rights while 
indigenous peoples seek to exercise collective rights, and (iii) minorities seek non-
discrimination while indigenous peoples seek self-government.119 Kymlicka points out, 
however, that these interpretations are not only stipulations in international legal texts but 
they also make claims about the aspirations of the two types of groups. For “if 
international norms accord different rights to minorities than to indigenous peoples, 
[then] this is because the two groups are presumed to want different kinds of rights.”120 
He argues that while these groups appear to differ very little in ‘objective’ characteristics, 
the distinction to be made between indigenous peoples and minorities is that of the nature 
of their political demands, rooted in their mode of organization and political aims.  
 With this contention, the question of the types of ‘minority’ categorizations, their 
applicability and shortcomings arises. Important to keep in mind is that an analysis of 
power and the notion of oppression is limited in Kymlicka’s account of minority 
categorizations. Throughout most of his scholarly work, he appears more interested in 
outlining the logics and structures of claims, obligations and inclusions provided to 
collectives placed in different legal categories; and in examining the possibility of 
whether liberal citizenship can coexist with or complement distinct rights and protections 
provided to ‘minority’ communities. With this focus, one of Kymlicka’s key scholarly 
contributions to the study of citizenship and its relation to the individual and collectives 
has been “the liberal mainstreaming of minority rights” so that such claims can be 
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sourced in the “liberal principles on which existing institutions are built.”121  Overall, this 
rise in the discourse of minority rights is an interesting phenomenon but perhaps what is 
more interesting is that, as an institution, citizenship itself is changing.  
 Now, Kymlicka makes a distinction between old or homeland minorities and new 
minorities. The former was settled on their territory prior to it becoming part of a larger, 
independent country. They have been settled within a particular part of that country for a 
long period of time, and, as a result of that historical settlement, have come to see that 
part of the country as their historical homeland. Conversely, the latter were admitted to a 
country as immigrants after it achieved legal sovereignty, and accorded a different legal 
status depending on the host society such as asylum seekers, temporary guest workers, 
illegal immigrants, and permanent immigrants.122  For Kymlicka, an important distinction 
ought to be made within the category of old minorities between indigenous peoples and 
other historically settled homeland minorities, called national minorities. Yet, the 
distinction between recognition as indigenous peoples and national minorities is 
nevertheless diluted in relation to issues of minority rights as both types of old minorities 
are bestowed the right to accommodation.123 He points out that both are granted various 
rights to self-government over traditional territory, along with linguistic and cultural 
rights in their respective public spaces. Therefore, international legal arguments for the 
recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples similarly apply to other vulnerable 
populations recognized as old minorities.  
                                                
121 Christian Joppke, “Multicultural Citizenship,” in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, eds. Engin F. Isin 
 and Bryan S. Turner (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 247. 
122 Kymlicka, “The Internationalization of Minority Rights,” 7-9. 
123 Ibid., 10-12. 
	 74	
The potentially destructive capacity of minority categorizations and the 
problematic elements in the attempt to draw a sharp distinction between the categories of 
indigenous peoples and national minorities produce various difficulties. Discursive 
categories in international legal texts have the power to mold the historical and political 
understanding of the population in the consciousness of both the ruling establishment and 
the community itself. In doing so, minority categorizations create moral inconsistencies, 
conceptual ambiguities, and fragile political frameworks.124 For Kymlicka, the real 
difficulty is not whether the subject is autonomy-seeking indigenous peoples or 
integration-seeking minorities, but rather the moral and political inconsistencies 
following from a sharp distinction in rights between the two types of groups. He argues 
that “whatever arguments exist for recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples to self-
government also apply to the claims for self-government by other vulnerable and 
historically disadvantaged homeland groups.”125 Kymlicka contends that outside the core 
cases of European immigrant or colonial-settler states, the very distinction between 
indigenous peoples and other homeland minorities is problematic. “In a familiar sense,” 
he argues, “no groups in Africa, Asia, or the Middle East fit the traditional profile of 
indigenous peoples,” as all of the homeland minorities in these regions were merged into 
larger states dominated by neighboring populations rather than into European settler-
states.126 For Kymlicka, these groups are more in conjunction with the profile of 
European national minorities than with indigenous peoples in occupied lands. 
Alternatively, using a more critical conceptual lens that views group categorizations in 
the context of colonial rule, all homeland groups including the dominating majority group 
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can be classified as indigenous in relation to the colonial rulers. From this perspective, 
the homeland groups and the dominant groups in post-colonial states are “indigenous” in 
a historical and political capacity. In the case of Israel, Kymlicka makes reference to the 
work of Arab political scientist Amal Jamal who argues that the Israeli national project 
should be considered and included as a European settler-colonial state.127 With this 
inclusion, non-Jewish Arabs both inside and outside of Israel’s imagined borders would 
meet the traditional definition of an indigenous people. Taken together, though these 
various legal categorizations are important, they are not so distinct so as to imply greater 
or lesser legitimacy in their claims to specific rights and obligations. 
9. Summary and conclusions  
Heightened interest in citizenship as a separate field of study has been a product of 
various political, historical, and social-cultural developments in our contemporary 
context. These developments include the rise of global migration and statelessness, 
changes in collective identities and allegiances with nation-states with the rise of 
heterogeneous civic societies, and rising liberal consciousness around the exclusion of 
minority communities from the body politic. Together, the changing nature of nation-
states has led to transformations in the discourse on the content, structures and boundaries 
of liberal citizenship in the contemporary period. First, the parameters of what being a 
citizen involves, where citizenship is located, and the rights and protections that are 
meant to accompany citizenship recognition are being redrawn and reconfigured, thereby 
no longer making the nation-state the exclusive site for its practice. This awareness is 
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making liberal citizenship increasingly uprooted and deterritorialized so that the state can 
no longer be posited as an all-encompassing repository of citizenship. Relatedly, this re-
location outside of the state framework has also fueled post-colonial scholarly critiques of 
liberal citizenship as part of an occidental tradition that is structured in a manner where 
cultural and political progress flows out of the largely European sector, toward the 
passive non-European sector on the receiving end.  
Second, the contemporary period is also witnessing a re-framing of citizenship in 
the face of an increasingly multicultural, multinational and multireligious reality. As the 
primary organizing relation between the state and its constituents, citizenship in 
contemporary nation-states has recognized new calls for recognition, rights and 
representation. These collective struggles often result in demands for a re-definition of 
state institutions and discourses surrounding citizenship, thereby challenging its 
traditional contours. This reshaping of the parameters of citizenship and civic action have 
led to a third and final transformation discussed above, revealing that new actors in the 
arena of citizenship, including refugees, asylum seekers, courts, international courts, 
multinational organizations and other non-status and/or non-citizen agents have surfaced 
as political subjects. Historically located at the margins of nation-states, these ‘in-
betweens’ or ‘Others’ of civic membership have served as exceptions to a nation-state 
system through sovereign practices of policing and border control. With transformations 
in the institution of citizenship expanding forms of civic membership and political 
activity, these formerly marginal figures no longer constitute the periphery and are 
increasingly able to access key spaces of citizenship. And so, far from the ‘end of 
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citizenship’ these new actors reflect the reconfiguration, interrogation and relocation of 
the traditional figures of citizenship.  
Overall, what surfaces from these related transformations is that liberal 
citizenship is a part of the history of modern exclusion. Its discourse, content, structures 
and boundaries are changing in the contemporary context because, as an institution and a 
practice, citizenship is an object of local restriction and closure. Central to the modern 
concept of citizenship that I examine is a relation of exception that maintains the notion 
of a foreign Other by introducing a new kind of privilege enabled by the formalization of 
membership politics. As mentioned, despite its generalization, the conceptual parameters 
of citizenship entrench a gap between human and citizen, between broader humanity and 
the law of the nation-state, through which it is able to prohibit the foreign Other from the 
political community of its subjects.128 As my study contends, the un-rooting of 
citizenship have internalized this relation of exclusion onto the citizen. Questions as to 
who is a real or a desired citizen on the part of ostensibly liberal democratic nation-states 
have shifted the gaze of exclusion internally, onto the figure of the citizen. With this 
transition, we see a rising political trajectory where the citizen is being inverted with the 
more temporary figure of the ‘immigrant’. These transformations are explored in the 
prospective chapters in the case of Israel. 
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Chapter Two | In the Image of Europe: The Colonial Foundations of the 
Jewish Citizenship and Nationality Regime 
 
“The English do not like the Jews as a subject population. In fact, they do not know what to make 
of them... the Jews must be classified as natives, but they do not seem like natives. They are 
acquainted with western culture; many of them speak the English language and are familiar with 
English ways. What is more, these Jews do not act like natives. They are not submissive and 
obedient and grateful… on the contrary, they are independent and proud... [they are thus] 
regarded by the English… with the active dislike of a superior class for an inferior class which 
does not know and keep its place.” 
John Hayes Holmes (1929)129 
 
“The four great powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or 
bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import 
than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land….” 
Memorandum by Mr. Arthur J. Balfour (August 11, 1919). 130 
 
“England lost an important bond with the Arabs because of her piggling policy, because of her 
Balfour Declaration, because of her oppression in Palestine, because of the unjust treatment of her 
representative display toward the Palestinian, because she wants to offer this noble Palestinian 
populace a sacrifice on the Altar of Zionism… Furthermore, because England showed the Arab 
that she exists for their destruction only.” 
 “Letter on Balfour and Palestine,” by Arab Government Officials, March 30, 1925131 
 
1. Introduction 
The Jewish national movement employed the ideological and conceptual model of mainly 
European colonialism. In doing so, it cooperated with the forces of European imperialism 
in its justification of Jewish statehood and choice of Mandate Palestine as its target 
territory. Indeed, the points of origin in the case of the Israeli incorporation regime lie 
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within the colonial record of Europe. Taking on liberal citizenship in Israel to show its 
colonial dimensions, this chapter outlines the colonial logic in interwar representations 
and formulations by political and liberal Zionist (both Jewish and non-Jewish) thinkers, 
writers and organizations on the configuration of the proposed Jewish State. I reveal how, 
growing out of the historical context of European (settler-)colonial projects, the liberal 
justifications for Jewish immigration, nationality and statehood in Mandate Palestine 
included promises of intellectual progress, technological advancement, economic 
prosperity, agricultural cultivation, and scientific development for humankind. 
Repeatedly, the cosmopolitan figure of the ‘European Jew’ was actively propagated as a 
civilizing influence in the interest of Western powers in an otherwise backward and 
undeveloped ‘Orient’. Given this historical condition, discourses on citizenship, inclusion 
and nationality in Mandate Palestine ought also to be understood as sites of production of 
European colonial power.  
The discussions in this chapter use both literary and historical texts to lay the 
grounds for examining the colonial context within which Arab and Jewish interactions 
around civil, political and social rights were framed.132 The combined and complemented 
use of these texts helps reveal the importance of the literary imagination to the Jewish 
national movement. The fictional structures of the literary texts I include, namely 
Altneuland (1902) and Palestine Parodies: The Holy Land in Verse and Worse (1938), 
reveal the extent to which the Jewish national movement employed the ideological model 
of colonialism, and cooperated with European imperialism. These fictional texts illustrate 
the juridico-political colonial blueprint passed on to the Zionist leadership by its imperial 
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supporters at the end of the Mandate period. Combining literary texts with historical 
sources, political documents, and key scholarship on Zionism as a colonial enterprise, 
this chapter details the colonial ideological foundations that gave shape to the civic 
exclusions and political configuration of the proposed Jewish State.  
Together, the literary and historical texts I cite in this chapter enable us to both 
extract the colonial context within which Arab and Jewish rights were framed, as well as 
place events in Israel as part of an international trend. Having demonstrated the colonial 
perceptions, discussions among Zionist figures and the framework of European 
hegemonic power within which the Jewish national movement burgeoned, I then list the 
pillars forming the logic of exclusion in Israeli citizenship. As this study argues, the 
figure of the citizen in Israel is being inverted with the more fluid figure of the 
‘immigrant’. By placing the configuration of the Jewish State in the context of global 
forces of colonialism and European imperial power I seek to explain the ways in which 
modern Israeli citizenship can inform our understanding of broader trends toward 
citizenship restriction and revocation. Building on the arguments below, the next section, 
Chapter Three, closely examines archival documentation to explain how the colonial 
context outlined in this chapter later configured features of the differential liberal 
citizenship and nationality regime anticipated for the Jewish State. 
2. Colonizing the land of milk and honey 
Modern political Zionism is, in both thought and practice, a product of a colonial world 
order. The depiction of the Zionist movement as a settler colonial project is neither new, 
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nor was it a characterization that Zionist figures shied away from.133 Even Altneuland 
(“Old-New Land”), a novel written by the father of political Zionism, Theodor Herzl, 
which aimed at propagating his utopian vision of a Jewish Palestine, openly adopts the 
language and logic of colonialism. While not a direct blueprint for Herzl’s Jewish State, 
nor a manuscript that can be brought to the level of reality, Altneuland is one of the first 
and most comprehensive literary accounts of a Jewish society in Palestine. Unlike Herzl’s 
more famous publication, Der Judenstaat (“The State of the Jews”), which served as the 
ideological bedrock and outlined the organizational structure of Zionism, Altneuland does 
depict an existing Arab population in Palestine. However, in its representation of Arabs in 
Palestine, it too places them within a hegemonic colonial order. A connection exists 
between the bedrock of modern Zionism (including its liberal-Zionist variant) and that of 
the colonial logic of the fictional text. Not only do they share Herzlian thought as a 
central tenet in their formation and development but also, more importantly, they both 
conjure the dream of integration, emancipation and coexistence.  
Intended for a non-Zionist audience and aimed at securing non-Jewish support for 
the Zionist movement, Herzl uses the fictional structure of Altneuland to express “his 
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own visions of Zionism in its purest, most uncompromising form.”134 Beginning in 1902, 
the novel follows the main character, Friedrich Löwenberg, a twenty-three year old 
Jewish Viennese lawyer, who, alienated by the decadence of Jewish-European 
bourgeoisie, decides to join an Americanized Prussian philanthropist named Kingscourt 
with a distaste for humankind to withdraw to a remote island. “Disgusted with life,” 
Löwenberg agrees to a “life-long obligation” to Kingscourt, and decides to dissolve all of 
his existing social, cultural and financial ties to the Jewish bourgeois circles in which he 
had long sought inclusion.135 The novel details their brief visit to Palestine during their 
journey to the island in 1902 and their observations of the land two decades later during 
what they had anticipated would be a brief return to civilization. Their second visit to the 
land reveals that during their twenty year absence: the “empty and deserted” town of 
Acre had undergone a “miracle;” Haifa had become a “magnificent city” with 
“cosmopolitan traffic in the streets” that “seemed thoroughly European;” Tiberias had 
become the “Garden of Eden … a new gem … [with] verdure and bloom everywhere;” 
Mount Hermon overlooked “the smaller ranges and the rejuvenated land;” Jericho and the 
Jordan Valley worked with “the newest and best agricultural machinery available” and 
produced “abundant crops … which brought rich profits;” the Dead Sea had been stirred 
to life; and Jerusalem, once a “picture of desolation” now had its sacred hills endowed 
with “new, vigorous, joyous life [and] many splendid new structures,” which transformed 
the ancient city into a “twentieth century metropolis.”136 All in all, Palestine had 
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ascended from a “forsaken” land, “a state of extreme decay [with] poor Turks, dirty 
Arabs, [and] timid Jews … indolent, beggarly and hopeless,” into a technologically 
advanced, agriculturally cultivated, intellectually progressive, economically prosperous 
“Promised Land.”137 A “truly modern commonwealth,” the Palestine built by the Zionist 
colonialists had been “fructified into a garden and a home for people who had once been 
poor, weak, hopeless and homeless.”138  
The utopian vision of a Jewish commonwealth depicted in Altneuland develops 
according to a clear colonial logic: through the immigration of a population of superior 
human intellect and capacity, a settler-colonial state is established according to rational 
plans that effectively exclude a wretched and underdeveloped indigenous population 
from the discourse of rights. A hegemonic strategy is thereby played out so as to detach 
the native population from the historical record of the space, while simultaneously 
entrenching the identity and legitimate claim of the settler population over the colonized 
land. As outlined in Altneuland, immigrating “in the full light of day,” the “Jewish 
settlers who streamed into the country had brought with them the experience of the whole 
civilized world.”139 Here surfaces one of the defining characteristics of the Zionist brand 
of colonialism. Instead of claiming to apply full or partial control over the territory of 
another population, settlement of the land is presented as a process of reclamation by, or 
return to, its rightful custodians. The settlers are posited as indigenous to the land. “We 
led our people back to the beloved soil of Palestine,” says David Littwak, Löwenberg’s 
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travel guide, “[and] milk and honey once more flowed in the ancient home of the 
Jews.”140 
Using the language of colonialism, Altneuland also expands on a familiar 
universal humanitarian argument posited by the European colonialists of the time: 
settling the land will result in the progress of humankind as a whole. Throughout the text, 
the founders of the Old-New-Land remark that its foundations were laid in Europe. 
Littwak notes, colonized Palestine “punish[es] only those crimes and misdemeanours 
which were penalized in enlightened European states.”141 Created in the image of Europe, 
the value of the achievements of the Jewish commonwealth in the areas of “education … 
land reform, charity organization, social welfare … the role of women … the progress of 
applied science,” literature, and technology are strictly measured in comparison.142 That 
the “Jewish peddler … [can carry] herself so modestly and yet with such dignity beside 
the great English lady” is proof that “Jews have risen to their ‘proper place’ among the 
‘great nations’ and ‘noble races’.”143 In Herzl’s novel, and within the Zionist framework, 
the logic of colonialism propagates the Jew as a liberal cosmopolitan “colonizer for 
progress” and Palestine is reduced to an “experimental land for humanity.”144 Overall, 
what is revealed in the fictional structure of Altneuland is the extent to which the Jewish 
national movement and its pundits employed the ideological and conceptual model of 
colonialism, and cooperated with the forces of European imperialism, in their 
justification of Jewish statehood.  
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Baruch Kimmerling points out that, since its inception, Zionism was adept at 
distancing itself from the colonial milieu within which it developed:  
Zionism emphasized the uniqueness of the ‘Jewish problem’: anti-Semitism, 
persecution, and, later, the Holocaust. It presented itself as the sole realistic and 
moral solution. Thus, the Jewish immigration movement was able to successfully 
present itself as a ‘return to Zion’, the correction of a cosmic injustice that had 
gone on for thousands of years, and as totally disconnected from other European 
immigration movements to other continents.145 
 
Granted, the historical record shows that prior to the advent of Zionism as a national 
movement, Jewish migration to Palestine spanned a number of centuries and was mainly 
driven either by religious motivations, or as a result of the socio-political circumstances 
for Jews becoming unbearable in other places.146 During these periods, however, and for 
almost thirteen centuries, the mainly peasant indigenous Arab population had remained 
on their native soil, and managed to survive the range of “natural catastrophes, epidemics, 
famines, devastating armies, foreign occupiers and tax collectors” that befell the land.147 
The discourse of Jewish immigration to Palestine radically transformed after World War 
I, whereby Zionism became intensively reformulated around European notions of 
statehood, colonialism and imperialism.148 In this period, the formula put forth by some 
Zionist figures – and one contested by some of their British sponsors – was that 
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“Palestine should become as Jewish as England is English.”149 Spearheading the political 
Zionist discourse, Herzl sought both Jewish and European support for his national project 
through “extortion, and stimulation of anti-Semitism.”150 Outlined by Walid Khalidi, 
Herzl’s framework of analysis can be summarized as follows:  
[A]nti-Semitism, which was the root of the Jewish problem, was ineradicable, the 
Jews constituted a people in the sense of a nation, and the Jewish problem was 
consequently a national problem which could only be solved by the gathering into 
one state of all Jews who wished to retain their Jewish identity, and by the 
complete assimilation and effacement as Jews of the remnant still scattered 
among the nations.151  
 
In other words, Herzl’s arguments go as follows: the Jewish problem exists because anti-
Semitism is both real and ingrained in Christian Europe, and because the Jews constitute 
a nation, the Jewish problem is therefore a national problem. Through the effective 
merging of Jewish identity with Zionist identity, not just as collectivities but also as a 
general mechanism of incorporation, Zionism has provided Israel’s settler-colonial 
framework with a certain social and historical validity. Despite this, the current 
scholarship from critical Arab and Jewish historians, social scientists and political 
scientists – particularly those in Israel – indicates that at a socio-political and ideological 
level the Zionist project has had to constantly defend the legitimate existence of Israel as 
a Jewish State. At the same time, at a legal-juridical level, the Zionist movement has also 
repeatedly had to explain its choice of Palestine as its territory for settlement to the 
international community.152 
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On this, the theoretical framework of analysis adopted by Gershon Shafir in his 
account of Israeli colonialism is particularly radical, and crucial.153 Shafir draws direct 
conceptual and historical links between post-1967 Israeli colonization in the West Bank 
and Gaza and pre-1948 Zionism.154 While acknowledging that the mode of Jewish 
colonization and settlement in Mandate Palestine differed and tailored itself according to 
the political, legal and economic realities of its time, he contends that the essence and 
nature of the Zionist project stayed colonialist. Shafir writes: 
Where others see historical bastards, I find a streak of historical ancestry. I offer, 
therefore, a theoretical and conceptual perspective that highlights the continuous 
centrality of colonization in Zionism and at the same time gives appropriate 
weight to the changes that have taken place, under new circumstances, within the 
framework of settlement. European colonialism, after all, did not create just one 
model of overseas society, and it seems to me that we can understand the 
transformation of Israeli society since 1967 most fruitfully as a transition from 
one method of European colonization to another one.155 
 
Shafir begins his comparative analysis by outlining the specific attributes of the Zionist 
means of colonization: unlike European hegemonic powers, the Jews had no organized 
polity until the beginning of the British Mandate; areas earmarked for settlement were 
selected ideologically by Zionists and not based on their economic potential; only a 
minor segment of the indigenous Palestinian population were nomadic when Zionist 
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settlement was underway and most were in the process of expanding their areas of 
residence to coastal and inland areas; purchase was considered a means of territorial 
accumulation by Zionist settlers unlike their European counterparts who considered 
colonized land as free; Jewish farmers employed seasonal unskilled wage labor unlike the 
contract-based or slave workers in European colonies; and many of the Jewish colonizers 
were refugees and lacked independent resources.156 These differences between the 
Zionist ‘pure settlement’ project and other frontiers of settlement do not indicate a non-
colonial character of the Jewish national movement, explains Shafir. Instead, these 
differences existed to ensure the smooth colonization of Palestine given the particularly 
difficult state of the land and circumstances of the incoming settlers. To Shafir, 
colonialism is not a cursory or transient effect of Zionism, but rather serves as its 
congenital backbone.157 
 He distinguishes between two phases of Zionist settlement in Palestine, what is 
called the First Aliyah from 1882-1903 with about 20,000-30,000 Jewish immigrants and 
the Second Aliyah from 1904-1914 with about 35,000-40,000 Jewish immigrants, the 
latter during a time where approximately 425,000 Palestinian-Arabs lived in Palestine.158  
The former period developed into what he calls ‘ethnic plantation colonies’ fueled mainly 
by a large low-paid and seasonal Arab labor force and a smaller better-paid Jewish labor 
force. The contradiction between market-based colonialism and Jewish national aims 
resulting from the considerable use of Arab labor stimulated a change in the colonial 
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direction during the second major phase of immigration.159 This arrival of Jewish 
immigrants during the Second Aliyah whose organized workers formed the ranks of the 
Labor Movement generated a change in the colonial struggle from the ‘conquest of land’ 
to the ‘conquest of labor’ as a central concern.160 However, despite this shift, Shafir 
contends that the ultimate aim of furthering Jewish colonialism and establishing a pure 
settlement colony has remained unchanged. 
 This analysis is significant given the ripples it creates within some of the most 
critical Israeli political circles. Depictions of Zionism as a colonial project is considered a 
provocation and translated in Israeli political discourse to self-hatred and disloyalty to the 
state.161 That said, as Ilan Pappé notes, the comparative colonial discourse does appear 
among a few critical Israeli scholars who tend to self-identify as the Zionist Left. But this 
too is a limited analysis. Pappé explains: 
Critical Israeli academicians … tend to see the year 1967 as a watershed between 
a pre-1967 moral, contained and basically united Israel and a post-1967 
occupying, expansionist and divided Jewish state. Hence, they are willing to point 
to colonialist features in the Israeli conduct in the occupied territories and trace 
all the present social and political predicaments to the making of Greater Israel in 
1967.162 
 
Shafir’s reformulation of Israeli history within the parameters of a colonial-settler scheme 
refuses the above demarcation. It simultaneously acknowledges the particular features of 
Zionist colonialism along with the key practices it shares with other ‘pure’ settler-colonial 
projects. The colonial logic of pre-1948 Zionism was amended in its post-1967 
realization, yet remained central to the Zionist project of nation-building. As the 
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paradigm of stateless citizenship demonstrates, this colonial logic has been inscribed in 
the contemporary Israeli incorporation regime in both its nationality and citizenship 
legislation. 
3. Behind the Balfour Declaration 
The above logic of colonialism reduces Palestine to an “experimental land for humanity,” 
– a blank slate on which human will and ingenuity could write what it wishes.163 Relevant 
for this study, the historical record pointed to above shows that the beginnings of Jewish 
national thought and activity were shaped by liberal conceptions of progress within a 
colonial era, when Jewish migration was heavily intertwined with large-scale 
intercontinental population movements. On this, Edward Said reminds us to consider 
Jewish colonization in Palestine within the larger context in which it was carried out. 
“Zionism was a movement for acquiring land in the Orient,” he writes, “during a period 
when in only one century (1815-1918) Europe's overseas territorial acquisitions increased 
from 35% to 85% of the earth's surface.”164 For Said, such territorial acquisitions cannot 
be dissociated from a specifically Eurocentric ideological constellation: “imperialism was 
the theory, colonialism the practice.”165 Indeed, placing the configuration of the Jewish 
State in the context of global forces of colonialism and European imperial power through 
the works of Kimmerling, Shafir, Pappe and Said explains the historical factors linking 
contemporary Israeli citizenship with global trends toward citizenship restriction and 
revocation.  
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As mentioned, since its inception, Zionism was sophisticated enough to distance 
itself from the historical matrix within which it developed, namely, traditional global 
colonialism. Prior to the advent of Zionism as a national movement, Jewish migration to 
Palestine spanned a number of centuries and was mainly driven either by religious 
motivations, or when the socio-political circumstances for Jews became unbearable in 
other places.166 During these periods, however, and for almost thirteen centuries, the 
largely peasant indigenous Arab population had remained rooted on their native soil, and 
managed to withstand the range of “natural catastrophes, epidemics, famines, devastating 
armies, foreign occupiers and tax collectors” that befell the land.167 Depicting the 
Palestinian-Arab peasant as “intelligent, competent and hardworking,” Dutch orientalist 
L.M.C Van Der Hoeven Leonhard points out that the land was heavily developed by the 
native population: 
The Jewish thinker Achad Ha'am reported after a journey through Palestine in 
1891 that it was difficult to find any still uncultivated farmland there. Other 19th 
century sources report on the cultivation of various fruits. In the plains of 
Esdraelon in 1883, 'almost every acre was in the highest state of cultivation,' 
[and] this was still the case in 1914.168 
 
The discourse of Jewish immigration to Palestine radically transformed after World War 
I, whereby Zionism became intensively reformulated around Western notions of 
statehood, colonialism and imperialism. Spearheading the political Zionist discourse, and 
seeking Jewish and European support for his national project through “extortion and 
stimulation of anti-Semitism,” Herzl's framework of analysis can be summarized as 
follows: the Jewish problem exists because anti-Semitism is both real and ineradicable, 
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and because the Jews constitute a nation, the Jewish problem is therefore a national 
problem.169 Other measures for securing support for the Zionist national movement 
included: 
... the trading of Jewish influence in the Press and Finance, and of the Jews 
themselves as being ten million secret agents; the playing off of colonial 
ambitions against each other... alarm[ing] the Jews by representing anti-Semitism 
as ineradicable... instil[ling] into non-Jews fear of the Jews, of their power, and 
especially of their revolutionary mentality... [and] forc[ing] European statesmen 
into the dilemma: Zionism or Jew-formented revolution.170 
 
Although suggesting in Altneuland that the native Arab population would have equal 
rights, Herzl wrote in his Tagebücher (“Diaries”) that the existing land property was to be 
gently expropriated. This involved the prohibition of any subsequent resale to the original 
owners, with all immovable lands remaining in exclusively Jewish hands.171 In fact, at the 
Fifth Zionist Congress in 1901, the Jewish National Fund was founded under Herzl's 
leadership with the explicit mandate to “purchase and develop land as a national resource 
of the Jewish people, by the Jewish people, and for the Jewish people.”172 
... Herzl tried in Constantinople to obtain a Charter for rights, duties and 
privileges of a Jüdisch-Ottomanische Land-Companie zur Besie-delung von 
Palastina und Syrien (Jewish-Ottoman Colonization Association for the 
Settlement of Palestine and Syria). In his archives the draft-Charter was preserved 
for exactly such an instrument for colonization. [...] Article III of Herzl's draft 
Charter gave the Jews the right to deport the native population.173 
 
Further, the Zionist project also developed within the discourse of European imperialism. 
In Der Judenstaat, seeking to persuade European imperial powers to legally acknowledge 
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and politically endorse Zionism and its two-fold mandate of Jewish settlement and 
statehood, Herzl argues: 
Palestine is our ever-memorable historic home. [...] We should there form a 
portion of a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed 
to barbarism. We should as a neutral State remain in contact with all Europe, 
which would have to guarantee our existence.174  
 
Overall, as a national movement, Zionism employed the ideological and conceptual 
model of colonialism, and cooperated with the forces of European imperialism, in its 
justification of Jewish statehood.  
This colonial mindset and imperial justifications for Jewish statehood are most 
evident in the first and most referenced documentation supporting “the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,” namely, the Balfour Declaration. 
Completed on November 2, 1917 and composed of a mere sixty-seven words, this 
pronouncement is a letter signed by Lord Balfour to Baron Rothschild, a Jewish 
community leader in Britain. An analysis paper by British journalist J.M.N. Jeffries in 
1939 outlines the deep conceptual, legal, and political problems of this document. With 
this, the colonial mindset of both the Zionist movement and its European supporters 
surface. Pointing out that the “authorship of the text was not solitary but collective,”175 
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and that before its public unveiling, the Declaration underwent intense examination “in 
all its bearings and implications, and subjected to repeated change and amendment,” 
Jeffries concludes that there is “no doubt” that: 
Whatever is to be found in the Balfour Declaration was put into it deliberately. 
There are no accidents in that text. If there is any vagueness in it this is an 
intentional vagueness.176  
 
The colonial underpinnings of the Balfour Declaration surface in three central ways. 
First, Jeffries points to a series of “unfathomable phrases” with a “culpable lack of 
definition,” which result in a certain vagueness of terminology.177 Phrases from the 
Declaration affirming support for “a national home for the Jewish people,” a “sympathy 
with Jewish Zionist aspirations,” and pledging Britain's “best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this object” were masterfully (and intentionally) dubious.178 “National 
home” had no established political or legal meaning in 1917, and the claims of 
“sympathy” and “best endeavours” were skillfully used in an unqualified and ambiguous 
manner to allow the British government to remove itself from any explicit indebtedness if 
necessary.179 The second and third elements of colonial logic are both apparent in the 
following, and final, clause of the Declaration: 
It being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the 
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the 
rights and political status enjoyed by any Jews in any other country.180 
 
Appearing as a desire to protect the rights of the indigenous population of Palestine, or an 
implicit call for Zionist military and political restraint, the depiction of Palestinian-Arabs 
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as the “existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” effectively identifies the colonial 
unit of measurement as “Jewish” and “non-Jewish.” The native Arabs are translated into 
the “non-Jews.” The majority population becomes the non-minority population.181 Not 
only is the actual ratio of Arab and Jewish populations in Palestine skewed with this 
skillful phraseology, but the very identity of the indigenous Arab is effaced and made 
obscure. Jeffries also notes that the qualification “existing” gives the “impression [...] that 
these Arabs have just managed to survive” after randomly ending up in the territory.182 
Indeed, sentiments and promises similar to the final clause of the above Declaration 
appear in an “Interim Report of the Civil Administration of Palestine” written by Herbert 
Louis Samuel as High Commissioner of the Council of the League of Nations on July 30, 
1921. Discussing how Palestine “animates the Jewries of the world,” Samuel claims: 
This is not to say that Jewish immigration is to involve Arab emigration, that the 
greater prosperity of the country, through the development of the Jewish 
enterprises, is to be at the expense, and not to the benefit of the Arabs, that the 
use of Hebrew is to imply the disappearance of Arabic, that the establishment of 
the elected Councils in the Jewish Community for the control of its affairs is to be 
followed by the subjection of the Arabs to the rule of those Councils. In a word, 
the degree to which Jewish national aspirations can be fulfilled in Palestine is 
conditioned by the rights of the present inhabitants.183 
 
It is worthwhile to push the significance of the above qualifications further and point to 
the centrality of the Zionist idea of transfer.184 Even the most progressive Zionist thinkers 
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in the early twentieth century asserted that the colonization of Palestine has to go in two 
different directions. This involves both Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel (or greater 
Israel), and the simultaneous resettlement of the Arabs to neighboring Arab states.185 As 
such, these early articulations by officers of the British Mandate of the indigenous Arab 
community as the ‘existing’ or ‘present’ populations hints at plans for their future 
displacement from their native soil.  
Furthermore, Jeffries asserts that this passage of the Declaration also “falsifies the 
status of the Arabs” by distinguishing between the “civil” rights of indigenous 
Palestinians and the “political” status of Jewish settlers.186 Here, reference to the “civil” 
rights of Arabs effectively replaces, and thereby negates, any historical rights or natural 
title they may have to the land. As a result, the political claims of the indigenous 
population are supplanted by an ambiguous and desolate legal category of “civil rights.” 
At the same time, there is a distinction made between the “rights” of Arabs and the 
“status” of Jews in Palestine. Acting as a “definite guarantee” of the “character of the 
regime intended,” the promise of Jewish political status effectively served as a “deceptive 
text by which Arabs were to be deprived of their citizenship.” 187 The Declaration's 
colonial conceptualization of the non-presence of Arabs on their native soil thus renders 
impossible Arab access to political and legal spaces in any future commonwealth. This 
realization is significant for current examinations of the meaning and civil status of non-
Jewish persons in the Israeli incorporation regime.  
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Discussed below, the Zionist drafters of the Balfour Declaration established a 
colonial logic that continues to persist in contemporary Israeli democracy. “A 
distinction... [is drawn] between Jewish rights and Arab claims... [so that] Palestine... is 
not a country unless the Jews occupy it.” 188 As the units of political measurement, only 
their presence can make it one.189 The logic of Jews as the central figure in the Israeli 
body politic lays the colonial grounds within which Arab and Jewish interactions around 
access to rights have been framed since its inception. Put differently, when placing the 
configuration of the Jewish State in the context of global forces of colonialism and 
European imperial power we can extract the historical factors that link modern Israeli 
citizenship with global trajectories toward citizenship restriction and revocation. 
4. Alice goes to Blunderland 
Alice had not been in Palestine long. She had arrived with her sister by the 
‘Empress of Britain’, having set off from England on one of those pleasant winter 
cruises which the inhabitants of northern countries patronize for the sole purpose 
of obtaining sunshine and excitement in a territory where Income Tax does not 
exist. … So she was considering in her own mind, as well as she could, […] 
whether the pleasure of visiting the Holy Land was really worth the trouble, when 
suddenly a White Rabbit with pink eyes ran into the lounge and jumped up on to 
the chair beside her. 
“Oh dear, oh dear” said the Rabbit, “I shall be too late; I shall be too late.” 
“Why, where are you going?” said Alice, politely. 
“To a very important meeting,” replied the Rabbit, looking at his watch. 
“A very important meeting,” repeated Alice; “I wonder where that can be?” 
“Follow me and I’ll show you,” replied the Rabbit….190 
 
This is the beginning of a 1938 book titled Palestine Parodies: The Holy Land in Verse 
                                                
188 Ibid., 185-186. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Mustard and Cress (P.E.F. Cressall), Palestine Parodies Being the Holy Land in Verse and Worse, 
 (Jerusalem: Azriel Press, private edition, 1938), XX. 
	 98	
and Worse, made and printed for “private circulation” by the Azriel Press in Tel Aviv, 
Palestine. Written by P.E.F. Cressall, a British District Judge during the Mandate and 
published under a nom de plume Mustard and Cress, the text follows Alice and the Rabbit 
as they explore the various contradictions and realities in Mandate Palestine. A literary 
gem of political satire, this revealing book written by a British legal functionary brings to 
the fore the juridico-political colonial blueprint passed on to the Zionist leadership with 
the end of the Mandate period. In particular, it provides a bird’s-eye into how British 
officials were unable to view Arabs and Jews as equals, often taking sides in the conflict 
between the two communities.191 Similar to the classical story of Alice in Wonderland, 
the story of “Alice in Blunderland” (in the land of ‘blunder’, that is) recounts her visit to 
the Holy Land and represents the struggle of a child to survive in the confusing world of 
adults. In both Wonderland and Blunderland, Alice grows older during the story as she 
observes that adults need rules to live by and that most will abide by those rules blindly 
and without question, leading to arbitrary behavior and incomprehensible exchanges. Yet, 
within the colonial context of the British Mandate, Alice’s observation of a way of living 
and reasoning that is quite different from her own takes on a different political tone.  
For example, “Dedicated with respect to those who possess a laughing mind,” the 
Preface of this candid, humourous and illustrative colonial text outlines its motives: 
One of the preliminary steps in the introduction of legislation is the publication of 
the proposed new measure in the form of a ‘Bill’. This is usually accompanied by 
a concise memorandum stating the ‘Objectives and Reasons’ thereof. So, 
following precedent, we humbly state that the objectives and reasons of this little 
book is to attempt to create in Palestine an atmosphere in which everyone will see 
themselves as others see them. What we mean by this is that if people in this 
distressful country stopped walking around like undertakers, looking for a dead 
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body to bury, and remembered the old tag ‘Laugh and the World Laughs with 
You,’ the country would develop that essential adjunct to civilization – ‘A 
Laughing Mind’ – and be happier for it. 192 
 
An instance of the literary nonsense genre, the adult world in Palestine is a strange and 
obscure space to the reader. This is because of Alice’s young age, but also due to the 
differences between the projected image of an enlightened and progressive England and a 
backward and undeveloped ‘Orient’. Alice represents the experience of an English 
audience, encountering the colonized periphery and forced to cope with an unstable and 
‘non-ordered’ socio-political order. Whether it is the chaotic streets, volatile and impolite 
cultural practices, lazy diplomats, bureaucratic absurdities or the rising social unrest in 
the country during these crucial years of the Mandate, Alice is repeatedly in awe and 
wonder of being “among the people who think upside down and write backwards.”193 
Published during the period of the first major nationalist uprising by Palestinian-Arabs 
against British colonial rule, the text is a treasure chest of parodic Orientalist 
representations of key issues facing inhabitants of the Holy Land from the perspective of 
a British expatriate. For example, the Rabbit’s introduction to Alice of the souk, an open-
air marketplace in Middle Eastern and North African cities, is as follows: 
The Souk’s a street of Monks and bones, 
And pavements flagged with murderous stones; 
Where Monks and Blokes and hideous Wenches, 
Produce the most unpleasant stenches: 
All well defined, as are the stinks, 
Pertaining to the sewers and sinks; 
So when you go to bed to-night 
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Repeat these words with all your might: 
‘O! City Fathers hear our prayer – 
‘Our supplication to the Mayor – 
‘If Ye remove the stones and stenches, 
‘We’ll try to put up with the wenches.’194 
 
While Alice guardedly questions this description by asking the Rabbit whether he is 
being “unfair to the local inhabitants,” the polluted space and violent history of the land 
nevertheless become its foremost and introductory features. The Rabbit then guides Alice 
through a tunnel-like street that dips and descends into the middle of the earth, leading to 
a long hall at the end of which “several funny looking men were sitting, arrayed in what 
looked to her like night dresses, and wearing… inverted ink pots on their heads.”195 
Described as discussing the affairs of the State, these men are defined in the story as “the 
A.S.S.”. Thinking that the Rabbit must surely have made a mistake, Alice timidly 
inquires into the name and the Rabbit responds “The Arab Supreme State… and don’t 
speak so loudly, or they’ll spot you and hold a demonstration. … They demonstrate about 
anything.” At this point, Alice is spotted by a government official and asked to follow the 
man to what he called “The Pool of Tears,” namely, the government offices.196 Headed 
by the inscription “Abandon hope all ye who enter here,” the government offices were 
explained to Alice as “the place where we draft circulars, and write departmental 
minutes… [where] they invent taxes, and produce surplus balances.” 197 This alludes 
nicely to the hardening of British attitudes toward the Mandate, including its economic 
and bureaucratic costs.  
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Recounting to Alice the history of the Civil Service of Palestine, the government 
official explains: 
You must realize that Palestine has undergone various changes since the time of 
the Crusaders. Originally, it was the Holy Land; then came the War when it was 
wholly occupied by Army heroes, finally becoming, owing to the League of 
Nations, and other what nots, as you see it now; – a most un-wholly Land. Its 
present position, however is not due to anything we have done… for Palestine 
was unknown to the Colonial Office before, we, pioneers put it on the map. We 
turned an Ottoman Vilayet into an English El Dorado fit for heroes to live in, but 
most unfortunately our efforts came to nought….198 
 
The sense of having failed in their efforts to secure self-governing institutions and a 
culture of self-management in Palestine becomes visible in the above account, and 
creates a sentiment of disillusionment and disinterest in the Mandate. For this reason, the 
story outlines that local Mayors are asleep and lazy, bureaucrats are terrified at the 
thought of locating new information to assist their work, promotion in office is seen as a 
form of punishment, political explanations take a long time and are “never satisfactory,” 
and District Commissioners struggle to learn the Arabic and Hebrew “without tears.”199 
In addition to the story of “Alice in Blunderland,” the book makes use of 
“Departmental Ditties,” “Misreported Cases in the Uncommon Law,” “Fabulous Fables” 
and “Potty Poems” to discuss a whole range of key issues facing the Mandate. These 
include: partition, religious tolerance, freedom of expression and criticism, the 
preservation of antiquities, border control and policing, the education system, the 
jurisdiction of courts, immigration policies (or, as it is written in the book, the 
“immigration quandrille”), passport control practices, policing, health care, the taxing 
system and urban and architectural development of the land, among others. One of the 
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key issues in the mid-late 1930s that the story of “Alice in Blunderland” addresses is that 
of partition. Appointed in 1936, the Palestine Royal Commission was a British Royal 
Commission headed by Lord Peel. Also known as the Peel Commission, its mandate was 
to investigate the causes of unrest following the first Arab general strike in Mandate 
Palestine. As Chapter Three explains, this was a broad-based political action that led to a 
three-year revolt by Palestinian-Arabs against both British colonial rule and increased 
Jewish immigration, in support of national self-determination. Resulting from the Peel 
Commission was a report in July 1937 that concluded, for the first time, that the Mandate 
in Palestine had become unfeasible and partition of the country into separate Arab and 
Jewish states was recommended. Near the end of the story, and having grown up a fair bit 
by now, Alice meets a Cadet at the District Commissioner’s Office. She asks him for an 
explanation about the process of partition in Mandatory Palestine. The Cadet is an erratic 
character who admits that, like the Arab and the Jew, he too does not “understand what 
the word ‘partition’ means.” Nevertheless, he goes on to recount a poem “worth listening 
to,” so as to clarify the situation to Alice: 
I passed by a vineyard and saw with one eye, 
How a Jew and an Arab were sharing a pie 
The Jew took some pie crust and gravy and meat 
While his friend had the dish as his share of the treat. 
 
When the pie was all finished the Jews as a boon 
Permitted the Arab to pocket the spoon 
Then some Englishmen came to join in the meal 
But they ate the orange: -- and left them the peel!200 
 
A number of issues are revealed between the lines of this humorous account of the 
political process and intention of partition in Mandate Palestine. The first is its perception 
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that both groups are considered inferior by the British and in need of the direction and 
support of an advanced and civilized nation. Relatedly, the English audience of this tale is 
also well aware of the unequal power relations involved between the Arab and the Jew. 
Leaving only with the empty dish and the spoon, the indigenous and economically 
precarious Arab is, under British administration, denied a just share of the pie; a 
metaphor for the land. In this narrative, the negative representation of the Jew as ‘greedy’ 
and ‘unfair’ is also a critique of the Zionist desire at the time for massive development of 
the land to facilitate Jewish immigration in Palestine. This was at a time when numerous 
British colonial officials were instead politically and economically inclined to maintain 
the status quo and hinder the organized rise of the Jewish population in the country. 
Moreover, it alludes to frustrations felt by some colonial officers for the manner in which 
the civilizing mission the British established to promote a modern society on Western 
lines was also claimed by the Zionists. As noted by John Hayes Holmes, an American 
journalist traveling in Palestine in the late 1920s, “Arabs are natives in the real sense of 
the word… [and] behave as the English have found natives behaving in other parts of the 
earth,” but as the governing authority of Palestine they “do not know what to make of 
[the Jews]” who do not act submissively and according to the traditional colonial 
authority.201 The participation of the Englishmen, as supposed interlocutors and 
arbitrators between the two peoples of the land, only led to a further extraction of the 
content and resources of the space. When the contents of the orange are consumed by the 
Englishmen, the two parties are left with the peel. This is, a pun, of course, for the Peel 
Commission that recommended partition and British withdrawal from the Holy Land. All 
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in all, the above passage nicely illustrates the uneven legal and political colonial 
arrangement of the Mandate for dealing with the collective demands and needs of Arabs 
and Jews, and alludes to its influence on the configuration of the modern Israeli 
incorporation regime. 
5. The Holocaust and the foundations of Israeli civil policy 
You know my friend how long since in this Land 
The Camel and the Ass walked hand in hand; 
Dost think it then so very strange a thing 
To find a city built on golden sand?202 
 
Differences between the scholarly and fictional idea of Israel as part of the ‘European 
core’ surfaced in the late 1940s, when the hundreds of thousands of European Jews who 
survived the Holocaust arrived in Mandate Palestine. Grown out of the historical matrix 
of European colonialism, Zionist proponents assumed Jewish, particularly Ashkenazi, 
intellectual, physical and moral superiority vis-à-vis the indigenous Arab population. 
Thus, the presence and collective experience of Jews with the death camps in Europe 
conflicted with the Zionist ideological discourse in Palestine and its projected body 
politic in numerous ways. As with today, mainstream Israeli historical and socio-political 
discourse has an ambivalent relationship with Jewish life in the Nazi ghettos and camps 
in Europe. On the one hand, the incoming Jews were projected as exhibiting the familiar 
diasporic ailments of unclear identities, non-rootedness and weak disposition. The image 
of the diasporic Jew as diseased, de-territorialized and physically and mentally decrepit 
was contrasted with that of the strong, healthy and territorialized Hebrew, armed and 
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actively pioneering the land.203 This adequately accounted for the image of European 
Jews held by Zionist Jews in Palestine as a passive mass easily led into slaughter. One of 
the first major writers of Hebrew literature, David Frishman, recounted the moral and 
social inferiority of the Holocaust survivors in relation to the Israeli Hebrew. He explains 
how Holocaust survivors were labeled as “human dust,” an identification “connoting a 
people without spine, without personality, who were blown hither and thither by the 
wind.”204 The characterization of Holocaust survivors as “human dust” attributed the 
fragile spirits of these Jews more to the diasporic existence and less to the systematic 
violence and unprecedented atrocities done by the Germans. This account of survivors 
was adopted by Yishuv leaders and even by David Ben Gurion himself who exclaimed: 
A mixed multitude of human dust without a language, without education, without 
roots, and without any roots in the nation’s tradition and vision…. Turning these 
people of dust into a cultured, independent nation with a vision will be no easy 
task.205 
 
As Pappe notes, the Israeli leadership and national narrative seemed to have “coped better 
with dead Holocaust Jews than with Holocaust survivors.”206 However, this narrative 
changed momentarily with the 1943 Jewish ghetto uprising in Warsaw, where the 
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‘diaspora’ and ‘Hebrew’ personalities became less distinct. Here, for the first time, the 
ghetto Jew was territorialized and cloaked in the mantle of Zionism as armed, proud, self-
reliant, and imbued with a combat spirit actively resisting humiliation and violent death. 
Between 1941 and 1943, dozens of Jewish groups formed underground resistance 
movements, the most famous of which was the Warsaw ghetto uprising. With the Nazi 
dispatch of Jews in Poland in 1942, from Warsaw to the death camps in to Treblinka, the 
Jewish inhabitants of the Warsaw ghetto organized and issued a proclamation calling for 
Jews to resist going to the railroad cars. Using weapons smuggled into the ghetto, the 
rebels fired upon German soldiers as they sought to collect a group of ghetto inhabitants 
for deportation to the death camps. Though the trained and armed German troops 
eventually crushed the resistance, capturing, executing and deporting the remaining 
survivors to death camps, this uprising was an astonishing and unprecedented attempt to 
resist the Nazi program from within the camps by force. 
Within Israeli historiography, the political elite re-presented the month-long 
resistance movement in the ghettos and camps as a phase in the “long Zionist history of 
struggle against those who wished to destroy the Jewish people.”207 Announced in the 
order of the day issued on the fifth anniversary of the Warsaw uprising to the Palmach’s 
soldiers, “the victory in the ghetto the victory of the Jewish person, was to die with 
honor, weapon in hand, and not as sheep led to the slaughter.”208 The contrast between 
the humiliating death of passive and elderly diaspora Jews in Nazi concentration camps 
and the heroic death of the partisan was inculcated in Israel’s national heroic mythology 
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as an exception. The leaders and fighters in the Warsaw ghetto were, in the process, seen 
as uniquely distinct from the other non-resisting Jewish masses.  
The ‘Zionization’ and re-territorialization of the narrative of the ghetto uprisings 
in the collective Israeli memory was exposed by post-Zionist scholars in the 1980s and 
1990s.209 Identified with the political-left, post-Zionism is an intellectual current among a 
collective of Israeli historians, theorists and social scientists that revolutionized Israel 
Studies. These scholars critically examine and subject Israel’s founding myths to 
historical and moral criticism. Calling for a revision of mainstream and mainly Labor 
Zionist understandings of Israeli history and identity, one of the key aims of post-Zionist 
scholars is to expose the discrepancies and untruths in, and to demolish the founding 
myths of Israel’s self-understanding and rhetoric vis-à-vis its relations with indigenous 
Palestinians. On this front, post-Zionists use historical, political, social and cultural 
records to reveal the aims and intentions of the Zionist project to systematically expel 
Arab inhabitants from historic Palestine. Here, post-Zionist scholars expose how the 
settler-colonial foundations of the Zionist movement in Palestine, as well as its legal, 
political and territorial ambitions have produced a xenophobic, nationalistic and 
militaristic society in Israel that is impervious to liberal and humanistic values.210  
Representations of the Warsaw uprisings by Zionist writers and leaders were 
revealed by post-Zionists as an example of the political and cultural production of a 
nationalist and militarist ‘idea of Israel’. Post-Zionist scholars pointed to accounts of the 
Warsaw uprisings as an example of how national self-determination movements 
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appropriate past events and identities in relation to current needs of nation-building and 
the political interests of social cohesion.211 A similar critique of depictions of the ghetto 
uprisings was posited by Marek Edelman, one of the rebel leaders in the Warsaw ghetto. 
Surviving the Holocaust and an outspoken critic of Israeli policies and practices against 
Palestinians, Edelman later became one of the most prominent thinkers in Poland. 
Insisting that the human and civil rights struggle remained in Europe, he was a strong 
opponent of Zionism and contested the representation of the Warsaw rebellion. Pappe 
writes, 
Edelman did not fit the image that the official cultural producers in Israel wished 
the leaders of the rebellion to have; worse, he actively contested it. …. He 
disliked the way he and his friends were portrayed visually and textually in Israeli 
scholarship – ‘none of them had ever looked like this… they didn’t have rifles, 
cartridge pouches or maps; besides, they were dark and dirty’, hardly the ideal 
type of handsome, Aryan-like young Jews seen in the Israeli museums of the 
Holocaust and in the pictures decorating official texts. 212 
 
Here differences between the scholarly and fictional idea of Israel begin to surface. 
Recent historical contributions also reveal that Holocaust survivors outside of the Ghetto 
uprisings were far more emotionally steadfast and mentally and physically resilient than 
Israeli national memory projects. Hanna Yablonka explains that Holocaust survivors 
were more educated, younger, urban, individualistic and mercantile, a lifestyle that 
conflicted with the more cooperative and secular forms of organization in the kibbutzim 
and moshavim.213 As such, while survivors were seen as effective in urban spaces, there 
was great doubt among the Israeli mainstream and its leadership as to whether these 
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immigrants would be able to transform abandoned Arab villages into functioning 
agricultural areas.214 
Yet, perhaps most telling of the resilience of survivors surrounds their integration 
into the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), an area of discussion that reveals the ideological 
understanding of the ‘idea of Israel’ held by the majority of sabar, or Israel-born Jews. 
From the perspective of mainly young Israelis, in whose eyes the respectable survivors 
were the partisans who exhibited the combat spirit they sought to foster in the IDF, their 
first interactions with survivors were either in the decrepit camps for displaced persons 
camps in Europe and Cyprus or on immigrant ships as they were arriving to Palestine. 
Immediately thrown in the IDF with the draft during the 1948-war, survivors were 
expected to fight alongside Israeli Jews. This transition was imposed without necessarily 
having their physical and psychological experiences in the Holocaust or their 
expectations communicated or addressed. However, though often portrayed in the Israeli 
national imaginary as weak and cowardly fighters through various cultural productions, 
Yablonka contends that Holocaust survivors were nevertheless able to successfully 
absorb into the IDF despite the aforementioned impediments.215 
The recent historical work of Salman Abu Sitta and Terry Rempel outlines the 
participation of Holocaust survivors in the detention and forced-labor camps that were 
established for Palestinians by the young State of Israel.216 Basing their work on 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reports from the time and interviews 
with former prisoners, they explain that there were five ‘recognized’ and official 
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detention camps and at least seventeen others that were unofficial and improvised where 
Red Cross officers were not allowed to visit. The first camp was Ijlil, which was about 
thirteen kilometers northeast of Jaffa and lay on the site of the destroyed Palestinian 
village Ijlil al-Qibiliyya, whose inhabitants were expelled in early April.217 Composed 
mainly of tents housing hundreds of individuals considered prisoners of war by Israeli 
forces, this site was surrounded by barbed wire fences with watchtowers and a gate with 
armed guards. 
While the placement of Palestinian civilians in Israeli prisoner of war camps is a 
largely under-researched event of the 1948-war, their internment was a much greater 
phenomenon compared with the detention of combatants. A majority of around 5,000 
civilians placed in the official camps during the war were reduced to conditions 
“described by one ICRC official as ‘slavery’ and then expelled from the country at the 
end of the war.”218 The monthly reports sent to the Red Cross headquarters weeks after 
the start of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, outlined that the majority of the civilian 
prisoners of war were being utilized as slave labor to fuel Israel’s economy during the 
war. The issue at hand was also that none of the treaties in the wake of World War II that 
determined the rules of conduct in wartime effectively addressed the problem of the 
treatment of civilian non-combatants in occupied territory. To address this, the ICRC 
appealed to the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), the organizations 
representing the two sides in Palestine. They were asked “to act in obedience to the 
traditional rules of international law, and to apply… the principles embodied in the [two 
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conventions] signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929.”219 This appeal included a specific call 
to both sides to respect the “security for all non-combatants, especially, women, children 
and the aged.”220 In April 1948 both bodies agreed to the ICRC’s appeal. As Zionist 
forces pushed along their conquest of the lands allocated by the United Nations to an 
Arab state in their 1947 General Assembly Resolution 181 (the UN Partition Plan), the 
number of prisoners in these labor camps continued to rise. This, in turn, constituted a 
key supplement to Jewish labor.  
Abu Sitta recounts that while the living and working conditions at the 
unmonitored camps were incomparably worse, those at the official sites were not 
necessarily preferable. The conditions in these camps deserve particular attention. By 
mid-May, less than two months into the war, the New York representative of the Arab 
Higher Committee sent a letter to the UN secretary-general complaining of the 
“maltreatment and humiliation of [Arab] prisoners” by Israel. 221 This humiliation 
involved, among other acts, “forcing civilians to dig trenches, carry water from Arab 
cisterns to supply Jewish neighborhoods, work as servants for Jewish families, and give 
blood for Jews wounded in the fighting.” 222 According to testimonies collected by Abu 
Sitta and Rempel, other treatment included Arab prisoners being “lined up and ordered to 
strip naked as a punishment for the escape of two prisoners at night,” with “[Jewish] 
adults and children [coming] from nearby kibbutz to watch [Arabs] line up naked and 
laugh.”223 Further, some prisoners recounted being denied food for several days while 
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only being provided dried bread, while others described extreme violence at the labor 
camps in the form of beating and random shooting.   
For our purposes, what is particularly striking, and what speaks to the kinds of 
integration the Holocaust survivor immigrant population was exposed to in the Israeli 
national project, is the participation of German Jews in these wartime labor camps. In a 
separate article about this study published in the Lebanese daily newspaper Al-Akhbar, 
Abu Sitta describes that German Jews were allegedly among the guards at these labor 
camps.224 His study effectively reveals the foundations and beginnings of Israeli political 
and legal policy towards Palestinian civilians; a policy that surfaces in the form of 
kidnapping, beatings, arrest, and detainment. The alleged participation of German Jews 
as prison guards at these camps places Israeli civil policy in the context of the crimes in 
Europe. It reveals one of the conceptual and historical ways the young Jewish State 
reproduced itself in the image of ‘the core’. That a forced labor camp was opened in 
Palestine three years after camps were closed in Germany, and that they were allegedly 
run by former prisoners of these extermination camps links Israeli civil policy to that of 
twentieth century Europe in intimate political forms. This historical connection and 
political trajectory is significant in two major ways. First, though viewed by the Israeli 
sabar as morally and socially inferior, immigrant groups such as Holocaust survivors (as 
well as the so-called ‘Mizrahi’ or Arab-Jewish refugees who arrived in Israel in this 
period) were nevertheless immediately thrown into the militarism of the Israeli national 
project.225 They were expected to perform despite their physical and psychological 
                                                
224  Yazan al-Saadi, “On Israel's little-known concentration and labor camps in 1948-1955,” al-akhbar 
  English, September 29, 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/21763.  
225  Post-Zionist academics have written extensively on the systemic exclusions, daily violence and ethnic, 
  cultural and socio-economic discrimination faced by so-called ‘Mizrahi’ or Eastern Jews (this is a 
	 113	
trauma. And second, the national project they found themselves contributing to in the 
young Jewish State was one whose methods were remarkably similar to those violent and 
exclusionary policies that had recently resulted in extreme human destruction in Europe. 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The Jewish national movement employed the ideological and conceptual model of mainly 
European colonialism. In doing so, it worked hand-in-hand with the tools and processes 
of European imperialism in its justification of Jewish statehood and choice of Mandate 
Palestine as its desired territory. This chapter has brought together literary and historical 
sources and outlined the key scholarship on Zionism as a colonial enterprise so as to 
extract the ideological foundations that gave shape to the civic exclusions and political 
configuration of the proposed Jewish State. With this I have shown that the colonial 
conceptualization of the non-presence of Arabs on the land enabled policies and practices 
to curtail their access to political and legal spaces in the future Jewish commonwealth. 
The literary and historical texts cited in this chapter lay the grounds for examining the 
colonial context within which Arab and Jewish confrontations on access to rights were 
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framed. As the next chapter argues, while the modern Israeli incorporation regime has 
been adept at distancing itself from the European colonial record within which it 
developed, its nationality regulations and the codification of its citizenship are derived 
from the above logics of exclusion. Understanding discourses on citizenship and 
nationality in Mandate Palestine as sites of production of European colonial power also 
aid us in placing modern interrogations of the figure of the citizen in Israel as part of a 
political trajectory towards restriction and revocation of citizenhood. As such, placing the 
configuration of the Jewish State in the context of inter-national forces of colonialism and 
European imperial power explains the historical factors that link modern Israeli 
citizenship with global trends in the West toward the stretching, dilution and redrawing of 
the boundaries of citizenship. 
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Chapter Three | Configuring the Jewish State: Citizenship from the Core to the 
Periphery 
 
At the application office for passports for the influx of incoming immigrants: 
The Walrus and the Carpenter 
were walking hand in hand, 
They’d come with tourist tickets 
to see the Holy Land 
And were discussing passport laws, 
But didn’t think ‘em grand. […] 
 
“Lets weep a bit,” the Walrus said, 
 “and deeply sympathize” 
“With those who come from other lands,  
 “and tell so many lies;” 
And he held his pocket hankerchief 
 before his streaming eyes. 
 
“O, Walrus,” said the Carpenter, 
 “cheer up, and don’t be glum.” 
“All immigration laws are bad, 
 but this one’s really bum. …”226 
 
1. Introduction  
During the interwar period changes to the immigration and travel regulations of states 
were prevalent around the world. This led to a rising need for governments to 
(re)categorize their inhabitants as subjects or citizens and administer to them regular 
certified documentation appropriate to their identity and nationality. Using extensive 
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archival material, this chapter outlines discussions among legal scholars and political 
figures in the Zionist leadership, the British government and the League of Nations until 
and immediately after statehood on the features of the liberal citizenship and nationality 
regime anticipated for the Jewish State. I begin by examining scholarship on British 
colonial policies and practices before 1948 that placed apart Jewish from Arab subjects in 
their applications for Palestinian passports, residency and visas. The scholarship I survey 
reveals that the British Mandate in Palestine (1922-1948) was key to the 
internationalization of citizenship structures and exclusions. It united various ethno-
national groups living around the world as Palestinian citizens, along with a wide ethno-
national range of largely Jewish citizen subjects eligible for Palestinian citizenship.227 By 
examining the formation of policies and practices of citizenship in the Jewish State, 
whether in the interwar period or in contemporary Israel, I show how this case study is 
located in a unique colonial position in the broader British Empire. Significantly, I 
conclude this chapter with an analysis of discussions among early Zionist policy-makers 
configuring the nature and constitution of the nationality and citizenship laws of the 
Jewish State in the first years after its establishment. With this I prepare the terrain of 
discussion for Chapter Four to examine the mechanisms through which the Zionist logic 
of exclusion continues from its pre-1948 forms and is constituted and manifested in 
contemporary Israeli citizenship structures. 
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2. Palestinian citizenship and nationality in the 1920s and 1930s 
2.1. British Mandate: Laying the basis for citizenship as exclusion 
Lauren Banko’s important study, The Invention of Palestinian Citizenship, 1918-1937, 
examines the development of the interaction between Palestinian citizenship and civic 
identity, placing this relationship within a colonial context. Initiated by the British, each 
step in the creation of a citizenship regime in Palestine in the interwar period involved 
key concerns and questions over the various legal status, civil rights and sovereignty of 
recognized subjects, nationals and citizens in a mandated territory. While the British had 
considerable experience with the management and classification of ‘oriental races’ in 
their other colonies, the case of Palestine was unique in a number of ways. In a separate 
publication, Banko explains that 
British notions of citizenship were imported into Palestine … and blended with 
existing Ottoman-era legislation, Palestinian municipal law and international laws 
of state succession and immigration. At the beginning of the mandate, British 
officials viewed the Palestinians as citizens in status only – without a defined set 
of citizenship rights – influenced by their empire’s own citizenship legislation, 
their history of interactions in the ‘Orient’, the perception of Palestine as divided 
into three religious communities (rather than civic communities) and the Jewish 
national home policy combined with the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ that the 
Mandate encompassed. In particular, the British came to Palestine with extensive 
experience in the governing of ‘oriental races’ in Egypt and India, which had 
shaped colonial officials’ perception of subject races. [….] In Palestine, unlike 
Egypt and India, the issue of governing an ‘oriental race’ had to be merged with 
the obligations of the mandate in regard to the Jewish immigrants.228 
 
The uniqueness of this Mandate as compared with other colonial administrations by the 
British during this time is that a citizenship order was formed in Palestine specifically to 
advance the Jewish national home policy. The directive followed by the British included 
the Balfour Declaration of 1917 calling for the establishment of a Jewish national home 
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in Palestine through unhindered Jewish immigration and land sales. The Palestine 
citizenship regime invited Jews already belonging to a multitude of ethnic, cultural and 
national groups throughout the world to become Palestinian citizens.229 The Mandate also 
prescribed the creation of laws for the effective and prompt acquisition of Palestinian 
nationality for the Jews.230 Far from a localized or domestic focus, the British Mandate in 
Palestine therefore necessarily included a gaze toward the international, involving the 
nationality and immigration policies of other states. This is key to mapping the trajectory 
of citizenship from the Israeli periphery to the core. For these reasons, the process of the 
creation of citizenship in Mandate Palestine can also be understood as an important 
contributor to the ‘bureaucratization’ and ‘internationalization’ of citizenship in general 
during the interwar period.231 
 As explained in Chapter One, the process of legal categorization and 
bureaucratization of citizenship is part of sovereign practices of policing identity and 
territorial control. Categorization by legal administrators, particularly of minority and 
indigenous groups have the power to mold the historical and political understanding of 
the population in the consciousness of both the ruling establishment and the community 
itself. In doing so, minority categorizations create moral inconsistencies, conceptual 
ambiguities, and fragile political frameworks.232 Similarly, colonial discourses and 
practices of citizenship and nationality in the 1920s and 1930s ought to be understood as 
attempts to re-produce and centralize European power through the privileging and 
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exclusion of certain identities.233 Similar to other colonized peoples, Palestine’s Arab 
inhabitants were confronted with new measures by the British to achieve recognition as 
citizens and nationals; a process that sometimes involved transformations in social and 
cultural identities and practices. Yet, in the case of Palestine these colonial designs and 
exclusionary discourses of citizenship and nationality were amplified with the Jewish 
national home policy.  
Throughout the period of the British Mandate in Palestine citizenship was shaped 
by various Palestine Citizenship Orders and immigration was managed by the regulations 
of the Immigration Ordinance.234 It became clear early on that British objectives with the 
Mandate and the liberal principles and parameters to which colonial officials must abide 
conflicted, pulling in two separate directions. On the one hand the Mandate stipulates 
through the Balfour Declaration that Jewish immigration and land sales ought to be 
facilitated. This required civil legislation and immigration policy enabling the acquisition 
of Palestinian nationality for the Jews, along with certain rights and responsibilities. At 
the same time, and as I outlined in Chapter Two, the Mandate was charged by the Balfour 
Declaration to implement the Jewish national home policy in a manner where “nothing 
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish 
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communities in Palestine.” As a result, British colonial administrators had to be 
extremely attentive, and design a colonial citizenship and nationality regime that provides 
a limited access to rights. Compared with the international mandates in the Arab world of 
the time, part of the significance of the formation of citizenship in Mandate Palestine was 
that the British commitment to the promotion of Jewish immigration required the 
promotion of a diluted and apolitical citizenship. Banko makes this point and recounts 
that 
In light of the mandate, the British feared giving explicit liberal citizenship rights 
and practices along with citizenship status, such as the formation of a legislative 
or executive body made up of representatives and proportional voting rights. 
Since Palestine’s population was 93% Arab at the time the British arrived, these 
types of rights would essentially allow the Arabs to have control of Palestine and 
its government.235 
 
Officially, the mandate system implemented by the League of Nations in the Arab world 
was considered a temporary international administration of property. It merged various 
legal obligations intended to enable a subsequent self-rule in the Arab provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire. To this end, democratic institutions such as municipal and legislative 
councils enabling civic participation in the formation of government and the 
implementation of law were promised. However, fostering greater autonomy and self-
government among Arabs through such democratic measures would also have enabled 
institutional and legal avenues for civil resistance from the non-Jewish inhabitants to the 
said British policy of facilitating the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. 
Thus, the kind of citizenship regime designed by British colonial architects did not permit 
or empower “civil, political or social rights or practices which threatened the Balfour 
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Declaration as enshrined in the mandate.”236 Of course, British colonial policy in 
Palestine, as well as its facilitation of Jewish immigration shifted during the almost three 
decades of the Mandate. Mobilizations by Zionist organizations, collective campaigns 
and resistance by Palestinian-Arabs to the policy of a Jewish national home in the Holy 
Land, the economic conditions of the country, and re-organization of British imperial 
interests in the region and abroad all contributed to the waxing and waning of Jewish 
immigration in these years.237 Despite these influences on British colonial policy, various 
legal and political restrictions were consistently imposed against Arabs from accessing 
both Palestinian nationality and democratic institutions that would empower their 
resistance to the Balfour Declaration.238 
 
2.2. Hierarchies of colonial citizenship 
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, privileged and educated classes in the Ottoman 
Empire witnessed a rise of available writings from Western Europe with political ideas 
and liberal notions of political subjectivity, civic identity, self-determination and 
democratic decision-making. The intensity of this intellectual and political interaction is 
revealed in the Ottoman reforms that followed this period: 
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New Ottoman reforms stressed equality before the law of all the Empire’s 
subjects regardless of religion or ethnicity. The terminology of liberalism used in 
the western political discourse (especially as associated with the French 
Revolution) on identity and rights influenced the Ottoman reforms, known as the 
Tanzimat: edicts evoked equality, liberty, natural rights and the protection of life 
and property. The reformers strove to cultivate a single Ottoman identity among 
the respective subject population.239  
 
This attempt to centralize and empower Ottoman identity around a core set of values was 
a defensive response to the rise of popular religious, cultural and territorial-based national 
movements. Yet it is not the case that ethnic and religious minority groups were denied 
collective identities as separate that from an Ottoman identity. Jus sanguinis and jus soli 
were both accepted by the Ottomans as legitimate means of procuring nationality. In the 
case of the Palestinian-Arab community, their nationality and sense of a shared ‘Arab’ 
identity was formally recognized by the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, an 
identity and political self-understanding that continued with the commencement of 
British colonial rule in Palestine.240 For this reason, Banko holds that liberal debates and 
processes associated with the design and provision of citizenship and nationality were 
also sites of control and power for the British Mandate. This was also the case for Zionist 
organizations, as it was faced with an existing blueprint for identity and national 
belonging. 
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 As mentioned above and in various studies on the Mandate, part and parcel of 
British policy in this period was the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine 
through immigration and land sale. A major component of this policy was the 
organization of Palestinian citizenship according to a hierarchy of racial background and 
political ideology. With this in mind, the British employed citizenship provision as “a 
bureaucratic technique to enforce the mandate policy—a policy that paid particular 
attention to Jewish immigration and naturalization.”241 This involves the formation of 
dual institutions for the administration of services that provided Arab and Jewish 
individuals distinct and unequal civil, social and political rights and protections. Cast in a 
broader colonial historical matrix, distinctions among various groups in citizenship and 
nationality legislation were used by states to reproduce their colonial powers and 
territorial control while policing identity. These policies and practices of control were 
designed to reinforce colonial understandings of the ‘natural’ disposition and dominance 
of white and settler identities in contrast with that of indigenous people.242 In the case of 
Palestine, and as the previous chapter explains, the British actively mobilized the 
cosmopolitan figure of the ‘European Jew’ as a civilizing influence in the interest of 
Western powers in an otherwise backward and undeveloped ‘Orient’. In doing so, the 
preferred and qualified candidates for the full rights of citizenship and nationality in such 
a racially hierarchized civil regime were those who could maintain and reproduce the 
projected image of enlightened and progressive England (or Europe). In the face of a 
‘backward’ and ‘chaotic’ Orient, these individuals were mainly white, educated, cultured, 
industrious and professional immigrant Jews.  
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Added to their conceived racial superiority, these ‘white’ Jewish immigrants 
maintained a kind of social self-composition, cultural proficiency and enterprising 
mindset placing them apart from the native Arabs in Palestine, whether Muslim, Christian 
or even Jewish.243 The Jewish immigrants from Europe served as a political and 
ideological compass of the kind of civilized behavior and lifestyle the British had in mind 
for the inhabitants in Palestine in a future Jewish State. The importance of the Jewish 
national home policy to the British combined with the colonial conception of a racial 
hierarchy enabled the mobilization of the liberal discourse of citizenship and nationality 
of this period to entrench the separate and distinct treatment and access for Arabs and 
Jews. 
 Political ideology and socio-economic outlook was also a major factor in access 
to and inclusion in Palestinian citizenship. For example, in relation to the Legislative 
Election Order of 1922, a directive that outlined distinct provisions for Jewish 
immigrants and former Ottoman subjects for the acquirement of Palestinian nationality, 
Banko explains that  
In the interim before the completion of the nationality law, members of the 
Foreign Office argued against the terms of provisional nationality …. They stated 
that a class of ‘undesirable people’ such as communists, prostitutes and fugitives 
could remain in Palestine as habitual residents who received provisional 
nationality through the order. These individuals would then acquire citizenship 
without a waiting period once the proper legislation was ratified. Since the short 
residency requirement for citizenship was meant to favour Jewish immigrants 
only, it led to intense debates that further delayed the final draft of the law.244 
 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Jewish citizens of Palestine with ties to leftist, socialist 
and Marxist political groups were viewed as a significant threat to the future state. The 
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fear of communist agitation was so fervent that discussions among policy-makers 
included options for the revocation of their citizenship and nationality and the control of 
mobility of this politically objectionable social group.245 
Overall, along with the colonial conception of the civilizing capacities of 
incoming European Jewish immigrants, maintaining the ‘correct’ political ideology was 
another tool used by the British to control the ‘types’ of individuals who acquire 
citizenship and reinforce their colonial power in the Mandate. The development of 
Palestinian citizenship according to these factors enabled the exclusion of unwanted 
portions in both Arab and Jewish society from Palestine, and the future Jewish State. 
Taken together, this generated a dual administration and an institutionalized and unequal 
hierarchy of rights among Arab and Jewish inhabitants. This conflicted with an accepted 
and popular liberal account of citizenship in Western Europe where differences on the 
basis of ethnicity religion, political affiliation and were meant to be indistinguishable or 
blurred. 
 
2.3. A blueprint for separate and unequal citizenships 
Citizenship and nationality legislation in Palestine was carefully constructed by the 
British to satisfy their policy of establishing a Jewish national home while adhering to the 
changing international regulations. With the two-pronged directive of maintaining the 
conditions of the Palestine Mandate as sanctioned by the League of Nations and their 
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perceptions of the nature of both Arab and Jewish ‘natives’ in Palestine, civil officers of 
the British Mandate “brought with them Western European concepts of law, 
administration and government that they molded in order to apply in the territory 
governed by the Ottoman Empire.”246 On this, Assaf Likhovski emphasizes that 
“analyzing the cultural prejudices and the colonial images which shaped the mind of 
British judges is … essential to understanding the process of anglicization of the law of 
mandatory Palestine.”247 He continues to point out that  
Many British judges shared the attitudes of their colleagues in the administration, 
and saw the natives in general, and native judges in particular, as inferior. The 
structure of the legal system tended to enforce that image. Because of the ethnic 
division of the country, the jury system was not used in Palestine. Native judges, 
both Arabs and Jews, were viewed at first as similar to English jurymen - local 
‘collaborators’ whose only role was to help British judges understand local 
customs and local mentality.248 
 
The process of creating a citizenship regime in Palestine was done during a period when, 
as an imperial state, Britain was transitioning. Political subjects of empire were 
transforming into the notion of citizens belonging to a nation-state. As such, ambiguities 
around the legal status, political participation, social and civil rights of Arabs and Jews in 
Mandate Palestine were not limited to this colonial context. Rather, they applied to 
questions British administrators and lawmakers were considering in this period in relation 
to their other colonial experiences. For this reason, conceptions nationality among British 
civil officers and policy-makers were “influenced by their empire’s own citizenship 
legislation and history of colonialism in the ‘Orient’ (including India and Egypt).”249 
Through the language of identity and recognition formulated by British officials the 
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established citizenship regime was thereby able (despite opposition by Arab inhabitants), 
to formally distinguish Arab from Jewish-Palestinian citizenship in various ways. 
 British-imposed legislation separated Arab from Jewish citizenship through an 
intricate institutional framework of exclusion and various mechanisms of control. This 
framework of exclusion can be said to have laid a blueprint for the differential citizenship 
that exists in contemporary Israel. Banko explains that although it was generally held that 
Ottoman legislation would try to be maintained, British administrators actively refused to 
maintain this practice on the issue of nationality: 
The main reason to discard Ottoman regulations for nationality was that the status 
quo would threaten the mandate’s immigration policy and indeed the mandate 
charter itself since a law was necessary in order to grant Jewish immigrants the 
nationality of Palestine. The 1925 Citizenship Order, more than other legislation, 
meant that Great Britain could assume and keep direct control over Palestine’s 
inhabitants through the grant or denial of their citizenship.250 
 
Overall, citizenship legislation in Palestine reflected changes in British policy on Jewish 
immigration and resulted in the provision and revocation of citizenship in various distinct 
ways for Jews and Arabs. In a Memorandum submitted in June 1926 to the League of 
Nations, The National Council of the Jews in Palestine (Waad Leumi) protested against 
Clause 7. (3) of the 1925 Citizenship Order that authorizes the High Commissioner of the 
Mandate to withhold citizenship at his discretion without any right of appeal.251 
Concerned with the rights of Jewish inhabitants to Palestinian citizenship, and by 
extension the land, the National Council contested the empowerment of Mandate officials 
to “deprive anyone who criticizes his actions of the right of citizenship.” 252 Realizing the 
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potential use of this right by the High Commissioner to repeal citizenship of Jews against 
the interests of the Zionist movement in Palestine, the National Council emphasized that 
“the danger to the loss of citizenship mainly concerns the Jews,” and asserted that 
citizenship “should be treated not as an act of grace but of right.” 253 For Palestinian-
Arabs, coupled with the denial of Ottoman nationality, the 1925 Citizenship Order was 
able to effectively deny citizenship to their descendants residing outside of the territory. 
Opting for the terminology of “born in the country” rather than “native of” to determine 
eligibility for citizenship of individuals residing abroad, British colonial administrators 
were able to ensure that automatic citizenship was not bestowed to children born abroad 
to Palestinian nationals; a measure that conflicted with “international standards, British 
nationality law, and the 1869 Ottoman law, all of which supported the acquisition of jus 
sanguinis nationality.”254  
 A curious effect of this measure was the asymmetrical legal distinction between 
Palestinian citizenship and full nationality. Palestinians living under the Mandate were 
provided with a local citizenship in the absence of British nationality. But when leaving 
Palestine to live abroad, the Mandate law located these individuals who were citizens and 
not always natives, in the category of British protected-persons.  
In an odd twist, they were recognised as citizens of the Palestine Mandate but in 
the absence of mandatory consulates, these inhabitants came under the same type 
of protection as did British colonial subjects. Citizenship in this sense was not 
equal to full nationality as far as international law was concerned since 
Palestinians became British-protected persons when outside of the mandated 
territory.255 
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Taken together, through nationality regulations and the codification of citizenship 
requirements that did not correspond to regional and international practices of the same, 
British colonial administrators were able to create mechanisms of exclusion to both limit 
access to and revoke citizenship for Palestinian Arabs.  
In the early 1920s … Arabs were treated differently from Jewish ‘provisional’ 
citizens in the practical matters of travel, passports, diplomatic protection and 
voting regulations. …. By the early 1930s it was clear the legislation effectively 
created two separate bureaucracies for Jews and Arabs in the application, grant 
and removal of Palestinian citizenship.256 
 
The arrangement and implementation of this logic of exclusion is key to the arguments 
put forth in this study. As I assert, it is this very logic that is being un-rooted and re-
framed to internalize the gaze of exclusion toward the figure of the citizen. For obvious 
reasons, this legal and structural arrangement of exclusion was hotly resisted by the 
Palestinian-Arab population during the Mandate in the form of letter campaigns of 
protest, calls for boycott, general strikes, and nationalist conferences, not least for the 
evident inequalities it encapsulated.257 The 1925 Order did not bestow Arab citizens 
meaningful citizenship as autonomous subjects with active decision-making power over 
education, health, cultural, taxation or government sectors. While Palestine is not the only 
case where British colonial practices provide exclusionary access to citizenship rights, 
privileges and protection, what stands out in this case is the extent to which this exclusion 
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violated even British political policy at the time. Palestinian Arabs were effectively 
subjected to a British colonial administration that denied them, as citizens, political, civil 
and social rights – a clear violation of the parameters of the Balfour Declaration. Yet, the 
British colonial rulers could not abide by the principles of liberal citizenship and 
democratic rule by providing and empowering Arabs with equal rights and the ability to 
shape legislation. This would impede their ability to support the Zionist movement. And 
so, far from an “equal, rights-based citizenship” regime, every effort was made to hinder 
and impede the collective needs and demands of the Arab population on citizenship and 
nationality.258  
The loss of Arab confidence in the intentions and institutions of the British led to 
the rise of Palestinian issue-based movements and civil society in this period, culminating 
in the major Arab uprisings of 1936-1939.259 Using multifaceted tactics, the organized 
segments of Palestinian society initiated community meetings, general strikes, mass 
protests, civil campaigns of letter and petition writing, urban and rural guerilla warfare, 
and numerous direct actions and collaborations targeting oil pipelines from Iraq to Haifa 
and those belonging to the British-owned Anglo-Persian oil company (the product of 
another British imperial venture and what in 1954 grew into British Petroleum), 
telephone and telecommunication companies, roads, bridges, government offices and 
police stations, among other key sites of British colonial rule. In response, the British 
brought in tens of thousands of troops to quell the Arab resistance movement, declared 
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Martial Law and set up the Peel Commission to investigate the unrest, all of which 
suppressed the Arab uprisings. By the end of the mass Arab uprisings in 1939, the Arab 
population was deeply aware of the extent of British collusion with the Jewish national 
movement, politically organized, and mobilized in the form of numerous women, student, 
worker, peasant and religious grassroots organizations and committees. Resulting from 
the anti-colonial revolt of the late 1930s was the growth of a dynamic and engaged civil 
society among the Arab community that also reflected greater civic consciousness and 
grasp among the general population of the rights and protections they require (and are 
denied) as a national group and as citizens.260  
When Banko argues that the Palestine Mandate is an important case in the 
bureaucratization and internationalization of citizenship during the interwar period, she 
also points to its role in entrenching the exclusions of certain ‘undesired’ populations 
through the regulation of movement and identity documentation. Restrictions in 
immigration regulations in Palestine in the early twentieth century functioned alongside 
the rising perception by nation-states of domestic and international mobility as a source 
of threat.261 The British desire to tighten requirements for citizenship and immigration by 
controlling Arab entry and exit into Palestine, redefining identity and belonging, and 
legislating tools for their exclusion and political disempowerment coincided with similar 
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restrictions to regulate legitimate movement in Europe and North America. This 
monopolization of the ability of nation-states to sanction and restrict movement of 
individuals and groups, whether civil, economic, or religious, in the form of passport and 
other legislated identity and documentary controls coincided with states monopolization 
of the legitimate use of violence.262 Contributing to these global techniques for passport 
and population control was the rise of documentary restrictions for the Arabs (and in 
periods of social and political unrest, also Jews) that they did not wish to admit so as to 
fulfill their policy of establishing a Jewish national home. 
The mechanisms whereby legislated identity and documentary controls (re)shape 
national belonging and institutionalize the civil exclusion of unwanted peoples in 
Palestine, both during the interwar period and after World War II, are relevant in our 
study of contemporary Israeli citizenship. Citizenship in Palestine was a key tool for the 
reproduction of state territory and membership, and its legislation during the British 
Mandate shaped a particular understanding of Palestinian citizenship. At a time when 
Palestinian Arabs were mobilizing their communal and legal identity as Arab nationals of 
the Ottoman Empire, the British structured a colonial citizenship that both failed to 
consult the local Arab population in determining its parameters and denied their access to 
social, civil or political rights as part of its policy in support of a Jewish national home. 
This pre-state construction of citizenship by the British as separate and unequal for Arabs 
and Jews was designed against the backdrop of rising international networks of 
recognition and control. These exclusions embedded within the historical matrix of 
Palestinian citizenship during the Mandate laid a blueprint for the differential citizenship 
regime that today exists in Israel. As I contend, the citizenship and nationality regime in 
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Israel since 1948 has continued its interactions with and reaction to global networks of 
restriction and control. The significance of the Israeli case, however, is that unlike liberal 
democratic states in the West, its major features of nation-statehood, including final 
territorial borders, understanding of peoplehood and demography, and sovereignty 
largely remain incomplete and unresolved. These unresolved parameters are reflected in 
the kind of exclusions the Israeli citizenship regime maintains. 
 
3. After statehood: Constituting the Jewish State 
3.1. Leo Kohn’s Draft Constitution: Balancing modern formulations and Jewish traditions 
The networks and discourses of restriction entrenched in the Israeli incorporation regime 
become apparent when we examine the country’s turbulent relationship with constitution-
building. Both the 1947 UN Partition Plan as well as Israel’s 1948 Declaration of the 
Establishment of the State of Israel, its Declaration of Independence, prescribed the 
creation of a constitution for the established state by October 1, 1948. Appointed by the 
Executive of the Jewish Agency, Leo Kohn, was tasked with writing a proposed 
constitution for the Jewish State. He was a key functionary of the Jewish Agency in 
Jerusalem and later political advisor to both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Israel’s 
first President, Chaim Weizmann.263 Once tasked, Kohn drafted various proposals for a 
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constitution, and did so under ‘wartime’ conditions and under a tight time-frame to meet 
the said deadline.264 Examining the trajectory of thought and discussion that led to the 
various drafts Kohn produced is useful for this study as they indicate the influence of 
Western democratic systems and constitutional structures, as well as point to the features 
that place apart the Israeli constitutional order. The First Proposal for a constitution was 
made late 1947 to early 1948, and largely emulated the formulation of the UN Partition 
Plan so as to mainly satisfy British and international audiences and observers investing 
economic and financial energy into the Jewish national home policy. As such, this 
proposal affirmed both that a Jewish State will be formed on the date declared in the 
Resolution and that with its creation this Constitution will take effect. Further, in Section 
9 of this first proposal Kohn held that “The seat of Government of the Jewish State is on 
Mount Carmel” as the Partition Plan did not include Jerusalem as part of a future Jewish 
State.265 Kohn himself later admitted that the inspiration for the formulations he adopted 
in the various sections of the proposed constitution was the Partition Plan but also 
contended that he largely “followed the model of Western parliamentary democracy.”266 
Segments from the constitutions and legislative and executive structures of the United 
States, France, England, China and the Weimar Republic were used by Kohn and 
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combined with his own original and extensive legal writing and specialization in the Irish 
Constitution. The Irish influence in the drafts produced by Kohn for the future Jewish 
State is interesting because while both are in the context of British imperial policies, but 
his draft for Israel is demonstrably different. As Amihai Radzyner explains,  
The Irish Constitution opens with the following religious sentence: ‘In the Name 
of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final 
end, all actions both of men and States must be referred.’ The religious influence 
on the Irish Constitution is significant…. [Yet, perhaps] as an antithesis to … the 
Irish Constitution, Kohn decrees in … the first proposal that: ‘There shall be no 
state endowment of any religion.’ In other sections concerning religious issues, 
such as days of rest and religious courts, there is no preference to Jewish 
institutions over those of other religions. Despite being a religious Jew and the 
fact that his proposal defines the State as the national home of the Jewish People 
… Kohn avoids religious declarations, apart from the thanks to the God of our 
forefathers with which he opens the Preamble.267  
 
Felt by religious and Orthodox political leaders who read this first draft, the absence of 
God and the Torah indicated a sharp liberal tone and character. A more simplistic 
reproduction of Western parliamentary structures and parameters of statehood and 
belonging would perhaps have incorporated a greater role for religion in state and civil 
affairs. However, Kohn’s method for drafting a constitution for Israel clearly proceeded 
on a particular understanding of the unique political traditions and outlook of Judaism. 
Put differently, Kohn’s vision for the future state appeared as a secular and modern 
Jewish one, similar to other enlightened states, with clear divides between religious 
institutions and state structures in public law. Overall, despite the constitutional rubric of 
other modern democratic states from which Kohn could build, little information about the 
structures and features of the state to be established often forced him to get creative and 
improvise. For example, in the first draft of the proposed constitution he called it the 
                                                
267  Ibid., 6-7. 
	 136	
“Jewish State” and then continued to list various possible names for this State, including 
“Yehuda, Zion, The Land of Israel, and The Western Land of Israel.”268  
After receiving suggestions and recommendations for amendments from legal 
scholars, practitioners and public and religious figures, some of which Kohn ignored or 
simply did not implement, a Second Proposal was submitted in July 1948. This draft 
heightened the prominence of the Jewish religious, spiritual and political tradition in the 
state. When explaining the protection of Fundamental Rights, Kohn held that “the Israeli 
constitution must rely in this matter on Jewish Law in addition to the principles of 
modern constitutions.”269 The only time an explicitly Jewish text is specifically cited is 
regarding the prohibition of capital punishment as it is also proscribed by Talmudic Law. 
Interestingly, Radzyner argued that this act was “merely symbolic, because the 
abolishment of capital punishment was present already in Kohn’s first proposal without 
resorting to Jewish Law.” 270 This indicates that Kohn’s enhancement of the position of 
Jewish tradition was more likely a response to political pressure.  
In the end, the third proposed Draft Constitution was submitted in October 1948.  
Though formally published with increased public and media visibility, the Third Proposal 
was, like the other preceding two proposals, not a binding document the Israeli 
government would be forced to adopt. Consisting of a Preamble and eight sections, this 
version opens with a series of general provisions regarding the fundamentals of the state 
and is followed by a Declaration of Fundamental Rights. In reading the Preamble of the 
Third Proposal separately it becomes clear that it can serve as a separate document 
commemorating Jewish history. The Preamble pays tribute to the tenacious endurance 
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and heroic sacrifices of the generations of Jews in Exile who maintained their spiritual 
heritage. It also honors the “faithful remnants who maintained the continuity of Jewish 
settlement in Palestine” thereby inspiring Jewish pioneers to make efforts toward national 
revival.271 Among the provisions of these opening sections of the Constitution are key 
ones that define the character, citizenship and official language of Israel. This includes 
complete civil and political equality among all individuals, Arabs and Jews alike, who 
live within the jurisdiction of the new state. The next three sections of this final Draft 
Constitution outline the parameters of the respective powers of the legislative, judiciary 
and executive, and the final sections outline provisions for amending the Constitution, 
reviewing the constitutionality of proposed and passed legislation and for the framework 
and structure of law in the newly established state.  
A Press Release issued by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 23, 
1948 publicizing this Draft Constitution explains that Kohn “proceeded on the basis of 
the actual structure of political life in Israel” and designed the provisions in a manner “so 
that a more stable political life may be expected under the new Constitution than has been 
of late the fate of old established democracies in other countries.”272 The Ministry 
continues to praise the liberal character of the Constitution when it comes to the 
protection of the Fundamental Rights of the individual: 
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It goes considerably beyond the traditional formulations of the Declarations of 
the Rights of Man which it has become customary to embody in modern 
Constitutions. The inspiration of the Draft Constitution of Israel is liberal.273  
 
Viewing Israel as a unique yet unfinished historical achievement in both liberal statehood 
and law-making, Kohn’s Third Proposal was designed to address what he believed would 
be future constitutional struggles. Though dividing the government into judicial, 
executive and legislative bodies, Kohn vests greatest powers into the hands of the elected 
legislative or State Council. This was done on the grounds that the difficulties this new 
state will face will require prompt decisions and effective actions by legal practitioners. 
Modeled on the constitutional structures of the United States, Republic of China, and the 
aforementioned major European democracies, features of Kohn’s third and final draft 
constitution are nevertheless catered to Israel as a novel phenomenon.274 For example, 
understanding that Israel is uniquely built upon the concept of immigration – a topic we 
will revisit in more detail – required Kohn to make malleable the makeup of electoral 
districts so that they reflect changing population distributions.  
Among other features, the Third Proposal sets up the blueprint for a social-
welfare state (likely due to the importance of immigration in the new state), abolishes the 
death penalty and as one commentator put it “goes beyond any existing document – 
including the United States constitution – in setting forth basic human rights.”275 
Moreover, it protects freedom of worship for all religious sects of recognized faiths, 
guarantees access to holy sites in Palestine and does not discriminate between inhabitants 
in the state on the grounds of race, religious, sex or language when it comes to their right 
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as citizens. In addition to providing citizenship to all Jews living in Israel (or “elsewhere 
in Palestine”) it also provides a citizenship to non-Jewish residents of Israel who were 
citizens of Palestine when the British Mandate expired, “unless they elect not to accept 
it.”276 The introduction of a voluntary citizenship in the proposed Draft Constitution is 
significant as the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine who remained on their historical 
lands were automatically and involuntarily granted citizenship with the establishment of 
the State of Israel. Following this, non-Jewish Arabs were immediately placed under 
Military Government as citizens. 
That said, the tendency of heightening the State’s Jewish character and the role of 
Hebrew tradition in his proposals was heavily present in the introduction and explanatory 
notes of this Third and final Draft Constitution: 
The introduction to the second proposal concludes with the lessons to be learned 
in drafting the constitution of the State of Israel, from the successes and failures 
of constitutions in other democratic countries; [yet] the introduction to the third 
proposal… contains lengthy additional sentences in which Kohn explains that the 
constitution of a people must also be rooted in its unique political traditions, and, 
therefore, the Israeli constitution must be influenced by the Jewish political 
tradition and by the unique outlook of Judaism.277 
 
Evidently, in the face of criticism and pressure, Kohn made strides to provide a Jewish 
character in this final version.278 This was done regardless of the fact that the Western 
democratic and parliamentary history he was referencing did not employ the Jewish 
tradition as a major source in its constitutional structure. Importantly, Kohn did not make 
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reference to “existing Jewish normative religious law,” which would have provided 
somewhat clearer instructions and relevant passages.279 Instead, the draft constitution 
makes reference to the notion of a Jewish religious jurisprudence, one that is more open 
to interpretation and the individual leanings of its practitioners.280 The effort to please 
voices of criticism of the separation of this Draft Constitution from Jewish history and 
texts compelled Kohn, himself a religious man, to incorporate a foundational sentence on 
law-making in the Jewish State. In the third Draft Constitution, Article 77 in the third 
Draft Constitution, Kohn writes that  
Future legislation in Israel shall be guided by the basic principles of Jewish Law. 
Wherever the existing law does not provide adequate guidance, the Courts-of-
Law shall have recourse to these basic principles.281 
 
Yet there is more to Kohn’s change in legal tone and normative focus than mere political 
pressure. Granted, his justification for such an extreme and sudden change in the 
foundational source of all future legislation in Israel reveals the types of contemporaries 
he was facing in this period. When explaining the need for the above formulation, Kohn 
accounted for this sentence by stressing the “uniqueness and advantages of Jewish Law, 
and the importance of replacing the civil code of the Mandate with a code based on the 
Jewish legal tradition.”282 However, the context is important and illuminates his reasons 
for resorting to Jewish traditions. Kohn was assigned to be the sole architect of a Draft 
Constitution to be written within a limited time frame and under conditions of war. 
Added to this, the constitution was meant for a future state whose spiritual and normative 
traditions were not sourced by the constitutional structures of existing democratic 
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countries. While it is natural for a legal practitioner and scholar like Kohn to reference 
the constitutional provisions of established liberal and largely Christian states, the state 
for which he was drafting a Draft Constitution was, in the end, meant to be a ‘Jewish’ 
one. The task therefore would be to find constitutional examples of states that were 
modern and secular and whose normative and spiritual sources were seeped in Jewish 
traditions, not merely religious but also cultural and spiritual traditions – a difficult task 
to say the least. The dilemma of the task at hand was to design an unprecedented 
constitutional structure: one that was seeped both in the Western (and largely Christian) 
tradition of modern and secular government, as well as in the basic principles of ancient 
Jewish law. In this context, in the absence of applicable historical examples from the 
Jewish tradition, Israel could be seen as a novel constitutional phenomenon. To some 
extent, the notion of a ‘Jewish’ State rendered the constitutional structures in existing 
democratic countries inapplicable.  
For Kohn, the jump from the American Constitution of 1776 to the Israeli Draft 
Constitution in 1948 was not so wide. He argued that the architects of the modern and 
Enlightened ideas of human rights, freedoms and equality were influenced by the 
Bible.283 As such, the use of constitutional examples from modern, largely Christian, 
Western liberal democracies could, in effect, be compared to using an additional source 
from what is essentially the Jewish tradition. As one high-ranking Israeli government 
official expressed: 
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The liberal spirit of the draft constitution reflects the sobering experience of the 
collapse of the democratic governments in Europe during the past decade and 
endeavours to draw lessons from that tragic experience. The draft constitution 
shows anxiety to prevent the pitfalls which undermined the democratic 
governments in Europe in our generations. It takes its mandate from the U.N. 
resolution of November 29, and its spirit from the liberalism and democracy of 
the constitution of the U.S. Its declaration of fundamental rights is modeled not 
only on modern constitutions, but on ancient Hebrew traditions. The Bible that 
inspired the first American constitution makers has inspired this draft constitution 
too.284  
 
In essence, Kohn’s Draft Constitution can be understood as an attempt to recreate and 
apply the liberal spirit and normative foundations of the American Constitution of 1776 
to the political and historical context of Israel in 1948. Yet, as I outline below, while 
discussions in the First Knesset around the adoption of a constitution commenced 
immediately after the establishment of Israel, a kind of forced compromise was reached 
among Members to postpone the process. In effect, Kohn’s proposed Constitution was 
relegated to a forgotten document. Nevertheless, the process adopted by Kohn and his 
various intellectual and considerations are illuminating for the purposes of this study due 
to two main reasons. Firstly, in all three proposals, the general direction of Kohn’s 
amendments and tone was to heighten the explicit Jewish character and sources in his 
writing. The Zionist project of creating a state with an explicitly Jewish character was 
constitutionally unprecedented in the world, thereby making it difficult to solely rely on 
Western legal experiences and sources. In this sense, Kohn’s experience appears similar 
to contemporary lawmakers in Israel. Namely, that the heightening of the Jewish 
character of the state also results in the simultaneous diluting of its liberal democratic 
character. 
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Second, and perhaps more central to my argument about the logic of exclusion unique 
to Israel, Kohn’s experience in drafting these proposed constitutions reveals the 
limitations to Israel’s appropriation of reproduction of Western parliamentary structures 
and parameters of statehood and belonging. To maintain the particular character of the 
State as ‘Jewish’, Israeli lawmakers re-read, re-formulate and re-use the principles and 
discourses of liberal citizenship and human rights from Western constitutional structures. 
With this, Israel practices a unique relation of exception when it comes to the discourse 
and formulation of its citizenship and nationality regime. Its stateless citizenship inverses 
the traditional relations of exclusion in classical liberal states. The specific use of the 
imported and adopted Western parliamentary structures and parameters of statehood and 
belonging by Israel has resulted in a unique liberal legal and political culture within the 
Jewish State. This in mind, examining how the appropriation and reformulation of 
classical liberal principles and frameworks of citizenship and nationality has unfolded in 
Israel over half a century provides a window to what is developing in the core Western 
democracies. I argue that Israel’s particular use of liberal democratic discourse to 
configure citizenship in a manner that is hierarchical and maintains an exclusionary 
Jewish character – something Kohn was increasingly compelled to do with each 
progressive Proposal – informs our understanding of changes to citizenship regimes in 
the core. Outlined in Chapter Five, the practices and dynamics of the colonial logic of 
Israeli citizenship illuminates our examinations of Western democratic drives toward 
national and cultural homogeneity and citizenship restrictions; even among the 
increasingly multicultural and multi-religious makeup of their societies. 
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3.2 Debating the constitution: A splintered Knesset 
In an address to the First Knesset, David Ben Gurion stated: 
On the fourteenth day of May 1948, a new state was not founded ex nihilo. 
Rather the crown was restored to its pristine splendor 1,813 years after the 
independence of Israel was destroyed, during the days of Bar Kochba and Rabbi 
Akiba [where Jews revolted against the Roman Empire]…The establishment of 
the Jewish state was not an event limited to the place and time of its emergence. 
Rather, it is a world event in the sense of time as well as place, an event 
summarizing a prolonged historical development. This event has introduced 
radical reforms and itself serves as a source for alterations and changes exceeding 
its temporal and spatial framework. [….] Just as it was clear that the renewal of 
the State of Israel is not a beginning, but a continuation from days of yore, so, too 
was it understood that this renewal is not an end and conclusion but another stage 
in the long path leading to the full redemption of Israel.285 
 
To this day, this point remains a common argument among Zionist thinkers and policy-
makers. Jewish indigeneity is affirmed based on their continued historical presence on the 
land, even extending to pre-Biblical times. Here, the State of Israel is projected as 
cementing the historical and communal link between Jewish life on the land from over 
five centuries before Christ, and Jewish membership in the state today. Evidently, among 
the key issues left outside of this kind of linear and one-dimensional historical analysis is 
that the constitutional inheritance of the newly established state included a rigid 
framework for hierarchical citizenship left behind by the British Mandate. Ben Gurion is 
thus correct in more than one way when asserting to the First Knesset that Israel was not 
created ex nihilo. This is because the exclusionary conceptual and legal regulations of its 
citizenship and nationality regime was in the process of being shaped during the interwar 
period. For instance, by the time the State of Israel was founded, the Palestinian 
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citizenship provided by the British to the Arab population was a controversial category 
they were continuously amending and challenging. 
By that point, the Arabs had been constituted as political subjects and active 
citizens for over two decades: they did not simply exist in nationalist imaginings 
but were a legally-defined demographic entitled to passports, identity documents, 
measures of civil, political and social rights and an international recognition.286  
 
For this reason, the debates I outline among Israeli policy and law-makers around 
whether to adopt a formal constitution ought to be understood in the context of a 
tumultuous period with extensive territorial, demographic, and governmental change and 
instability. In the end, various historical and political reasons supported the decision not 
to accept a formal constitution. As per the archival material I cite, this was nevertheless a 
discussion that had to occur. The hesitations and positions put forth in these debates 
illuminate the schisms in Israel’s body politic along with the kinds of ideological, 
religious, historical and political factors that maintain the logic of exclusion in its 
citizenship and nationality regulations.  
Expectedly, in the early days after the mass displacement and expulsion of the Arab 
population, coupled with the institution of Military Administration for the remaining 
Arabs in the country, there was limited independent Arab participation in Israeli 
institutions. That said, the pressing issues – not least of them the absence of a 
constitutionalized guarantee of equality – facing the Arab population in the newly 
established Jewish State were clear from the onset.287 For example, on February 16, 1949, 
the first address by an Arab speaker in the Knesset with simultaneous Hebrew translation 
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was made by a Nazareth democrat. In it he pointed to the contradictions of Arab political 
participation in Israeli institutions stating, “We would not have undertaken the difficult 
task of representing the Arabs in the assembly had we not been confident that the 
members of the Knesset would support us, encourage us and cooperate with us.” The 
Arab Member then went on to remind members that all parties had formally subscribed to 
the principle that the young state ought to be based on social and political equality for all 
citizens, regardless of creed race or sex – a practice that was already showing signs of 
failure.288 
The first Knesset, which at the time was the Constituent Assembly, debated on 
whether and when Israel shall have a Constitution on February 1, 1950, the content of 
which revealed the magnitude of the ideological and political cleavage in the Israeli body 
politic in this period. Nahum Nir, Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, believed in the 
need to have a constitution. He reminds the members at the beginning of this meeting that 
as the Declaration of Independence prescribes that it be drawn up by the Constituent 
Assembly no later than October 1948, the onus of explanation is thereby on those 
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members in the Knesset who oppose the drafting of a constitution.289 Nir addressed the 
common arguments by the opposition, the first being that Great Britain’s constitutional 
structure is suitable for Israel. Explaining that the liberal tradition is for states to have 
constitutions, he points out that the unwritten constitution of the British was more 
stringently and meticulously followed than the written constitution of other states. In 
addition to outlining the limits of governmental powers, Nir held that unlike the 
patchwork structure of the Basic Laws a constitution would also lay down the 
relationship between the citizen and the State, the legislature and the executive in a 
manner that would not leave legal gaps. He concludes that the difficulty is not the legal 
aspect of drafting a constitution but, rather, that such a document imbues “the spirit, 
character, the past and future and the vision of the State… [as] a ‘Jewish’ constitution.”290 
Opposing Nir, David Bar-Rav-Hai of the MAPAI Party (a leftist worker’s party that 
dominated until its merging with the modern Labor Party) argued that the Zionist project 
had not yet solidified to the point of adopting a set constitution: 
…[O]ne does not create a constitution at the beginning of a revolution, but when 
it is completed. All constitutions are an attempt to ‘freeze’ certain principles, to 
preserve them, inasmuch as it is possible to preserve any particular thing in the 
life of a nation…. [All] those constitutions that were created apropos the 
revolutionary process were nullified, exchanged, or altered as the revolution 
progressed.291 
 
He also stressed the need to have a constitution that reflects the ‘Jewish experience’, 
stating that 
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The constitution is created for that population which was in existence within the 
borders of the state. Ours is a different situation. Our population is fluid. We are 
not at the end of a revolutionary progress but at its beginning. For our revolution 
is not the establishment of the state, that is only one of its stages. Our revolution 
is the ingathering of the exiles; it is the maximum concentration of Jewry within 
Eretz Israel. The question is, Can we, today, in these fluid circumstances, cast the 
decisive molds that will determine the permanent framework of the State of 
Israel?292 
 
Bar-Rav-Hai rejects the notion that England has no constitution and, as an example for 
Israel, goes through the numerous laws that together serve as a de facto determination of 
the constitutional structure of England. To make the argument that the Torah as the basic 
Jewish law renders a constitution unnecessary and even harmful, Member of Knesset 
(MK) Zerah Warhaftig (National Religious Front) focused more on the nature or 
character of a constitution as a prescriptive text. Pointing to existing laws, including the 
Law and Administration Ordinance, the Transitions Law, and the Knesset Elections Law, 
he argued that a system of law that regulate matters of government and law in the state 
already exists in Israel. 293 Warhaftig expresses,  
… [T]o me the work [of drafting a constitution] demands inspiration, and that the 
Spirit of God must guide those who engage in such a project. …. Gentlemen, 
what is a constitution? A constitution must have educational value for the youth 
and for the Jewry of the Diaspora. …. It must be a sort of calling card, an 
indicator of the character of this nation and of this state. …. We are known to the 
world as the People of the Bible. We have no need of a second calling card.294 
 
Belonging to the pro-Constitution faction, Yisrael Bar-Yehudah of MAPAM (originally 
Marxist-Zionist party and predecessor of the today’s Meretz party) responded to the 
above arguments with a straightforward retort: 
The very opposing of the legislation of a basic constitution is a continuation of … 
a constant legislative irresponsibility with all depending on the moment, the doer, 
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or the circumstance. We must legislate permanent and stable basic elements that 
will obligate all. 295  
 
Bar-Yehudah emphasized the need for directives on governing the citizen-resident and 
the rights of the citizen with regard to the government. He was also the only one who 
refocused the discussion on domestic relations among Israeli citizens, Arabs and Jews 
alike. 
Don’t forget that here we are the majority people, and that at our side there is a 
minority people – this after a bitter war – and coexistence will not be achieved so 
easily. Perhaps in this matter we should not depend only on the freedom to use 
emergency measures and various ordinances; rather, basic rules should be 
formulated…. 296  
 
He continues:  
We live in this country, in the peculiar circumstances of the ingathering of the 
exiles, of different communities, coming from the four corners of the earth, with 
different habits… having all sorts of strange unwritten constitutions that 
sometimes contradict and oppose one another. Our goal is to create one nation out 
of this mixed multitude. …. This period of our history in our country is certainly 
not the end of our national revolution; it is the middle of it, perhaps only its 
beginnings. 297 
 
Menachem Begin of the smaller right-wing Herut Party, part of a national Zionist 
movement, took the pro-Constitution argument a step further. Begin lambasted the MKs 
for opposing the adoption of a constitution so as to retain their dominant powers over the 
law and over the people.  
There is one thing you wish to prevent: the existence of a law of freedom, of 
justice, that will take precedence over all other laws and that you will not be able 
to nullify one fine morning by a mechanical majority. … When liberal thought 
flourished it was said of the state’s authority to be limited to the role of ‘night 
watchman.’ …. Yet, we, here, seem to have found the final answer to the 
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question of the type of living regime we should establish in our state. Not only 
will we extend the authority of the government apparatus to all aspects of our life, 
but we will turn the state into a sort of ‘night thief.’ The citizen – surrounded by 
detectives, superintendents, policemen, clerks; the rule – suspicion; the exception 
to the rule – trust. The rule is that the citizen is a criminal; the exception to that 
rule is that he is law abiding.298 
 
Begin goes on to paint a grim image of an Israel without a constitution as a police-state 
with an unchecked government: 
That is your philosophy – that your majority is superior to the nation, and that is 
why you oppose the constitution. If the Constituent Assembly legislates a 
constitution, then the government will not be free to do as it likes…. Does the 
government want a particular law? Then, that law is adopted. Does it want to 
nullify a particular law? Then, that law is nullified. And so, you are really 
situated above the law. We [will] have a ruling sect, superior to the law, because 
there is no constitution to restrain it. …. Your first obligation is to enact a 
constitution. You do not have the authority to change your mandate. 299 
 
The above differences of opinion reveal the nature and ferocity of the schisms in Israel’s 
body politic. They also show the kinds of ideological, religious, historical and political 
factors that any constitution of the Jewish State will need to address. Despite this, the 
opening of the debate on a constitution was largely transferred to lawyers. This could 
have been because the involved MKs believed the issues of and the spirit that shapes the 
discussion were mainly of a legal nature. Regardless, there was limited public 
involvement in the determination of these issues, no referendum was held on this 
question not was there any appreciable preparation of citizens to weigh in on these 
complex issues.300 By June 13, 1950, the Knesset reached a compromise. Known as the 
Harari Decision, it charged the Constitution, Legislative and Justice Committee of the 
Knesset with the task of creating a draft constitution, consisting of various chapters, each 
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of which would constitute a basic law.301 Once completed, each of these chapters that 
form a separate basic law would be combined together to serve as the constitution of the 
State of Israel.  
3.3. Pulling the break: ‘Israel needs laws, not a constitution’ 
As Prime Minister, Ben Gurion was unequivocally opposed to the drafting of a 
Constitution. Despite the prescription in the Partition Plan and Israel’s Declaration of 
Independence that a constitution be adopted, Ben Gurion did not feel the Knesset was 
obliged to implement such a legal document given the arguments presented by MKs. 
Similar to the MAPAI speaker above, he held that Israel’s revolution was not yet 
completed, and “moved forward every time another boatload of Jews arrived or more 
barren land was redeemed.”302 Agreeing that the legislation inherited from the Ottomans 
and the British mandate ought to be changed, Ben Gurion contended that a constitution 
would neither expedite this nor protect the democratic rights of citizens. Knesset law 
needs to be supreme, he argued, and went on to cite Eastern European states as examples 
of the lack of a guarantee of civic rights and freedoms even with the adoption of a 
constitution.303 Put differently, Ben Gurion argued that a constitution is not necessary to 
create, educate people toward, or preserve citizenship. In a speech before the Knesset in 
September 1950, Ben Gurion summarized the position against adopting a constitution: 
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The United States has a constitution, but the law imposes military censorship in 
times of emergency. Britain does not have a constitution, and in times of peace 
the law does not permit military censorship there. The Soviet Union certainly has 
a constitution on the strength of which the Soviet Union has censorship and it is 
not only military. As to the dismissal of the Knesset – it is the custom in Britain 
that Parliament may be dismissed, and the Prime Minister is authorized to do this 
at any time he may think fit. I have never heard that there is in this any affront to 
democracy or to the rights of the citizen.304 
 
Democracy is enduring in England not due to the absence of a constitution, he contends, 
but because there is respect for the rule of law and faith in the judges. Here England is 
given as an example where the absence of a privileged constitution is understood as 
heightening democratic structures and the rule of law. Ben Gurion goes on to assert that 
rather than a constitution Israel needs strong laws. Perhaps to mobilize the existing 
Orthodox and religious voices of criticism against a constitution in his audience in the 
Knesset, he begins by citing the Torah as “Israel’s First Constitution.” He gives a series 
of examples from the holy book to illustrate how legislation accompanied with respect 
for the rule of law among the public can ensure that the will of ‘the people’ is met. Using 
the First Book of Samuel where there is a detailed debate between a secular authority and 
a theocratic one, Ben Gurion points out that Samuel was forced by the power of the 
people as sovereign to meet their needs and demands, despite the fact that their demands 
were both wholly secular and based on source borrowed from other nations.305 From 
here, he argues that 
The freedom of the individual and the freedom of the people do not spring from 
proclamations of freedom nor from a constitution, even though it were the best in 
the world: they have their source in one thing – the rule of law. …. Where the law 
does not rule there is no freedom, even if there is a constitution that incorporates 
the most ardent and progressive scrolls of freedom. 306 
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But the issue for Ben Gurion is not only the need for the rule of law. As Prime Minister 
of the Jewish State during a period when its political structures, territorial boundaries, 
legal institutions, and ideological mindset around citizenship and nationality were still 
malleable and being determined, Ben Gurion’s main interest was to prevent any 
impediments to lawmaking in the Knesset – which he headed. He was particularly 
troubled by the notion that a Supreme Court or any other collective may have the power 
or authority to nullify Knesset legislation on the grounds that it conflicted with the 
Constitution. For him, in a non-federal system like Israel, where provinces do not need 
protection from the whims and interference of a Federal Government, such an 
arrangement would be nonsensical and merely serve to slow down the passing of required 
and/or desired legislation.  
We are in need of laws in every field. …. These laws limit and define the rights 
and duties of the citizens, the representatives of the people, the government 
officials, the police, of a man and his wife, or parents and children, of companies 
and organizations. No constitution can fulfill this purpose. Only by laws can this 
be done, laws that can be changed and amended from time to time as the need 
arises…. Real freedom is assured only under such circumstances, and only then 
will the rights of every man be safe.307 
 
The element of flexibility and efficiency in the passing and withdrawing of existing 
legislation is key for Ben Gurion. Of course, flexibility in lawmaking is not necessarily 
impeded by the adoption of a constitution. As I pointed to above, all of Kohn’s proposals 
for a Draft Constitution vested the greatest powers into the hands of the elected 
legislative or State Council. This was done explicitly on the basis that the struggles the 
newly created Jewish State will face will require prompt decisions and effective actions 
by legal practitioners. And yet, Ben Gurion stressed that 
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In a country where the rule of law [exists,] the making of law is in the hands of 
the people and the control and defence of the law in that of the judges. The 
people must not be hampered in the making of laws…. A judge cannot make laws 
and he cannot ban laws, for like every other citizen he is himself subject to the 
law…. In a state ruled by law there is a complete separation between the 
legislative authority, which is entrusted to the representatives of the people, and 
the executive authority, which is handed over to a body of judges…308 
 
To quell the concerns of his audience of the development of an uncontrolled and 
dominating Knesset, he assures Members that the absence of a constitution and the 
limitation of the means of the judiciary to check the legislation passed by elected 
representatives will not lead to a totalitarian state. 
Every totalitarian regime is deadly poison to the Jews and to the Jewish people, 
physically and spiritually. These governments destroy the existence of the Jews 
or the existence of Judaism, or of both together. Israel, too, would not be able to 
exist under such a regime…. Under totalitarian rule, even if there is no special 
hostility towards them, their existence as Jews is destroyed. The fate of the 
Jewish people is linked to the fate of democracy. 309 
 
Clearly concerned about limiting the powers of the Knesset according to a Constitution 
that is interpreted and enforced by the judiciary, he ends this historic speech by warning 
his audience of the dangers to come. Ben Gurion points to the existential threats faced by 
Israeli democracy from both non-Jewish minorities and an ethnically and culturally 
diverse and divided Jewish population in the new state: 
If Israeli democracy wishes to survive for any period of time it will have to be 
armed with means of defence and instruments of action and creation which will 
prevent minorities – and not only non-Jewish minorities – from obtaining 
ascendancy over it by force, from inside or from outside. It is difficult to be so 
simple as not to see that there are such minorities among us, even if they do not 
all reveal their intentions….310   
 
He emphasizes the potential existential threat posed to Israeli democracy and the Jewish 
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character of the state by both non-Jewish minorities, and those minorities within the 
Jewish population, whether inside or outside. With this, Ben Gurion effectively paints a 
picture to the attendees that the absence of an empowered Knesset will render them all 
vulnerable. For him, the adoption of any constitution of any form to which the Knesset 
and elected representatives of the people will have to abide can only be seen as an 
impediment to action. It limits options for the self-defence of the newly established and 
‘vulnerable’ Jewish State. The final compromise on this question reached by the 
attending MKs was the aforementioned Harari Decision. A slower process, this 
arrangement entailed that draft constitution would be produced through the formation of 
various chapters, each of which would constitute a basic law and eventually be combined 
to form a constitution.  
Pointing to a major feature of the Israeli logic of exclusion, Ben Gurion’s intervention in 
the Knesset on this debate reveals that far from stabilizing the new state – clarifying its 
parameters of inclusion and entrenching the protection of its citizens and residents – a 
constitution was almost completely viewed by the first Prime Minister as a barrier to 
political decision-making. While this potential impediment to Knesset decisions was 
located by Ben Gurion in the judiciary’s implementation of the constitution, another 
barrier he likely considered was that of international law and United Nation’s resolutions. 
Indicated in the drafts produced by Kohn, a constitution for the Jewish State would also 
mean the implementation of basic parameters of international law and UN decisions, 
including the Partition Plan. Kohn had admitted that the inspiration for the formulations 
he adopted in the various sections of the proposed constitutions was largely the Partition 
Plan and the constitutional model of Western parliamentary democracy. For example, 
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Jerusalem was not included as part of a future Jewish State. In contrast, Ben Gurion’s 
distaste of UN involvement in what he considered the internal affairs of the established 
Jewish State was made explicit on a number of occasions, not least around the issue of 
Jerusalem. In an address to the Knesset on December 6, 1949, Ben Gurion stressed the 
organic and inseparable place of “Jewish Jerusalem” in the State of Israel, arguing that 
“we cannot conceive that the United Nations will try to tear Jerusalem from Israel or to 
impair the sovereignty of Israel in its Eternal Capital.”311 Eight days later, after stating, 
“in our view the [UN] decision of November 29 about Jerusalem is null and void,” Ben 
Gurion announced the beginning of the transfer of government offices to Jerusalem and 
the creation of needed conditions for the proclaimed capital.312 Such poignant and 
divisive political, legal, ideological and territorial issues would likely require clarification 
in any adopted Israeli constitution. Of these, the central issue being the pressing problem 
of the rights of non-Jewish minorities (mainly Palestinian-Arabs) alongside Jewish 
inhabitants in a Jewish State committed to maintaining a Jewish character, traditions, 
majority and source of law. The associated risk being, of course, heightened opposition 
by the international community to the newly formed and unstable Jewish State. 
4. Summary and conclusions  
Recent scholarship has shown that British colonial policies and practices before 1948 
placed apart Jewish from Arab subjects in their applications for Palestinian passports, 
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residency and visas. Using Banko, we see that the British Mandate was key to the 
internationalization of citizenship in that it brought together various (largely Jewish) 
ethno-national groups as Palestinian citizens. The British Jewish home policy placed 
Mandate Palestine in a colonial position set apart from other colonies in the broader 
Empire. Discussions among legal scholars and political figures in the Zionist leadership, 
the British government and the League of Nations outlined in the above archival material 
reveals the multifaceted difficulties in configuring the future nationality and citizenship 
regulations for the Jewish State. The outline of the political and ideological trajectory that 
led to Israel’s contemporary citizenship and nationality structures accounts both for the 
features placing apart the incorporation regime of the Jewish State, and the reasons for 
why it explicates the global logic of exclusion and the internationalization of citizenship 
revocation.  
Clearly there was extensive European normative, legal and spiritual influence on 
Israel’s projected nationality and citizenship regime. Leo Kohn’s proposed constitution 
borrowed heavily from the legislative and executive structures of the United States, 
France, England, Ireland and the Weimar Republic. However, a strong ‘Jewish character’ 
was also desired; an incredible task given that Jewish traditions were not a major source 
in the referenced Western democratic and parliamentary structures. The constitution for a 
Jewish State was meant for a body politic whose spiritual and normative traditions were 
not sourced by the constitutional structures of existing democratic countries. Hence, what 
was desired by the drafters was the design of an unprecedented constitutional structure: 
one that was seeped both in the Western (and largely Christian) tradition of modern and 
secular government, as well as in the basic principles of ancient Jewish law. Added to 
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this, the differences of opinion and interpretation of these principles of Jewish law also 
point to the schisms in Israel’s body politic. 
As my examinations reveal, Israel was formed through the historical matrix of 
European colonialism, serving as a site of Western power and influenced by European 
citizenship and nationality regulations. And yet, the constitutional structures in existing 
Western liberal democratic countries are unable to fully encompass the parameters of 
Israel’s particular logic of exclusion. This accounts for the existence of exclusions that 
are particular to Israel’s citizenship and nationality regime. Unlike liberal democratic 
states in the West, Israel’s major features of nation-statehood, including territorial 
borders, demography, and sovereignty largely remain incomplete, unresolved and 
illegitimate, indicating the type of citizenship regime it maintains. Its ability to 
interrogate and dilute the figure of the citizen in such a unique manner is precisely 
because as a nation-state it is a novel constitutional phenomenon. This arrangement has 
enabled Israel to use citizenship structures to place citizens in a relation of exclusive-
inclusion: namely, to exclude by actually including the political subject. In doing so, it 
has rendered the ‘immigrant’ as the primary figure making up the Israeli body politic. 
This core analytical contribution of the study culminates in the following chapter, where I 
outline the mechanisms through which the colonial logic of pre-1948 Zionism resurfaces 
in contemporary Israeli citizenship structures.  
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Chapter Four | Constituting the Jewish State: Inverting the Citizen with the 
Figure of the Immigrant 
 
“The passport is the most noble part of the human being. It also does not come into existence in 
such a simple fashion as a human being does. A human being can come into the world anywhere, 
in the most careless way and for no good reason, but a passport never can. When it is good, the 
passport is also recognized for this quality, whereas a human being, no matter how good, can go 
unrecognized.” 
Bertolt Brecht, Refugee Conversations  
[Flüchtlingsgespräche] (1940; Berlin, 1961) 
 
“Our state is the most dynamic state in the world and is being reshaped daily. Every day, new 
Jewish people come into the country, and every day abandoned land is liberated. These dynamics 
cannot be submitted to a pre-defined frame or artificial bonds.” 
David Ben Gurion arguing against an Israeli Constitution 
January 1949, Knesset Debate313 
1. Introduction  
The Israeli project of statehood commenced during a historical period where every major 
nation-state in the world, certainly in Europe and North America, were re-considering 
their nationality and citizenship laws. In the aftermath of World War II, states were faced 
with significant boundary changes, anti-colonial independence struggles and 
disagreements over territorial ownership and governance. Further, major population 
movements in the form of transfer, resettlement, forced migration and exile due to state 
policies and military conflict during the War prompted questions of legal status and the 
protection of non-state individuals and groups. In this chapter I explain how the colonial 
logic of pre-1948 Zionism resurfaces in contemporary Israeli citizenship structures at the 
legislative, declarative, structural, and operational levels. The matrix of European 
colonialism within which the Jewish national movement burgeoned and where notions of 
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liberal citizenship first took root will be demonstrated as a key source of the multifaceted 
racial discrimination and exclusion faced by non-Jewish citizens and subjects today. 
Closely examined is the Law of Return (1950) and the Citizenship Law (1952). The 
former guarantees the right of immigration to every Jewish person to Israel and is 
completed by the latter which, called the first genuinely ‘indigenous law’ of the State, 
provides automatic citizenship to any Jew upon immigration. Together, these two laws 
form the substructure upon which a whole arrangement of formal policies, informal 
practices and new legislation ensuring Jewish dominance within the State of Israel are 
based.  
Of these laws, I focus on the function of the Law of Return (1950). It clothes the 
Jewish historical experience in legal form and acts as a legal precursor that actually 
constitutes the Jewish State. Our detailed analysis of the conceptual and legal role of the 
notion of return as an original method of acquiring Israeli nationality reveals that Zionist 
lawmakers did not view it as either attached to the legitimacy, legal backing or will of the 
State’s constitutional order. Put differently, I hold that while the Law of Return may itself 
be repealed or amended by the constitutional structures of the State for its explicitly 
discriminatory and exclusionary premise around the rights of non-Jews to immigrate and 
settle as citizens, the right of return is not something that can be revoked. In effect, as all 
Jews are covered by virtue of the principle of return, this also paradoxically includes 
those Jews who are born in the country. This means that on the event of the creation of 
the State of Israel, even the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine in the country are conferred 
nationality through the concept of return. With this arrangement, I explain that the Israeli 
constitutional order is structured in a manner that broadens the category of the ‘Jewish 
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immigrant’, placing this figure on the top of the constitutional process. A country 
primarily aimed at ingathering Jewish exiles, the immigrant is here placed at the center of 
the Israeli constitutional equation. The ‘desired’ citizen in Israel is the figure of the 
Jewish immigrant. This is the newcomer or ‘guest’ who by arriving to congregate in the 
Jewish State thereby reproduces and maintains both its identity and existence.  
Together, the analysis in the previous chapters lay the basis for the present 
examination of the Israeli nationality and citizenship regime. The scholarship on 
transformations in liberal citizenship I surveyed revealed that discourse on the content, 
structures and boundaries of civic institutions are today increasingly becoming politically 
informal, un-rooted, de-territorialized and undetermined. Having laid out this general 
trend in the institution of citizenship I then turned to the Israeli case study. Using both 
literary and historical texts, I was able to locate discourses on citizenship and nationality 
in Mandate Palestine as sites of production of European colonial power. With this I have 
shown that the Jewish national movement burgeoned around and framed asymmetric 
Arab and Jewish access to rights through the colonial perceptions, experiences and 
discourses of Zionist figures and through the support of European hegemonic power. This 
colonial logic of exclusion has been demonstrated, using archival documents and 
scholarship I collected and examined in Chapter Three, to have delimited the features of 
the liberal citizenship and nationality regime anticipated for the Jewish State. This section 
weeds together these discussions by examining in detail the precise mechanisms through 
which the Zionist logic of exclusion continues from its pre-1948 forms to be constituted 
and manifested in contemporary Israeli citizenship structures. In doing so, I show that 
citizenship structures in Israel are arranged in a manner where the figure of the citizen is 
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being stretched. This chapter outlines that the matrix of inclusion into citizenship in Israel 
is less geared toward the citizen, and more towards determining immigration in a manner 
that enables Jewish entry and settlement. It makes intelligible the mechanisms through 
which Zionism forms a redefinition between the citizen and the immigrant.  
By examining the Law of Return and its associated constitutional arrangements I 
analyze how the Israeli incorporation regime inverts the image of the citizen with the 
figure of the immigrant or guest. Compared with what Chapter Five points to as repeated 
efforts and trends restricting Western immigration systems and nationality laws, the 
political survival of the State of Israel depends on open immigration and automatic 
citizenship for Jews. For Israel, the desired, preferred, and most qualified political subject 
is first and foremost the ‘Jewish immigrant’. The notion of ‘return’ thereby serves the 
function of overturning the classical practice in Western liberal democratic societies by 
rendering the ‘Jewish immigrant’ as the preeminent figure of Israeli politics. Thus, placed 
at the center of the Israeli constitutional equation, the immigrant guest surfaces as the 
‘real’ citizen in Israel. 
Collectively, these chapters form a key analytical contribution of this study. The 
interrogation of the figure of the citizen in Israel examined below is shown in the next 
and final chapter to be reminiscent of rising political trajectory where the citizen is 
assuming features of the more capricious figure of the immigrant. What I aim to highlight 
in this study, is that these processes occur through the active use of citizenship structures 
themselves. Whether in Israel or in the Western countries cited in the next chapter, they 
create exclusions and restrictions beyond the existing marginalization faced by racialized 
minority citizen communities. I argue that we are in the midst of a transition in 
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citizenship regimes, towards a more interrogated and restricted model of citizenship. 
Using the Israeli logic of exclusion as a looking glass for understanding changes in 
Western citizenship, my study points to the forms through which the figure of the citizen 
is being thinned down. To this end, it explores how the restrictions, redefinitions and 
controls on citizenship in Israel today can help elucidate the implications what is 
happening to citizenship in ‘core’ liberal democratic states. 
2. Israel’s constitutional makeup today 
After the mentioned Knesset compromise in June 1950, Israeli parliamentarians agreed to 
adopt various chapters, each of which would constitute a separate basic law and together 
serve as the constitution of the State. Failed efforts in the Knesset at adopting a bill of 
rights in the 1980s meant that “until the early 1990s, the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, reflecting the influence of the English system, reigned supreme” among 
Israeli lawmakers.314 This changed in 1992, when the first two basic laws, Basic Law: 
Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom were adopted.  
The adoption of these two basic laws can also be understood as another Knesset 
compromise. Both were implemented after unsuccessful efforts to enact Basic Law: Basic 
Human Rights, a proposed bill that would have provided and enforced a broader basic 
law that “dealt explicitly with the right to equality.”315 With ambiguous and undefined 
language in its purpose clause that included the words ‘Jewish’ and ‘democratic’ in its 
definition, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation was designed by its legal architects to 
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mend the divide in the Knesset. This is an ideological, religious and conceptual divide 
that also exists within the character of the state more broadly.316 Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation was passed by twenty-three members with no opposition or abstentions, 
while Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom was narrowly passed by a majority of 
thirty-two, with twenty-one votes against and one abstention.317 Limited public 
involvement in the determination of these issues as well as the lack of preparation of 
citizens to weigh in on these key issues reveal the near total monopolization of the 
Knesset as the representative and embodiment of the sovereignty of the people. As such, 
the two basic laws were critiqued by their detractors for the “absence of public 
deliberation during… [a] crucial legislative process that reframed the state’s fundamental 
values.”318 
Overall, the passing of the two Basic Laws in this context and manner can be read 
as an attempt by law and policy-makers to allow for as little inclusion and protection of 
rights and freedoms as politically possible. Looking at the historical compromises of 
Israeli constitutionalism from this light, where, first, the option for a constitution 
enshrining rights and protections is rejected in favor of the gradual adoption of separate 
basic laws so as to prevent the possibility of nullifying problematic Knesset legislation; 
and second, where two Basic Laws are then first adopted over forty years later so as to 
prevent the passing of another proposed bill dealing with a broader set of rights, one can 
infer that these constitutional efforts are themselves political and legal compromises 
seeking to maintain as much exclusion as possible in the face of greater calls for set legal 
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protections. This conclusion is reinforced by the continued absence of a provision in 
Israeli law for the concept of constitutional equality.  
Although a promise of full equality for all citizens is made in the Declaration of 
Independence, it is thoroughly absent in the form of actual legislation. Equality is not an 
enshrined constitutional right, and is absent from the above Basic Law: Human Dignity 
and Freedom which has, in the absence of a written constitution, served as Israel’s 
constitutional bill since its inception. This means that while the law protects the equal 
rights of disadvantaged groups, no general statute relates to the right to equality or 
freedom from discrimination for all citizens.319 The lack of an explicit guarantee and 
protection of the right to equality is rooted in the declared Jewish character of the state.320 
A character that, as we will learn, is being increasingly constitutionally entrenched to the 
point where it cannot be changed democratically. 
The primacy of the Basic Laws as constitutional legislation over regular 
legislation was first recognized in 1995, when the Supreme Court decided that the 
prescriptions in these laws will impact the reading of prior, ‘ordinary’ legislation.321 With 
this decision, the basic laws have been considered and administered as a kind of ‘limited’ 
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constitution of sorts.322 The features of these debates on Israel’s constitutional makeup 
resemble the political and structural dynamics pointed to that were present in the first 
years of its establishment. Similar to the decision-making process in the first years of 
statehood on the question of Israel’s constitutional structures, these debates too were 
conducted with little civic participation.  
Relatedly, and perhaps more concerning, while basic laws have been enshrined 
with a kind of constitutional merit and authority rendering them superior to other 
‘regular’ and periodic legislation, the procedural mechanisms in place for implementing 
and amending both sets of laws are the same. The Knesset does not require a “special 
majority or special quorum” for changing or adopting a basic law, meaning that the 
constitutional makeup of Israel as embodied in these declared superior laws can be 
redrawn by a mere “handful of MKs.”323 In effect, while there are legal principles that 
delimit the parameters of Knesset powers, it nonetheless remains a constituent body with 
extensive and unmatched legal powers and authority to reformulate the arrangements and 
character of the Israeli body politic. This structural arrangement echoes the grim image of 
the Jewish State painted forty years prior by members of the First Knesset. An image of 
the development of an uncontrolled and dominating representative body that can, for the 
most part, implement major constituent changes with limited impediments, all with a 
simple majority of ministers. The difference, however, is that while in the first years of 
statehood the legislature engaged primarily in these constitutional disputes, the so-called 
‘Constitutional Revolution’ of the 1990s was a debate between the institutions of the 
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Supreme Court and the Knesset.  
Within five years of this revolution, by March 1997, eleven Basic Laws were 
already approved by the Knesset, and designed to serve as the starting point for a 
‘constitution’. Praising what he considered the inclusion of the Jewish State into the 
historical matrix of liberal democratic Western nations, former President of the Israeli 
Supreme Court Aharon Barak proclaimed: 
[W]e became a constitutional democracy. We joined the democratic, enlightened 
nations in which human rights are awarded a constitutional force, above the 
regular statutes. Similar to the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan and other western countries, we now have a constitutional defence for 
Human Rights. We too have the central chapter in any written constitution, the 
subject matter of which is Human Rights; we too have restrictions on the 
legislative power of the legislator; we too have judicial review of statutes which 
unlawfully infringe upon constitutionally protected human rights; we too have a 
written constitution, to which the Knesset in its capacity as legislator is subject 
and which it cannot alter.324 
 
Though ambiguities around “who really holds constituent power in Israel” remain, 
currently the Knesset is empowered to exercise constituent power that is sourced in and 
legitimized by the sovereignty of the people.325 Of course, limited restrictions to the 
constituent power of a legal apparatus where the authority of any given government can 
significantly reconfigure all aspects of Israeli life raises numerous critical questions 
concerning democratic representation and rule. The moments where striking and 
prominent restrictions by the judiciary to the Knesset’s constitutional ability to amend 
and enact law have been issued are those pertaining to Israel’s definition as a Jewish and 
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democratic state.326 The legislative authority of the Knesset is repeatedly instructed by 
the Supreme Court that it is not within its constitutional mandate to question or negate 
Israel’s character as both Jewish and democratic. Outside the parameters of Knesset 
powers, the democratic character of the state as well as its Jewish character are thereby 
both entrenched as part of the fundamental and unchangeable principles of its 
constitutional system. The former may be expected given the historical, normative and 
spiritual legal links the Jewish State has formed with liberal democracies in North 
America and Europe. But the implications of the latter are key as it significantly trims the 
democratic rights and protections of Israel’s non-Jewish subjects.  
[T]his position means that the Jewish definition, which cannot be changed 
democratically, in essence trumps the democratic character. The Jewish character 
is not a matter of democratic agreement, but an axiomatic given that even 
democracy… cannot change or question. A scenario where the Knesset decides to 
change the definition of the state and change the Jewish character is of course an 
almost impossible scenario… [b]ut the fact that this almost impossible scenario is 
presented as an unconstitutional constitutional amendment gives a strong 
indication about how deeply entrenched and all-encompassing the Jewish 
definition is to the constitutional order. 327  
 
Mazen Masri continues to explain what this rigid constitutional arrangement reveals 
about the makeup of the people holding sovereign power in Israel: 
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In this case, the People, or whoever is acting on its behalf, is not only bound by 
democracy, but also by a commitment to uphold the Jewish nature of the state 
that trumps democracy. The ultimate locus of sovereignty in this case, therefore, 
is not the People seen as the citizenry, but a different collective that believes in 
the Jewish definition and its minimum requirements.328 
 
Despite this inflexible and unalterable structural and ideological definition, in November 
2014 a bill for a new basic law called Basic Law: Israel and the Nation State of the 
Jewish People was approved and passed on by the Netanyahu-led Knesset to be debated 
at a higher governmental level. Introduced on August 3, 2011 by Avi Dichter of the 
Kadima-party, the proposed basic law was filed along with another thirty-nine Knesset 
members belonging both to ruling coalition and the opposition parties. Seeking to 
interpret the terms “Jewish and democratic” as they appear in the existing basic laws 
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the 
proposal defines the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people. It grants the 
right to self-determination in Israel exclusively to the Jewish people. Among other 
features, the proposed basic law unequivocally anchors the state’s symbols, holidays, 
calendar and heritage as Jewish, stipulates Hebrew as the only official language giving 
Arabic only a ‘special status’, entrenches the maintenance of a Jewish demographic 
majority, and sources Jewish religious law as inspiration for the Israeli court system.329 In 
other words, systematic discrimination in Israel is explicitly codified in racist legislation 
that unequivocally denies its non-Jewish citizenry, over twenty percent of the citizen 
population, any national rights and the right of self-determination in the state. Moreover, 
as Hassan Jabareen, Director of Adalah, points out, 
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For the first time, the Israeli political right is proposing a Basic Law (a law that is 
equivalent to a constitutional law in a country that does not have a Constitution) 
that distinguishes between the ‘Land of Israel’ (Eretz Israel) and the ‘State of 
Israel’ in regards to the fulfillment of self-determination. The Nation-State bill 
declares that ‘the Land of Israel is the historical homeland of the Jewish 
people…’ and that the State of Israel is the national home of the Jewish people, in 
which it fulfills its aspiration for self-determination’.330  
 
The distinction between the State of Israel and the Land of Israel in relation to self-
determination is important. The former refers to pre-1967 borders that are internationally 
recognized, as per the UN Partition Plan, to belong to the territory of the State of Israel, 
with the remaining lands under its military control considered occupied lands, including 
the Golan Heights. The latter, however, is a geographical extension of this area that for 
some Zionist figures includes all of 1948-Palestine. For others, it includes areas of the 
Southern Levant, including parts of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. While this is the 
first time the line dividing the two is being explicitly codified in law in relation to 
national rights, the distinction itself is nonetheless part of a hegemonic Zionist discourse 
and commonly referred to by Israeli public figures and policy-makers. In effect, the 
proposed Basic Law is reaffirming popular and long-held Zionist attitudes that the 
national rights of the Jewish people extend to lands beyond the recognized territory of the 
State of Israel (a political project evidenced with continued Jewish-only settlement 
building in Jerusalem and the West Bank), but also possibly even beyond the lands of 
1948-Palestine. 
The absence of constitutional equality is actively played upon as the proposed 
Basic Law – having passed its preliminary reading in the Knesset in May 2017, and 
currently awaiting three further parliamentary votes before becoming law – gives 
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concrete expression to discrimination against non-Jewish minorities in Israel in numerous 
ways. Preference is given to Jews both inside Israel and abroad over the citizens of the 
state, the resources and efforts of the state will be overwhelmingly directed toward 
fostering of Jewish culture, development, and heritage in Israel and abroad (when it 
comes to the state’s non-Jewish communities, mere permission is given in the bill “to 
strive for the preservation of [their] culture, heritage, language and identity”331), and 
Arabic will no longer maintain the status of an official language. Yet, importantly, the 
proposed bill is not a major change from the existing state of affairs in all areas of life in 
Israel. As we explore, discriminatory and racist legislation explicitly targeting the non-
Jewish community in Israel has been proposed and adopted by Zionist lawmakers since 
its inception. Since 2009, with the rise of extreme right and Orthodox representation in 
the Knesset, we have seen a particularly sharp increase in discriminatory laws that 
specifically target Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel and affect them disproportionately. 
Extending from the Israeli logic of exclusion, they also target Palestinians in Jerusalem, 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian refugee population. These laws are 
pervasive. They target all areas of Arab life in Israel: land rights, economic, land and 
budgetary allocations, freedom of association and expression, the right to protest and 
challenge Zionist policies, and even the right to ask for equality in the law, among other 
areas.332 Indeed, these legal amendments are not made in isolation but against the 
background of a hegemonic Zionist discourse, whose aim is to force concession to a 
dominant Zionist consensus on the Arab citizenry.333 The contemporary legal and 
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political arrangement in Israel is already set up in such a manner that entrenches Jewish 
dominance and privilege in all areas of life. As such, the proposed Basic Law is as 
significant as it is actually constitutionally unnecessary for the maintenance of this racist 
hierarchy. 
Despite upholding expansionist and discriminatory Zionist attitudes regarding 
non-Jewish inhabitants in the State, the proposed Basic Law also ironically makes 
reference to a liberal tradition and democratic principles. Expressing commitment to the 
“values of Israel as a Jewish democratic state,” it explicitly instructs legal decision-
making to refer to liberal “principles of freedom, justice, equity, and peace [as] derived 
from Jewish civil law.”334 This reveals the major underlying tensions among Israeli 
policy-makers between the clear ideological and political campaign to maintain Jewish 
exclusivity and dominance in all areas of life, while attempting to incorporate liberal 
democratic principles of governance. Jabareen explains that 
… the new legislation seeks to challenge the longstanding ‘Ben-Gurionist’ 
tradition regarding the rule of law. This tradition asserts that, apart from a few 
exceptional laws… Israel should refrain from enacting ethnically based 
legislation—laws that are clearly written in discriminatory language—in order to 
present the state as democratic in the international arena. Under this tradition, the 
executive and judicial branches would carry out the discriminatory and repressive 
policies instead, without the existence of ethnic legislation.335  
 
Put differently, the public debate around the proposed bill is not whether or not 
discrimination against Israel’s non-Jewish inhabitants ought to continue, but rather, how 
to continue to maintain and empower this arrangement. The debate is “not about whether 
discrimination should or should not be stopped” but whether it should be clearly 
expressed and codified in racist legislation that would then detract from Israel’s perceived 
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liberal character. 336 In essence, the parameters of and debates on this proposed Basic 
Law nicely encompass the existing exclusionary constitutional character and vision of the 
State of Israel.  
Existing racist and discriminatory legal and political practices are legislated so as 
to empower the Knesset’s authority as a constituent body with extensive legal powers to 
formulate the arrangements and character of the Israeli body politic. While in this case 
the definition of Israel as a Jewish State is a tenet accepted by all major Jewish political 
parties and figures well across the political spectrum – and, unlike its democratic 
character, a feature that remains unquestioned and supreme – the constitutional makeup 
of Israel today is maintained by the Knesset as an unmatched representative body. This 
means that it that can, for the most part, implement constituent changes with limited 
impediments. This said, the ideological and political cleavages in the Israeli body politic 
become more explicit when considering why in the face of an unalterable structural and 
ideological definition of Israel as ‘Jewish’ such a bill is even considered. Why do Zionist 
policy-makers even need such a Basic Law? On the one hand, if it survives in this form 
and is finally adopted as a Basic Law, it will further empower the implementation of any 
discriminatory policies and practices proposed by Israeli public figures. Granted, existing 
structures and ideological arrangements in Israel already provide for the implementation 
of such legislation. Yet this proposed law can be said to at least simplify and make 
apparent the major aims of the Zionist political project in the state. On the other hand, 
more than simplifying an existing practice of racial discrimination in law, the proposed 
bill can also be understood as part of an effort to reaffirm Jewish ascendancy 
domestically, in the hearts and minds of Israeli society itself. The governmental and legal 
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Zionist drive to explicitly entrench exclusive Jewish dominance, stand alongside drives 
by Western liberal democracies to implement legal exclusions to citizenship to maintain 
homogeneity and racialized structures of power. Although not a replica, both political 
projects clarify a violent rigid and exclusionary set-up and political tone that is already in 
place. The political motivations and legal effects of this ideological drive, as well as its 
liberal justifications, will be examined in the forthcoming chapters. 
3. Constructing the Israeli body politic: Who is a Jew? 
The 1948-war transitioned the Zionist movement from a pre-state to a post-state project. 
The widespread ideological commitments to the maintenance of the Jewish character of 
Israel are entrenched in a set of pre-state institutions that actively advocate Jewish 
independence in Palestine, mass Jewish immigration, increase of Jewish land ownership 
and other Zionist aims.337 Together, these institutions – including the Jewish Agency, the 
Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth Le-Israel, hereafter ‘JNF’), the Histadrut 
(general union of workers), the Haganah (the underground army and later the Israeli 
Defense Forces), the Basic Fund, and the other political associations and their respective 
educational systems and kibbutz (agricultural commune) movements – formed a kind of 
proto-state before 1948, called Yishuv, at an institutional and practical level. After 1948, 
these very institutions, whose primary commitment to the Zionist ideology remained 
unscathed, continued to function but instead as quasi-state organizations.338 The 
perspective of the Zionist movement therefore shifted to the logic of governance and 
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statehood. With this came the need to give shape to the Israeli body politic through 
engineered policies and practices of nationality and citizenship. 
 State-building initiatives began in a historical period where every major nation-
state in the world, certainly in Europe and North America, were re-shaping their 
citizenship and nationality laws. In the aftermath of the World War II, states were faced 
with significant boundary changes, anti-colonial independence struggles and struggles 
over territorial ownership and governance. In addition to this, major population 
movements in the form of transfer, resettlement, forced migration and exile due to state 
policies and military conflict prompted questions of legal status and the protection of 
non-state individuals and groups. To address their displaced and dispersed populations, 
(and sometimes to create mechanisms to encourage a return or resettlement in the 
country, as was the case of post-war Germany) states were compelled to revisit and 
reform their nationality and citizenship laws to account for the new territorial realities 
and political power divisions. Israel was no exception to this post-war global process. As 
the projected Jewish State, it was at the center of the Western question of how to address 
the surviving Jewish populations and the historical record of human destruction that had 
just unfolded. However, the major difference in the case of Israel was that despite its 
newly acquired recognition as a state, the focus and objective of the Zionist movement 
was more about completing the project of the ingathering of exiles. In effect, statehood 
then was seen as an instrument, a means to an end. It is not the Zionist project that serves 
an overriding state project. Rather, it is the state that serves as an instrument for and is 
superseded by Zionism’s continued settler-colonial project. An uneven relation appears 
where the master signifiers of state and nation are in the direct and explicit service of a 
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chosen people. Key to exploring the Israeli logic of exclusion that gives shape and vigour 
to its particular incorporation regime is understanding the processes through which the 
projected ‘people’ in Israel – or the Jew as the figure making up the Israeli body politic – 
are defined. 
Raef Zreik points to the fact that the organizations and institutions declaring the 
State of Israel were mandated to represent not only Jewish-Israelis in the Yishuvs of 
Mandate Palestine, but Jews all over the world. By extension, this mandate, he explains, 
reflects the broader mandate and purpose of the State of Israel itself. As we will further 
explore, the Declaration of Independence itself specifies that the purpose of the state is to 
be “open for Jewish immigration,” foster “the ingathering of the exiles” and encourage 
“the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally round the Jews of Eretz-Israel in the 
tasks of immigration and upbuilding.”339 Zreik explains that the mission of the state was 
thus to draw in and integrate Jews from all other nation-states, including Arab ones, 
making the creation of the state itself “only one stage in a long journey.” He stresses that 
this was (re)affirmed three years after the establishment of the state by David Ben Gurion 
who, in a 1951 speech made to the American Zionist Movement, explained that the 
creation of the state was not the culmination of the Zionist project: 
Zionism is a dream while the state is a fact. The state only speaks in the name of 
its citizens and its laws are only valid for its citizens within its sovereign borders. 
However, not all Jews can take part in this sovereignty, but rather only few of 
them …. As a citizen of Israel my relation to the people of Israel has priority over 
my relation to my state because the state is just a tool, and at this point in time the 
state has absorbed only a small part of the nation … the state is a tool and an 
instrument, but it is not the only tool.340 
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If the aim of the Zionist movement is to return the Diaspora to the projected homeland 
then the question, therefore, is who is the desired or preferred exile to be included into the 
nation? How does one define the Israeli body politic? The notion of the ‘people’ as a 
whole and integral body politic represents the total state of the sovereign and integrated 
citizens. In Western politics, it is the basis of the constitutional order. It is the criteria for 
membership in the club of rights that oscillates between a model that restricts rights to 
preferred and dominant groups, and one granting rights to all who need protection and 
support. As a legal and political concept, the notion of the people is the dividing line 
between the included and the excluded.  
In Means without End: Notes on Politics (2000), Agamben examines the question: 
“What is a people?” and begins by telling us that in modern European languages, the 
political meaning of the term ‘people’ “always indicates also the poor, the 
underprivileged, and the excluded.”341 Far from a total and integrated unit, the concept of 
a ‘people’ is “a dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles.” 342 It includes both the 
qualified political subject, the body politic, and the excluded and marginalized classes, 
the bare life. The fracture or relation of exclusion configured within the ‘people’ arises 
because while it is a source of identity and meaning, it is also repeatedly compelled to 
turn to that which is outside, the excluded, for its self-definition. Part of a dialectic, the 
outside is always already a part of the concept. It is already included in the concept but it 
is nevertheless outside of it and cannot belong to it. Both poles of this concept are 
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indispensable and part of what he describes as “an incessant civil war that at once divides 
this concept more radically than any conflict and keeps it united and constitutes it more 
firmly than any identity.” 343 For Agamben, this broad and recurring semantic tension 
within the concept of the ‘people’ reflects an inherent ambiguity in the role and character 
of this notion in Western politics. Historically, juridico-political attempts were made to 
fill the split that distinguishes the two branches of the ‘people’ by radically removing, 
erasing and dissolving the excluded and disenfranchised classes. Agamben contends that 
state-led biopolitical plans to form a simple ‘people’ without crevice remain futile. They 
will continue to ultimately fail as they do not foster a politics that is reconcilable with the 
oscillation and fracture inherent in the concept itself.344 
The fracture embedded in the concept of the ‘people’ at work in the State of Israel 
differs from that which exists in liberal democratic states in the West. Determination of 
who is the desired or preferred exile to be included into the nation and provided the rights 
and benefits of recognition in Israel is mainly conducted through the above two 
foundational laws – both of which are examined in greater detail in the following sub-
sections. Perhaps the most important legal expression of Israel’s self-definition as a 
Jewish State, the Law of Return (1950), guarantees this right of immigration to every 
Jewish person. Preference for Jewish persons – a category that is ethnic, religious and 
cultural – is legalized so that instead of a general civic immigration law, the Law of 
Return only applies to any Jew looking to immigrate to Israel, to her/his spouse, children, 
grandchildren, and their respective spouses. It applies to Jewish immigrants after the 
establishment of Israel and retroactively to Jews, without major preconditions, who had 
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immigrated to Palestine or had been born there before the creation of the State. The 
exclusive parameters of this law become evident when Palestinian refugees who were 
expelled from their land and homes in 1948 are not granted the ‘right of return’ and not 
even entitled to residency or citizenship status. An extension of the Zionist project of 
enabling the return of the exiles as embedded in the Law of Return is The Citizenship Law 
(1952).345 This law defines the criteria under which non-Jewish persons can be granted 
citizenship in Israel and is meant to grant almost automatic access to Israeli citizenship 
for any Jew upon immigration “according to the Law of Return” without any length of 
residency, economic or language requirement. In essence, a nation-state with a 
hierarchical citizenship regime is established through this legal tenet encompassing all 
Jews, and only Jews, by virtue of their ethno-national or religious descent. This law 
solidifies the secondary citizenship status of Palestinian-Arabs, as there is no chance for a 
non-Jew to acquire automatic citizenship through the Ministry of Interior.346 Together, 
the Law of Return and the Citizenship Law form the basis upon which a whole 
arrangement of formal policies, informal practices and new legislation ensuring Jewish 
dominance within the State of Israel are based.347 Ultimately, these two laws are key in 
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managing the hierarchical design of the Israeli body politic. 
In the case of Israel, defining the nation, or determining who is a Jew, is more 
than merely a prescription on who is allowed to enter but also determines rights and 
benefits of recognition.348 The question of whether and how to define who is a Jew was 
prominent in a series of exchanges between Shabtai Rosenne, legal adviser to the Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the early years of the state, and Dr. Jacob Robinson, legal 
adviser to the Permanent Delegation of Israel to the United Nations. While the two 
agreed that they ought not provide a legal definition to the word ‘Jew’ in the 
implementative regulations of the citizenship legislation, Rosenne nevertheless pointed 
out that the absence of a clear definition creates clear administrative and public relations 
problems for the new State. A kind of constitutional placement of the cart before the 
horse. We are creating structures to include the ‘desired’ and qualified political subjects 
in mind for the Jewish body politic, but we do not even know how to determine whether 
someone actually qualifies as a ‘desired’ political subject in the first place. Rosenne 
remarks 
I must say that I am not so frightened of the consequences of a definition of Jew 
as you appear to be. As I understand it, the Rabbinic definition of a Jew is no 
more than an application of what we today would call jus sanguinis, descent 
being re-cloned through the mother and not through the father – a well known 
traditional reason for this – while proselytion is no more than a peculiar form of 
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naturalization. The so-called “racialism” to which you refer in… your letter exists 
whenever nationality is transmitted jus sanguinis.349 
 
Interesting here is the immediate recourse to religious practice and law for the definition 
of the national body of the State by a state official speaking from a largely secular and 
liberal legal tradition. Not shying away from the primordial underpinnings of Israeli 
nationality legislation, Rosenne’s comment points to the racialist, historical and 
ideological matrix from which Israeli citizenship structures were born. This ideological 
matrix is largely Western given that the modern conceptions of citizenship Israeli law-
makers considered when drafting its own civic regime were mainly from Western 
parliamentary states. In fact, a great number of Israeli lawyers engaged with law-making 
alongside Rosenne in these early years of the state had received their training in 
Germany. This includes Pinhas Rosen (originally Felix Rosenblüth) who was Israel’s first 
Minister of Justice, and Uri Yadin who headed the legislative section of the Ministry of 
Justice.350 Claude Klein points out that the Law of Return was adopted in June 1950, only 
fourteen months following the passing of the Basic Law in the German Federal Republic 
in May 1949. He continues to say that the German legal experience and practice is rather 
comparable with that of the Jewish State, as the question of ‘who is a German’ is 
“mutatis mutandis, with a discussion almost identical to the famous ‘who is a Jew’ 
question of Israeli law.”351 
Today, discussions on what it means to be a Jewish and democratic state, the 
balance and hierarchy between the two concepts, and the definition of who qualifies as a 
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Jew within this incorporation regime remain prevalent among commentators and Israeli 
lawmakers. Key gaps exist between an inclusive democratic tradition vested in the 
principles of legal equality of recognized members despite their respective differences, 
political freedom and the rule of law, and the more obscure notion of a State that implies 
exclusive membership in the body politic and arrangements of privilege based on shared 
ethnic and/or religious identity. Similar to the apparently seamless recourse of liberal 
policy-makers to religious law, despite overtly secular legislation the common practice of 
determining who is a Jew (or, the qualified political subject of the Jewish State) 
nevertheless adheres to religious rules and stipulations: 
When the Law of Return was first enacted in 1950, it did not include a definition 
of who is a Jew despite the demands of religious members of the Knesset. In 
1958, after consulting over 50 Jewish intellectuals worldwide, the Government 
decided to adopt a religious definition.352  
 
In effect, despite being depicted as secular immigration legislation by a largely nationalist 
leadership, consideration of whether one qualifies as a Jew under the Law of Return is 
mainly reliant on religious evaluations and practice, rather than cultural ones. The 
definition of the body politic, the nation, or the qualified political subject therefore 
surfaces as a largely religious one. In practice, this also means that government ministries 
take direction from religious and spiritual leaders who play a key role in defining who 
belongs to the ‘people’ and thereby constitutes the nation in Israel. 
Membership in the People, it turns out, has a lot to do with religion. More 
striking is that it gives ample authority to individuals or bodies outside the state 
to make important decisions on who can immigrate, decisions that, as the 
                                                
352  Masri continues, “Even the “secular-liberal” test deals with religious issues. It comes as no surprise 
 therefore that [Supreme Court] decisions rely heavily on religious Jewish law with lengthy quotes 
 from Jewish religious texts. [….] The reality is that despite the attempt to present the definition and 
 the tests as secular-liberal, they remain religious in their essence.” The Dynamics of Exclusionary 
 Constitutionalism, 107-108. 
	 183	
Supreme Court has acknowledged, are inherently related to sovereignty. The 
determination of whether an individual is Jewish is usually done using 
documentation provided by the head of the Jewish community where the 
potential immigrant lives, or the by the Rabbi of that community. Essentially, it is 
a delegation of power to that person who confirms the Jewish identity of the 
future immigrant. It is even more so when conversion outside Israel is involved. 
The most significant part of the decision who to admit to Israel as an immigrant 
and a citizen (and by extension who can join the People) is in the hands of a 
foreign individual/body. 353 
 
This matrix of privileged inclusion is further evidenced by the creation of an Israeli 
government committee established in May 2015. The committee was tasked with 
examining mechanisms to expand the breadth of the definition within the Law of Return 
of who is determined a Jew, and thereby entitled to immigrate. In its deliberations, the 
committee was to consider whether the definition of ‘who is a Jew’ should also be 
extended to groups with ‘strong affinity to the Jewish people.’354 The potential creation of 
a new category of ‘Jewish’ non-Jews, which includes an offer for extended stay in Israel, 
also involves undergoing conversion to Judaism upon arrival.355 This re-reading of the 
definition of who is a Jew surfaced a few years earlier with the case of what are called 
‘lost tribes,’ remote communities in Ethiopia, India, Latin America and other places 
claiming Jewish ancestry. In the case of the Bnei Menashe from India, although this trip 
was ruled by the chief Rabbinic authority in 2005 to have no proven Jewish ancestry and 
not to be a ‘seed of Israel’ according to its accepted halakhic definition, special 
government permission in October 2012 nevertheless enabled their immigration. In a 
context where largely numbers of Israeli citizens like the Bedouin are having their 
citizenship cancelled (an Israeli practice examined in the next section), this move to 
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broaden the potential definition of ‘who is a Jew’ reveals itself as a response to a 
perceived erosion of the country’s Jewish demographic profile. Although the parameters 
around who may constitute a Jew is what is being debated, the dominant and privileged 
figure of the desired ‘immigrant’ nevertheless remains unchanged and solely Jewish. 
Consistent with the notion of ‘return’ outlined below, what surfaces from the Israeli 
incorporation regime are juridico-political mechanisms that reverse the standard practice 
in Western liberal democracies by rendering the ‘Jewish immigrant’ as the primary figure 
of Israeli politics over that of the citizen. 
In Israel, nationality reveals itself as a political problem. Nationality directly 
affects the continuity and preservation of Israeli statehood as such. Outlined below, 
today, Israel remains the only recognized state in the world whose citizens do not 
constitute its nationals. The Israeli body politic, the people belonging to its recognized 
nation are not a politically organized group of citizens, not do they reside under a single 
governmental authority. The constituents included in the Zionist national project are not 
limited to those within or even legally tied to Israel itself, whereas those who are actually 
within the state and legally bound to it are not viewed as its constituents. This point, 
(re)asserted by Ben Gurion above, dilutes and blurs the distinction between actual and 
potential citizenship, and goes on to delimit the state as an instrument for the broader 
project of Judaization in Palestine. The Law of Return ought not be understood as a law 
of the State of Israel, but rather as a legal precursor that constitutes the state. It is the 
Zionist project, and laws such as the Law of Return, that actually create the Jewish State, 
not vice versa. The absence of fixed and decided borders is also reflective of the 
intentions and mandate of the State of Israel and the Zionist incorporation regime. Its 
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body politic is not only not limited to those Jews inside Israel, but also does not actually 
include those non-Jewish citizens inside the state. 
4. Regulating the citizen: Israel’s first indigenous law 
On April 1, 1952, nearly four years after the creation of the State of Israel, the Knesset 
adopts the Citizenship Law. In a preliminary version of a commentary on this law written 
in July 1951, Shabtai Rosenne expressed that 
In many respects this is the most important law yet enacted by the Israel[i] 
Parliament, for it fills a void which, having effects upon every person in the 
country, became more pressing with the passage of time. It is also probably the 
first law which is completely indigenous in the sense that it (a) regulates 
problems that are peculiarly the concern of the State, and (b) it does not aim 
simply at modifying earlier enactments of the mandatory Power in the light of the 
requirements of the new state, but at performing the more radical operation of 
substituting the citizenship of a territory under mandate the nationality of an 
independent State.356 
 
The significance of this law is multifold. Despite being the first genuinely ‘indigenous 
law’ of the State, a critical feature given that Israel was born into a web of multifarious 
and intertwining legal systems, its architects had undergone an exhaustive examination of 
the nationality legislation of other countries. International precedents and modern trends 
in the practice and reading of legislation pertaining to citizenship and immigration were 
considered by the Zionist lawmakers. Their aim was to find similar arrangements 
elsewhere addressing the particular dilemmas posed by the overwhelming existence of 
dual nationality and statelessness in its body politic. With strong liberal underpinnings of 
individual rights and equality, substantial consideration was placed by these lawmakers 
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on the use of new conceptions and approaches to existing principles of nationality law. 
Rosenne recounts that 
… special attention has been paid to the position of the married woman who, has 
been placed on a footing of complete and individual equality with the man in the 
matter of nationality, even at the expense of impairing the unity of the nationality 
of the family. It has also been necessary to avoid unfair discrimination between 
different sections of the population while taking due account of their disparate 
circumstances and interests. 357 
 
Interpretation of ‘political’ rights was broadened to include an understanding of 
sociological factors, including social class, mobility, stratification, sex and lifestyle, 
among other arenas of human exchange and action affected by the interplay between 
individual agency and social structures of behavior. These prevalent conceptions in 
approaches to the nationality law of that period were considered by Zionist policy-makers 
in the primary context that the State of Israel was created as a Jewish State. The Israeli 
Citizenship Law can only be understood within the framework of basic Zionist 
philosophy, calling for the ‘reunification’ of the Jewish population with the land. And so, 
liberal principles were incorporated into this legislation insofar as they enabled (or at 
least did not impede) the transformation of the Jewish national home into the Jewish 
State. Central to this is the recognition that mass Jewish immigration forms an integral 
part of this mandate.  
Working from the legal context of the Mandate for Palestine that was formally 
confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations on July 24, 1922, the UN Resolution 
181, and the 1925 Palestine Citizenship Order along with other legislation, the main 
objective of The Citizenship Law was to express the “undoubted tie which exists between 
the actual Jewish population in the country and its potential Jewish population… 
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scattered throughout the Diaspora.”358 Depicted by Rosenne as a “sociological and 
historical fact,” the tie between the Jewish State and the Jewish nation en genera was an 
integral part of this law and entrenched in the idea of ‘return’. Overall, the Citizenship 
Law listed, in order, key means of receiving Israeli citizenship: return, residence, birth 
and naturalization. For Jews only, the Law of Return (1950) was cited as providing 
automatic nationality to those born, resident in and immigrating to the country. Of course, 
a Jewish person who does not wish to avail her/himself of the rights granted under the 
Law of Return can also acquire citizenship through naturalization and residence. While 
for non-Jews, citizenship was mainly bestowed via various residency specifications. 
These requirements include being: a resident of Mandate Palestine and registered on 
March 1, 1952 as an inhabitant under the Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance 1949, an 
inhabitant of Israel on the day the law was implemented, and being in Israel, or “in an 
area which became Israel territory after the establishment of the State, from the day of the 
establishment of the State to the day of the coming into force of this Law, or entered 
Israel legally during that period.”359  
 The Citizenship Law was also hailed by Dr. Jacob Robinson as “one of the most 
liberal pieces of immigration ever passed by any Government on the subject of 
immigration, citizenship and naturalization.” Commenting on the law in a speech on May 
29, 1952, Robinson expressed: 
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No nation that I know of has ever written a nationality law which provided as 
many liberal provisions as does this bill. It has made the return of the Jews to 
their homeland as easy as possible while at the same time it has not discriminated 
against the local non-Jewish inhabitants.360 
 
When pressed about the singling out of the Jewish people in a special section of the law 
and effects of conditioning citizenship on the legal residency within the country on the 
local Arab population, Robinson assured his audience that 
The singling out of the Jews in this law is actually more of a symbolic than a 
practical differentiation. By no stretch of the imagination can it be construed that 
the law discriminated against the legitimate Arab residents of Israel. While the 
formulation of the conditions for the acquisition of Israel nationality by Arabs is 
somewhat different from that by Jews, the practical effect of mass naturalization 
is essentially the same. It does, rightfully, exclude from citizenship a small 
minority of Arabs who illegally entered the country after the establishment of the 
State. I know of no other State, including the United States, which extends such a 
privilege. Indeed Israel has exempted the Arab immigrants who may apply for 
naturalization from requirements which apply to other groups.361 
 
In more ways than one, Robinson’s statement is misleading and inaccurate. The separate 
and privileged treatment of Jews in The Citizenship Law is neither symbolic not 
accidental. As Rosenne candidly expressed, the existential function and task of Jewish 
statehood is to enable the exercise of the historic right to return to Palestine, a right 
limited to Jews only requiring immigration structures designed for its implementation. 
Thus the singling out of the Jewish people in a special section is fundamental to any 
Zionist citizenship and immigration legislation. Further, while the law appears to provide 
various mechanisms for the inclusion of non-Jews into citizenship, a closer look reveals 
efforts by lawmakers to allow for as little inclusion of non-Jews in the country as legally 
and politically possible. The largest group to be completely excluded from citizenship is 
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Palestinian refugees. Although there were around one million Palestinian-Arabs living in 
Mandate Palestine in early December 1947, the mass displacement and series of 
systematic exclusions, ethnic cleansing and rampant massacres by the Zionist forces 
resulted in the creation of around 750,000 Palestinian refugees. As it stands, Palestinian 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and their descendants form the largest 
and oldest unresolved case of refugees and displaced persons in the world: their numbers 
continue to grow due to Israeli settler colonial policies and with the devastating armed 
conflicts in Syria and Iraq, thousands of Palestinian refugees are subjected to forced 
secondary displacement. When it comes to IDPs in the Israeli incorporation regime, the 
settler colonial practices against Palestinians causing their ongoing mass displacement 
and lack of access to citizenship rights since 1948 include, among other practices: land 
confiscation; tens of thousands of administrative home demolitions; the establishment of 
military ‘security zones’; discriminatory housing and planning; imposed closures on the 
movement of persons; the forced expulsion, transfer and relocation of entire 
communities, as in the Bedouin populations in Jerusalem and the Naqab desert; major 
Israeli military assaults and extreme warfare practices rendering impossible the 
rebuilding of homes and civilian structures such as the 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2014 wars 
in Gaza; the confiscation of identity cards and the revocation of residency rights in 
Jerusalem, including those of children; discriminatory permit regimes; and the 
displacement of over 30,000 Palestinians resulting from the illegal construction of the 
Apartheid Wall in Jerusalem and the West Bank. Yet, despite this multiple and ongoing 
displacement, today the majority of Palestinian refugees continue to live within 100 
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kilometers of the legal borders of Israel and the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories 
where their places of origin and homes are located.362  
During the Zionist ethnic cleansing campaigns, around 13,000 Palestinians were 
killed and around 418 villages were destroyed and depopulated, leaving a mere 156,000 
Palestinians remaining on their lands after the war.363 For the remaining Palestinians in 
the new State after 1948, the conditions imposed to prove residency were incredibly hard 
to meet in practice. In a candid analysis paper written on October 14, 1958 on the Israeli 
Citizenship Law from the American Jewish Committee, the difficulties facing non-Jewish 
Arabs in Israel were outlined: 
Most non-Jewish residents had no proof of Palestine citizenship, which could be 
established only by possession of a Palestine Passport or identity card. Under the 
Mandate, only a small portion of Palestinians who travelled abroad had passports. 
Large numbers of Arabs who had identity cards either lost them or surrendered 
them to the Israeli Army during or immediately after the war. Many non-Jews 
were not included in the Registration of Inhabitants because careless registration 
teams by-passed many Arab villages. (The Minister of Interior promised to 
register some of them at a later date). Many Arabs had only temporary residence 
permits or military certificates of residence. Arabs had to prove that on the day 
the Law came into force they were Israeli residents, a term which had not been 
clearly defined and was, therefore, subject to the interpretation of the Minister of 
Interior….364 
 
Consequently, “out of 175,000 Palestinian residents at the time the law entered into force, 
only 143,000 were entitled to citizenship,” with the over thirty thousand Arab residents 
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being forced to naturalize so as to gain citizenship.365 The paper of the American Jewish 
Committee continues to remark that: 
While there is no doubt that theoretically there is discrimination [in this law] 
between Jews and non-Jews outside Israel, such discrimination is of very little 
practical consequence until that individual goes to Israel. However, even these 
practical consequences could be mitigated, and the Nationality Law aggravates 
them unnecessarily. This is contrary to the interests of the Jewish communities 
throughout the world, to a rational and sound Israeli immigration policy, and the 
interests of the State of Israel itself. 366 
 
For these reasons, Robinson’s reference to the United States in justifying Israel’s 
citizenship structure is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, far from a small minority, the 
refugee population that is denied citizenship comprised over 80% of the total Palestinian-
Arab population living in Israeli-controlled territories. And second, in contrast to a 
minority immigrant group requesting status in a host-society, Palestinian-Arab refugees 
and displaced persons are an indigenous group seeking return and recognition on their 
historical lands.367 Overall, the classes and groups denied full inclusion and access to 
structures of citizenship are the various segments of the displaced Palestinian-Arab 
population that remained as residents, displaced persons and refugees in what became 
Israeli controlled lands. Given that the blueprint of The Citizenship Law (1952) is the 
transformation of the Jewish national home into the Jewish State, Palestinian-Arabs are 
not only not a priority for constitutional inclusion but, as non-Jews with historical, legal 
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and political claims, they are an impediment to the fulfillment of the Zionist project. As 
such, the constitutional efforts to construct citizenship laws that follow liberal 
interpretations of nationality laws of the time are revealed as political and legal 
compromises seeking to maintain as much exclusion of non-Jews as possible. Put 
differently, the residency requirements of this law, one of the “most liberal pieces of 
legislation,” were structured in a manner by Israeli law-makers to deny access to 
citizenship and reduce numbers and access to the land to the vast majority of the non-
Jewish population living under Israeli control.  
This is evidenced in contemporary form with the continued practice of sweeping 
citizenship revocation, or cancellations, of Bedouin citizens of Israel. In 2016, Israeli 
officials from the Ministry of Interior confirmed an ongoing policy since 2010 where, for 
Bedouin citizens, clerks are instructed to consult the population registry for records of 
their parents and grandparents between the years of 1948 and 1952. When Bedouin 
citizens would come to Interior Ministry offices in Beer Sheva/Beer al-Saba to deal with 
routine issues such as obtaining a birth certificate, registering the names of their children, 
or changing their address, the Population Authority of the Ministry would check not only 
their status, but also that of their parents and grandparents in the early days of Israeli 
statehood.368 Importantly, in the years between the 1948 establishment of the Jewish State 
and the 1952 passage of The Citizenship Law, numerous Palestinian Arabs were unable to 
register with the Population Authority. This is partly due to the fact that their 
communities were governed by a Military Administration formed by Israel on the basis 
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of the Emergency Regulations set up during British rule.369 In many cases, consulting the 
records of an individual's grandparents meant examining their citizenship status during 
the time of the British Mandate. A paradoxical practice, as this was a period when Israeli 
citizenship did not even exist. This meant that Bedouin citizens would arrive as citizens at 
the Ministry to deal with a bureaucratic issue or procedure, and effectively leave with a 
new legal status. The Ministry clerk would inform them that their Israeli citizenship had 
been given in error by the State, and in that moment, would change their status from 
citizen to resident, issuing the new document. Having in that very moment become a non-
citizen resident whose presence in the country is now more precarious, these former 
citizen Bedouin are instructed by the Ministry to submit a request and start the process of 
obtaining citizenship from the beginning. As a result, they were reduced to the status of a 
new (non-Jewish) immigrant coming to Israel. 370 
 When it comes to interpreting general parameters and specific questions of The 
Citizenship Law, considerable difficulty arises. Namely, the complicated task faced by 
architects of the law to combine the liberal tradition of Western, mainly English, civil law 
with Jewish religious law. Rich and varied, the literature of Jewish law relies heavily on 
the centuries-long decisions, interpretations and regulations provided and passed on by 
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constitutive Rabbinic authorities. Absence of a useful receptacle for expressing legal 
concepts that are not found in Rabbinic law and the lack of guidance from the Supreme 
Court on how (and to what extent) to interpret words with preexisting meaning and 
connotation in Rabbinic law left policy-makers with a weak legal compass. For former 
Supreme Court Justice Cheshin, the two met “if it is established beyond all doubt that the 
stipulations of the modern law and the prescriptions of the ancient law are comparable to 
one another in the legal context under discussion.” Yet, he nevertheless concedes that 
Zionist legislators “borrowed” modern ideas from the ancient word thereby reintroducing 
another ambiguity in interpretation.  
Rosenne outlines the problem of interpretation in Israeli citizenship and 
nationality laws in cases where a word appearing in modern law requiring interpretations 
according to that tradition is taken as the Hebrew equivalent of an idea located in English 
law. Pointing to the need to develop an interpretation of citizenship legislation that is 
indigenous and appropriate to the unique and multifarious legal influences of the Jewish 
State, Rosenne explains: 
In the first place, there is no objective reason for regarding the Nationality Law 
[Citizenship Law] as operating within a general English context. The Law itself is 
not intricately tied to the whole complex of the Israel legal system, and there is no 
reason for thinking that the legislature had in mind any particular foreign system 
of law when enacting the Nationality Law. In the second place, it is suggested 
that comparative study of nationality laws and judicial interpretations by the 
courts of various countries is of little assistance and less relevance in interpreting 
individual words and phrases appearing in any one nationality law. [I]n the 
absence of guidance from the secular courts it would be unwise, at this stage, to 
assume that they would prefer a possible interpretation at variance with the 
accepted one in Rabbinic law and, more particularly, that the nationality law will 
be interpreted in the light of any individual system of law.371 
 
For Rosenne, the interpretation of Israeli nationality law needs to be indigenous. This is 
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so that they are not indiscriminately subjected to the same canons of interpretation as 
English and Mandatory law. Part of the assertion of independence and sovereignty of the 
newly established State also includes the need to engineer a uniquely ‘Israeli’ 
interpretation of imported Western legal concepts to match the specific aims and 
circumstances of the Zionist project. And here, the prominence of the concept of ‘return’ 
and its particular interpretation in Israeli citizenship legislation is clarified. 
5. Law of Return (1950): Clothing historical experience in legal form 
The notion of return symbolized the Zionist answer both to legal and political restrictions 
on the immigration of Jews to the territory and to the problem of statelessness that affects 
them in the modern state system. A crucial idea in Jewish history, Zionist literature and, 
subsequently, a cornerstone of Israeli constitutional structures, return is what Rosenne 
calls “an original mode of acquiring Israeli nationality.”372 Of course, Israel is not the 
first state in the world to employ the notion of return in a constitutional capacity. After 
World War I and in the interwar period, the notion of return was applied in the nationality 
laws of states that were newly formed and whose borders were redrawn. This was done to 
enable dispersed refugee populations to come back to their home societies. Moreover, 
after World War II in 1945-1946, the former Soviet Republic of Armenia adopted a law 
enabling the return of Armenian nationals to their homeland. However, by presenting the 
application of the concept of return more as a restoration or reinstatement of former 
political powers, the Israeli application of this pivotal concept differs.  
The Old Testament Hebrew word for this foundational notion simultaneously 
implies a process of captivity (shevut) and of return (shiv). This meant that coming back 
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to the old Jewish polity centuries after the Destruction of the Temple and the end of the 
Davidic monarchy was, in Jewish religious and spiritual thought, both to be a captive of 
or returned to the land and, by extension, God. Relevant to modern international 
structures of nationality, the Zionist application of the concept of return refers to the loss 
of political power and independence in Biblical times, long before the modern nation-
state and international system even existed. Outside of a liberal democratic tradition of 
modern nation-state and law-making, the argument for Jewish indigeneity justifying the 
application of the concept of return is sourced in the Jewish people’s “eternal, historic 
right to the Land of Israel [as an] inalienable inheritance of its forefathers.”373 Rosenne 
explains that 
… in the case of Israel the loss of political independence occurred in the too 
remote past for its consequences to be remedied by ending the effects of 
relatively modern antecedent treaties. For Israel, the conception of Return is a 
deep historical, philosophical and religious experience which the Law now tries 
to clothe in appropriate legal forms...374 
 
Evidently, with the Law of Return (1950), modern Zionist lawmakers were attempting to 
render legally tangible a concept mostly present in centuries of religious and spiritual 
yearning and Messianic writing. Additionally, the concept of return had, during the 
Mandate Period, also come to imply the complete opening of Palestine’s borders for 
unhindered Jewish immigration. This was a political practice that Western states 
mistrusted and opposed, given their obsession with the sovereign regulation of population 
movement and territorial control. As explored in Chapter One, civic membership in a 
nation-state requires the identification of a certain personhood that can be placed apart 
and in opposition to non-citizens, strangers and foreigners. Modern nation-states need the 
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category of “illegal immigration” along with constitutional structures that impose 
restrictions and levy penalties on such persons to clearly outline the margins of the body 
politic. In effect, the notion of unhindered return and open borders for Jews in Palestine 
had come to acquire a negative and adverse legal and political connotation among 
Western powers.375 As the first undertaking of Zionist lawmakers in the new Jewish 
State, the Law of Return (1950) reversed this understanding of return into the form of a 
positive right obliging action for Jews to immigrate into the newly created State. This law 
served as an original immigration law. And, after a couple of years when it was combined 
with the Citizenship Law (1952) to determine access to Israeli citizenship, the notion of 
return effectively became translated into a modern legal concept. Entrenched as a legal 
principle and a constituent element of the State of Israel, the full legal implications of the 
concept of return are given shape with the Citizenship Law as the principal means of 
acquiring Israeli nationality.  
6. Placing the ‘Jewish immigrant’ at the center of Israeli politics 
Keeping the above in mind, however, the constitutional coding of return does not mean 
that Zionist lawmakers viewed the concept of return as either attached to the legitimacy, 
legal backing or will of the constitutional structures of the new State. In an address to the 
Knesset on July 3, 1950 debating the Law of Return and the Citizenship Law, Ben Gurion 
remarked that 
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The Law of Return is one of the Basic Laws of the State of Israel. It comprises 
the central mission of our state, namely, ingathering of the exiles. This law 
determined that it is not the state that grants the Jew from abroad the right to 
settle in the state. Rather, this right is inherent in him by the very fact that he is a 
Jew, if only he desires to join in the settlement of the land.376 
 
It is not accidental that Israel’s Declaration of Independence outlines that the primary and 
elemental principle governing the central mission of the State of Israel is that, before 
anything else, it “will be open for Jewish immigration.”377 It states, in almost prophetic 
terms, that “impelled by [an] historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every 
successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland.”378 But Ben 
Gurion’s candid description (now common among Israeli policymakers) of the right of 
return as “inherent in him by the very fact that he is a Jew” carries various legal and 
conceptual implications and deserve particular attention. The Law of Return is a kind of 
constitutional coding of a physical and spiritual embodiment of a right return. One that is 
granted only because a person is Jewish and thus considered to be part of a single 
national unit. This means that, for Zionist policy-makers, the Jewish right of return to and 
settlement in the Land of Palestine is not something that can be un-legislated or repealed 
by modern structures in the state system. Yfaat Weiss explains that 
The semantic debate that took place in the committee between those who 
advocated the term ‘return’ and others who were in favor of calling the law the 
‘Ingathering of the Exiles Law’ reflects different levels of awareness vis-à-vis the 
historical symbolism of the law. [I]t is this pervading sense of fulfilling a 
historical mission that became the bedrock for the wording of the Law of Return, 
and is responsible for the great weight attached to origin in the model of Israeli 
citizenship, that is, to Jewish ethnic affiliation, and less to territory, that is, the 
state.379 
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This builds on my point that, rather than state-building, the central and overriding 
objective Zionist project concerns Jewish immigration. Statehood is, as explained earlier, 
understood as an instrument, a means to an end, which is supported insofar as it enables 
and furthers the primary aim of ingathering the Jewish exiles. This basis of Zionist 
thought is therefore the fundamental guiding and existential principle of the State of 
Israel. Hence, the Law of Return (1950) may possibly (though, obviously highly unlikely) 
be repealed or amended by the constitutional structures of the State for its explicitly 
discriminatory and exclusionary premise around the rights of non-Jews to immigrate and 
settle as citizens. But the right of return for Jews is not something that can be revoked. 
 A bizarre effect of this arrangement is that all Jews are covered by virtue of the 
principle of return, including those Jews who are born in the country. Paradoxically, even 
the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine on the event of the creation of the State of Israel are 
conferred nationality through the concept of return. Rosenne nicely outlines this curious 
process: 
The Law of Return 5710-1950 [states that] … ‘every Jew who, before the entry 
into force of the Law, immigrated into the country, as well as every Jew born in 
the country after the coming into force of the Law, shall have the same status as a 
future Jewish immigrant.’ By a peculiar inversion, the status of Jews already in or 
to be born into the country (whether themselves immigrants or not) is assimilated 
to that of the new immigrants, and not vice versa, as might have been anticipated. 
This provision is an interesting example of the awareness that Israel is par 
excellence a country of immigration.380 
 
The category of the ‘Jewish immigrant’ is broadened and placed of the top of the 
constitutional process. Immigration surfaces as the key priority in the Israeli nation-
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building project.381 The assimilation of the Jew born in the country prior to its 
establishment and the Jew born elsewhere and entering via migration is important. They 
are not assimilated into the category of the ‘original inhabitant’ but instead into that of 
the ‘new immigrant’. This distinction is key to understanding how the concept of return 
functions. In the Zionist lexicon, return involves both going somewhere you have never 
been; and if you are already there, it involves being re-categorized as having returned. It 
reverses the standard practice in Western liberal democratic societies, placing the ‘Jewish 
immigrant’ at the center of Israeli politics. A country primarily aimed at ingathering 
Jewish exiles, the immigrant is placed at the center of the Israeli constitutional equation. 
Compared with what Chapter Five will reveal as consistent efforts and trends restricting 
Western immigration systems and nationality laws, the political survival of the State of 
Israel depends on open immigration and automatic citizenship for Jews. Taken together, 
for Israel, the desired, preferred, and most qualified political subject is first and foremost 
the ‘Jewish immigrant’.  
 The method of acquisition of nationality by return reveals that in this sense the 
acquisition of citizenship in Israel is based on the delicate integration of the principle of 
jus sanguinis and the principle of jus soli. Here the method of automatic nationality (and, 
by extension, citizenship) through return reflects a subtle amalgamation of these two 
principles. The Israeli Citizenship Law (1952) bestows all Jewish children born in the 
country Israeli citizenship at first sight, irrespective of the nationality of their parents. But 
that the child is Jewish also implies that the parents are also Jewish and would also 
qualify for prima facie nationality. The principle of jus sanguinis indicates that 
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assessment for the original nationality of the new-born child is located in the nationality 
of at least one parent irrespective of the place of birth. What occurs is a double 
movement, where the Jewish-born child acquires membership both through jus sanguinis 
and jus soli. In effect, the two foundational principles of nationality law are carefully 
amalgamated. Rosenne remarks that, 
In this sense the principle of jus sanguinis, which might be better termed jus 
originis, operates to confer Israeli nationality upon children, any one of whose 
parents is an Israeli national, wherever such children are born…. The 
combination in this manner of these two principles is thus an important 
contribution to the reduction of cases of statelessness, and is in accordance with 
modern trends on this subject.382 
 
An inevitable product of the emergence of strong nation states was the exclusion of 
stateless persons from the community of citizens. State-produced statelessness increased 
in the interwar period as European states sought to regulate their populations and 
generated laws permitting the expatriation of ‘unwanted’ citizens. Of course, revocation 
of civic rights and expatriation of various groups of residents and citizens was legal in 
numerous European countries even prior to the broad legal exclusions implemented by 
the National Socialists and other xenophobic and nationalist political parties in Europe. 
However, the rise of new exclusionary legal categories of national identity and belonging 
in Europe meant that, of the various refugee populations in the inter- and post-war period, 
Jews were one of the major categories of stateless persons. Responding to this 
extraordinary situation, and keen to enable easy and prompt immigration of Jews to the 
new State, Zionist lawmakers thereby combined the above two principles regulating the 
original nationality of an individual. The simultaneous application of jus sanguinis and 
jus soli thus creates a kind of legal loop ensuring Jewish inclusion: if a Jewish immigrant 
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does not qualify for Israeli nationality through one legal method, she/he is automatic 
covered through the other. Weiss contends that “[i]t was not simply that legislators gave 
preference to Jewish migrants over other, non-Jewish migrants; they also made the civil 
status of Jews born in what was now the state of Israel equal to that of those who 
immigrated to the country on the basis of the Law of Return.”383 The provision blurring 
the division between the Jewish immigrant and those Jews both in the country was legally 
amended in 1980 before which the latter group was registered as having acquired 
‘citizenship via return’.384 Significantly, while this change meant that Jews born in Israel 
were now registered as citizens by birth (rather than return), the section of the blurring in 
the Law of Return itself has not been amended and remains active. Despite not being 
legally referenced or requiring application, under this section of the existing law, those 
Jews who had been in the country before statehood nevertheless formally have the same 
status as a future Jewish immigrant. The implications on citizenship of this legal 
assimilation of the Jew born in the country and the Jew born elsewhere and entering via 
migration informs the first core track of this study. 
7. Posthumous citizenship: Victims of the Holocaust as an ‘immigrant population’ 
Yad Vashem: 
To the martyrs of the destruction 
To the rebels of the ghettos 
To the uprooted communities of Israel 
To those who fought and fell on the fields of battle 
To those who offered themselves for their people385 
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A similar constitutional structure was put into place in Israel for the millions of 
denationalized Jews who were exterminated during the Holocaust. A close examination 
of the 1953 Yad Vashem Law (officially translated in English as the Martyrs' and Heroes 
Remembrance Law), reveals the troubling political and economic interests of its legal 
architects. Chapter Two examined the specific placement of Holocaust survivors in the 
national imaginary of the new state, outlining the ways that this group revealed 
differences between the scholarly and fictional idea of Israel. When it came to the 
treatment of the Jews who perished from the Holocaust, they too were treated as an 
immigrant population. They were bestowed rights and privileges as other Jewish 
immigrant populations through a similar structure of automatic nationalization. The 
major difference being, of course, that this was both posthumous and involuntary 
nationalization. As such, it was outside of the normal principles and practices of the 
provision of nationality. 
Originally named, Law for the Return of Civil Rights to the Victims of Nazi 
Extermination, what later became the Yad Vashem Law (1953) establishes itself as a 
memorial authority, It commemorates, among other things, the six million members of 
the Jewish people and their families and associates who died at the hands of the Nazis 
and their collaborators, the fortitude and heroism of Jewish servicemen and underground 
fighters, and the unceasing efforts of the besieged to reach Israel and non-Jewish persons 
who risked their lives to save Jews. The Yad Vashem Law authorizes the conferment of 
honorary Israeli citizenship to those non-Jews who risked their lives during the Holocaust 
to save Jews from extermination by the Nazis, deemed, ‘Righteous Among the Nations’, 
and commemorative Israeli citizenship if they have passed away. Significantly, it also 
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enabled the provision of commemorative citizenship to the millions of Jews murdered in 
the Holocaust, “as a token of their having been gathered to their people.”386  
As the principal architect and instigator of this law, Mordechai Shenhabi, an 
ardent Zionist and Kibbutz member, began lobbying for the formation of a national 
memorial authority in 1950. In addition to seeking to register the names of the Jewish 
victims of the Holocaust, Shenhabi surprised his contemporaries by also proposing the 
granting of honorary posthumous citizenship to all of these martyrs. To this end, 
Shenhabi engaged in various written exchanges with international lawyers, state 
functionaries, and Zionist organizers to examine the concept and practice of 
commemorative citizenship. Among others Shenhabi’s corresponded with renowned 
legal practitioners and professors. This included Sir Hersch Lauterpacht who later 
became a member of the UN International Law Commission and a Judge of the 
International Court of Justice, René Samuel Cassin, who helped draft the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights passed by the UN in 1948, and Franz Rudolf Bienenfeld, a 
key figure in the World Jewish Congress. These exchanges tackled two main issues. 
Whether nationality can be retrospectively and posthumously granted, and if so, what 
‘dangers’ the legal precedents on reparations of lost property and state representation this 
Yad Vashem Law may set for Western countries in the international system. Some of the 
specific legal questions considered were as follows: 
… 
3. In the absence of any precedent, would it be desirable to base this new law of 
nationality on the genocide convention, or perhaps on the Israeli Law of Return? 
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4. Is it likely that certain States where children of the deceased live, or whose 
nationals they are, would raise objections to this Law, as it might be detrimental 
to the interests of such States? 
5. Apart from its moral and political significance, can this law also serve as a 
ground for the State of Israel putting forward claims to heirless or communal 
property? 
6. Is this new Law likely to cause friction between Israel and other States, and, if 
so, how best to avoid such friction? 
7. What are the chances of other States recognizing this Law in respect to heirless 
or communal property? 
8. Could there be any objection on the part of any State to its national giving 
information or making declaration to the Government of Israel in the matter of 
granting Israel nationality to their deceased relatives?387 
 
As to the question of posthumous awards, by the end of World War II, there was a 
standard practice among states to confer nationality to accomplished and decorated 
soldiers and other notables after death. Moreover, responding to the issue of legal 
precedence, Lauterpracht candidly expressed in a letter on April 29, 1952 that “it would 
be an extraordinary statute; but so is the occasion which would be the cause and the 
occasion of the proposed statute.”388 So the law was justified normatively as there is also 
no historical precedent for what the six million Jews being re-nationalized endured. This 
is unprecedented legislation responding to an unprecedented political project. Overall, the 
legal commentators took issue mainly with two elements of the proposed law. The first 
was fear that the Yad Vashem Law would politically shame European countries, 
particularly the post-war German state. In a letter on May 17, 1951, Cassin warned that 
when it comes to the personal status of the surviving members of dead families, “Israel 
was in need of the sympathy of the other States, and should, therefore, avoid conflicts 
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with them on such matter.”389 The law, he stressed, should instead adopt the moral and 
political tone of remembrance, solidarity with and homage to the victims of the 
Holocaust. Bienenfeld echoed this sentiment in another letter also dated May 17, 1951, 
stressing that he “would not be in favor with the honorary conferment of Israeli 
nationality with any claim against Germany.”390 The second and perhaps most pressing 
issue of legal and political controversy was the possibility that posthumous nationality 
could enable Israeli claims to heirless and communal property of exterminated Jews in 
Europe. There was a clear concern of linking reparations for Jewish families directly to 
Israel. Indeed, an expected fear given efforts by Zionist figures at the time to monopolize 
the ‘Jewish experience’ of persecution in Europe, and represent an answer to the ‘Jewish 
question’. In the same letter to Shenhabi on May 17, 1951, Bienenfeld agreed that the 
fundamental and basic purpose of the law is to bestow Israeli citizenship “to the victims 
as a symbol that they belonged to the Jewish people and died because they belonged to 
the Jewish people.”391 For this reason, he stressed that: 
This posthumous conferment of nationality must, however, remain an act of 
honoring the dead and must not have any effect in the civil and political status of 
the deceased victim. Neither the status of the children of victims nor the laws of 
inheritance, property or other rights should be affected by the honorary 
conferment of Israeli nationality, and this should be clearly stated in the law so as 
to avoid any objections of the governments of which the victim was a national at 
the time of his death.392 
 
Bienenfeld went on to suggest that the name should thus be changed from Law for the 
Return of Civil Rights to the Victims of Nazi Extermination as suggested by Shenhabi, to 
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the Law for Honorary Conferment of Israeli Nationality to Victims of Nazi 
Extermination. This is meant to avoid its potential interpretation by European 
governments as a kind of political reproach. Thinking along the same lines, in an earlier 
exchange with Lauterpracht, Shenhabi had also established that the law seemed 
reasonable “so long as Israel does not claim for the right for herself – or anyone else – 
any legal rights against other States for their citizens.”393 
Receiving rather consistent responses from these renowned legal practitioners and 
theorists, Shenhabi had a clear sense of the features of the proposed law that may invite 
opposition from other states. In this time, the Israeli government decided to defer the 
decision on posthumous citizenship. Instead, it moved ahead with the formation of Yad 
Vashem as a memorial authority. However, the granting of posthumous citizenship to all 
six million Jewish victims of the Holocaust was later finalized in 1985 with Knesset 
approval. Significantly, throughout his exchanges with legal theorists in the first years of 
the state, Shenhabi was, as its chief proponent, largely candid about the intentions behind 
the Yad Vashem Law (1953). Of course, the law would re-nationalize and honor the 
deceased Jewish victims of Nazi extermination. The mass, retroactive and posthumous 
granting of Israeli citizenship would be a historical response to the previous and heinous 
mass de-nationalization and extermination of this group. But the other pivotal objective 
of the law was also to enable Israel (as the projected Zionist representative of the Jewish 
experience) to claims for the return of at least a portion of the plundered Jewish property.  
While this intent and objective ought not be the primary focus, nor be worded in a 
manner that raises suspicion of its second purpose among other countries, the proposed 
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law must nevertheless entrench the possibility of re-compensation and claims to heirless 
or communal property. Shenhabi was frank: 
My own impression was that, eventually and after the passage of this law and its 
taking effect, you would have no objection that this law should contain the germ 
of a possibility to exploit the participation of the masses of our people in the 
Diaspora and in Israel in this act of according Israeli citizenship to the martyrs 
also in the sphere of material re-compensation; it is clearly understood, that the 
statute cannot and need not contain any hint towards such a possibility. It is, 
however, also important that ‘the door should be left ajar’ for the opportune 
moment.394 
 
The strategic wording of the Yad Vashem Law (1953) is explained by the historical and 
political context. Its formulation highlights the provision of retroactive citizenship to 
deceased Jewish victims, while softly legislating the possibility of Israeli claims to their 
lost property. Shenhabi was advocating this law during difficult years for the Zionist 
movement, and the new State of Israel; not to mention for Jewish communities around 
the world. In the postwar period and immediately after the 1948-war, Jewish 
communities were recovering from the trauma and displacement caused by the state-led 
mass extermination and denationalization in Europe. At this time, the State of Israel was 
managing and negotiating its new presence and self-identity in the international system 
vis-à-vis neighboring Arab states. It implemented multifaceted policies of forced 
displacement and military rule of the also newly displaced indigenous (and largely 
refugee) Palestinian-Arab population. Meanwhile, the Zionist movement itself was 
struggling to transform its political and normative project of enabling Jewish immigration 
and self-determination into the language of liberal democracy and state representation. 
Political instability, social fragmentation and legal ambiguity were proliferating with 
little clarity or end in sight. In such a moment, Shenhabi could not ‘hint towards the 
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possibility’ that Israel may be legally empowering itself to put forward claims to heirless 
or communal property of deceased Jewish victims. Instead, what was at his disposal was 
a citizenship and nationality regime in Israel whose constitutional structure enabled the 
automatic nationalization of all Jews (regardless, as we said, of place of birth) as 
‘immigrants’.  
Treating murdered Jews as a kind of ‘immigrant’ population, the existing 
structure of automatic nationalization and citizenship for ‘returning’ Jews is here 
employed to further exclusive Israeli State claims to their stolen property. The mass 
posthumous re-nationalization of an exterminated collective is proposed and worded in a 
manner to empower the Zionist movement. This further entrenches the State of Israel as 
the singular authority of what it considers the legitimate demands, needs, priorities and 
experiences of the Jewish people en genera. Mobilizing the memory of the Holocaust, 
and counting on a future rising momentum of support and organization of Jews around 
the world for the new State, the provision of automatic citizenship is used as a tool for 
legal claims to formerly private assets.395 Indeed, for legislators, the link between the 
Holocaust and the formation of the Jewish State was clear. The 1948-war, or what Israel 
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calls its War of Independence, was repackaged as an extension of the Jewish struggle for 
survival and recognition in Europe. With this, Zionist law-makers justified the provision 
of posthumous Israeli citizenship to those Jews in the Holocaust as they were now viewed 
as having given their lives for the State of Israel. Put differently, “once martyrs of the 
Holocaust are united with those who fought and died for the state, the War of 
Independence itself might be said to have begun not in 1947 but in 1939.”396 Taken 
together, what surfaces is both the general repugnancy and violence of citizenship and 
nationality structures, and its particular application through the Israeli logic of exclusion. 
The consistently exclusionary and repressive underpinnings of these structures assume 
different shapes. In so doing, they have enabled one state to de-nationalize a population 
so as to exterminate them en masse, and another state to re-nationalize that very same 
population posthumously – but only with the germ of a possibility for claims to their 
property.  
8. Immigration as ‘return’ 
The notion and practice of automatic citizenship upon entry remains politically and 
legally contested. Arguments for the exclusive Jewish right of return are grounded in the 
self-definition of Israel as a ‘Jewish State’. Until today, this is a denotation whose 
alignment with the country’s declared democratic definition, its understanding of who or 
what constitutes ‘the people’, remains unsettled and unresolved. The main argument of 
the need for a Law of Return is the need to maintain Jewish demographic majority in 
Israeli controlled areas. In addition to control over the land, demographic control is also a 
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cornerstone to the Zionist project. The Zionist settler-colonial paradigm dictates that the 
‘right’ people – namely Jews – must settle the land and that this population must 
constitute a majority of the total population of the state to maintain its Jewish character. 
A recurring concern for Israeli national security officials, and a stimulant of periodic 
geographic and topographic changes to the state, demographobia, or the pathological fear 
of and concern around non-Jewish (i.e. Palestinian-Arab) births, has shaped Israel’s 
public debate.397 Israeli economic, political, social and military considerations have 
historically been sacrificed on the altar of Jewish demographic dominance. The politics 
of a ‘demographic competition’ between Arabs and Jews is embedded in the cultural 
code of Israeli society, fueling a national narrative of an outnumbered Jewish collective 
in a hostile environment. With this narrative, Jewish demographic majority is reinforced, 
not merely as a tool of political survival, but also as a moral and civic necessity.  
Since its inception, the Law of Return (1950) has served two principal functions in 
the Israeli constitutional system. First, it is the main immigration law of the State of 
Israel. Masri writes 
In the years 1948-2011, more than three million people immigrated to Israel 
under the Law of Return, with the rate of immigration reaching as high as 
199,516 in 1990. …. Since the overwhelming majority of migrants entered Israel 
under the Law of Return, and the majority of the population is essentially the 
offspring of migrants under this law, it is the main immigration law in Israel. The 
main question that determines eligibility under this law is being Jewish or a 
family member of a Jew. The main question for Israeli immigration law, 
therefore, is not “who is a citizen?”, but “who is a Jew?”.398 
 
Evidently, Israeli citizenship has mainly been provided and given shape through the Law 
of Return. A major pillar of its self-definition as Jewish and of existential importance to 
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the State, this law is not only the key immigration policy of the state but significantly it is 
a “Jews-only immigration policy.”399 Second and relatedly, as part of the foundation of 
the Jewish State the Law of Return (1950) also serves as the main identifier of the citizen 
subject. If all Jews decided to emigrate from the country leaving only non-Jewish Israeli 
citizens and residents, the state would no longer exist as a ‘Jewish State’. Hence, by 
regulating immigration and ensuring Jewish entry into the state, the Law of Return is also 
maintaining the identity and existence of the State itself.  
An expression of Jewish identity and self-determination, the allegiance of the Law 
of Return is not to the citizens of Israel (which includes non-Jews), nor is it to the Jewish 
inhabitants within Israeli controlled areas. An integral part of this law and entrenched in 
the idea of ‘return’ is the link between the Jewish State and the Jewish nation as a whole 
and everywhere, past and present, dead or alive. Today, the rising securitization and 
militarization of this migration in Israeli controlled areas involves the continued social 
and political unease and fear over non-Jewish subjects, both present and the ones to-
come. For this reason, the second major function of the Law of Return is to regulate 
membership in the Israeli body politic and in arrangements of privilege in the State. Jews 
are exclusively and automatically suitable to enter the ‘club of rights’ in the Israeli 
incorporation regime. The ‘desired’ citizen in Israel is therefore the figure of the Jewish 
immigrant. The Jewish newcomer or ‘guest’ who by arriving to congregate in the Jewish 
State, thereby reproduces and maintains both its identity and existence. With the Law of 
Return and its associated constitutional arrangements the Israeli incorporation regime 
inverts the image of the citizen with the figure of the immigrant or guest. The matrix of 
inclusion into citizenship in Israel is thus less geared toward the citizen, and more 
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towards determining immigration in a manner that enables Jewish entry and settlement. 
Placed at the center of the Israeli constitutional equation, the immigrant guest surfaces as 
the ‘real’ citizen in Israel.  
9. Merging the ‘Jewish’ with the ‘Israeli’ 
Taken together, the constitutional reality in Israel today is one that does not simply 
express the Jewish majority in the country, but instead the Jewish people, en genera. As 
such, part of centering its political survival on immigration, rendering its desired citizen 
as the ‘Jewish immigrant’, is molding ‘Israeli’ identity to fit this arrangement.400 Alluded 
to above, the ‘Israeli people’ are not limited to Israeli citizens, nor are they limited to the 
Jewish population within its territorial rule. Instead, the ‘Israeli people’, or the ‘people of 
Israel’ are merged with the Jewish nation. Scholars such as Kimmerling (2002b), 
Rouhana (1997) and Ghanem (2001) point to the central, and deeply controversial, 
feature of Israeli national identity, or Israeli nationality: its internal social contradictions 
and chasms. The dominance of Jewish-Israeli citizens and others granted the status of 
‘Jewish nationality’ under Israeli law makes ‘Israeli nationality’ an impossibility. And 
this impossibility has, on numerous occasions, been upheld through Israeli court 
decisions.401  
For instance, in 1970 when the registration of the children of a Jewish naval 
officer and his non-Jewish wife as ‘Jews’ was accepted by the Supreme Court – along 
with the recommendation that the classification of ‘nationality’ be completely withdrawn 
                                                
400  As Masri points out, “while legal fictions were used to demonstrate the unity and the rights of Jews 
 only, no similar provision was introduced to highlight unity among Israeli citizens.” Ibid., 106. 
401  Some of the literature and discussions on the colonial foundations of Jewish nationalism that are 
 outlined in this chapter incorporate material and arguments I have previously made in Chapter Five of 
Stateless Citizenship. 
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from the Israeli identity card – a Knesset law fueled mainly by religious parties was 
passed stipulating that both parents need to be Jewish in order to register the child as a 
Jew.402 On April 18 of the same year, and in response to the limitations and controls this 
law imposes on personal status, Jewish-Israeli psychologist George Tamarin sought to 
challenge the official designation of his nationality from ‘Jewish’ to ‘Israeli’.403 The 
process for a change of registration requires public notice and, for this reason, Tamarin 
even filed a petition at the District Court asking it “to affirm that he had appeared before 
it and alleged in good faith his commitment to the Israeli nationality.”404 In considering 
Tamarin’s petition, the District Court Judge, Yitzhak Shilo, acknowledged the oppressive 
character of laws that impose an unwanted designation and even agreed that nationality 
ought to be determined by the individual. However, Justice Shilo concluded that the 
existence of an Israeli nation as distinct from a Jewish nation seemed to be an 
impossibility on account of his “living amongst [his] people,” and stated that “a person 
cannot create a new nationality just by saying it exists, and then say he belongs to it.”405 
The impossibility of a separation between the Israeli state and the Jewish nation was also 
affirmed in Tamarin’s appeal to the Supreme Court whose participation in the same 
national consensus was revealed in the opinion of Justice Shimon Agranat, then President 
of the Court. Ruling that “there is no Israeli nation separate from the Jewish nation … 
                                                
402 Michael Keren, Zichroni v. State of Israel: The biography of a civil rights lawyer (Lanham: Lexington 
 Books, 2002), 105. 
403 Ibid. 
404 See Tamarin v. State of Israel (1970) Israeli Supreme Court, 26 P.D. I 197, quoted from United 
 Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-ninth session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
 adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, Mr. Miloon Kothari,  
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405 Keren, Zichroni v. State of Israel, 106-107; Moshe Gorali, “So this Jew, Arab, Georgian and 
 Samaritan go to court… The state denies there is any such nationality as `Israeli’,” Haaretz, December 
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composed not only of those residing in Israel but also of Diaspora Jewry,” Justice 
Agranat went on to stress that recognizing a uniform Israeli nationality “would negate the 
very foundation upon which the State of Israel was formed.”406 In his denunciation of the 
petition, he continued: 
If a handful of people or more wish to separate themselves from the Jewish 
people – only twenty-three years after the establishment of the state – and acquire 
the status of a separate Israeli nation, this separatist trend should not be regarded 
as legitimate and should not be recognized.407 
 
At first glance, the accusation of separatism appears to be extreme and unfounded. 
Tamarin is an Israeli citizen who merely asks to be officially recognized as bearing the 
nationality of his state. Nationality expresses the legal relationship of an individual to 
her/his state, and given that Tamarin is not detracting from nor formulating an exclusive 
identity within and apart from an Israeli identity, the accusation of separatism appears to 
be misplaced. But if we take a closer look, we see that Tamarin’s petition does advocate a 
certain separation from the Zionist framework of identity and inclusion that serves as the 
basis for the State of Israel. And here the Jewish ethnocentric and primordial foundations 
of Israeli nationhood and citizenship begin to emerge. The Israeli government and its 
Supreme Court cannot recognize an ‘Israeli’ nation separate from a ‘Jewish’ nation 
because, from their ideological perspective, Israel is the state of the Jewish nation. To 
officially recognize an Israeli nationality, and even to adopt the language of an ‘Israeli’ 
nation as a category distinct from a ‘Jewish’ nation, would imply that, at some conceptual 
level, the two are distinct. That one category includes a collective identity that the other 
does not. However small, this conceptual separation between ‘Israeli’ and ‘Jewish’ would 
                                                
406 Tamarin v. State of Israel. 
407  Gorali, “So this Jew, Arab, Georgian and Samaritan go to court.” Emphasis added. 
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have juridico-political repercussions for the entrenchment of Jewish ascendancy within 
the state. Of course, this is because, in doing so, it could open a window of inclusion 
within the Israeli nation for non-Jewish citizens. It is the conceptual separation between 
‘Jewish’ and ‘Israeli’ along with the potential practical implications of having to formally 
– and even equally – incorporate a non-Jewish collective within the self-definition and 
self-understanding of the state that renders Tamarin’s petition a danger to the existing 
Zionist consensus. Though put forth by a Jewish citizen concerned with the State’s 
hegemony over personal status, the petition simultaneously and acutely points to the 
absence of any meaningful Israeli citizenship for the non-Jewish population within the 
state. Understanding this, we come to learn that the accusation of ‘separatism’ by Justice 
Agranat is not inconsistent with the Zionist foundations of the State of Israel. This is 
because its language, constitutional framework and practices fuse Israel with the Jewish 
people; both within and outside of its ‘formal’ borders.  
 As it stands, Israel remains the only recognized state in the world whose citizens 
do not constitute its nationals. In fact, although the Interior Ministry includes 137 
nationalities in its list of recognized designations for Israeli citizens, including Assyrian, 
Albanian, Burmese, Hong Konger, Samaritan, and even Hebrew, it denies its citizens an 
‘Israeli’ nationality.408 The Israeli government has even gone so far as to create 
nationalities that are not recognized outside of Israel including ‘Arab’, ‘Druze’ and 
‘Unknown’ to evade the formation of an ‘Israeli’ nationality.409 Tamarin’s initiative has 
been reawakened in recent years. In December 2003, thirty-eight signatories mainly 
composed of Jewish-Israelis but also including some Arab citizens submitted a petition to 
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the High Court of Justice asking it to “order the Ministry of the Interior to inscribe their 
nationality as Israeli in the population registry.”410 Though unsuccessful, the petition put 
forth by this group of academics, and social, cultural and political figures urged the 
formation of a more inclusive nationality that does not simply privilege Jewish members 
of Israeli society over their non-Jewish counterparts. This request again resurfaced in 
2008 when a similar group of Arab and Jewish citizens, including former Members of 
Knesset, submitted a petition challenging the state’s refusal to recognize an ‘Israeli’ 
nationality. They argued that an ‘Israeli’ nation was simultaneously created with the 
establishment of the Israeli state. Headed by retired professor Uzi Ornan, the petition 
argued that the Declaration of Independence, also distinguished between the ‘Jewish 
nation’ within Israel and the ‘Jewish nation’ abroad. The former collective was to 
“establish the state and become like all other nations standing in its own right in its 
sovereign state,” while the latter were to first migrate to Israel to then contribute to 
building the state.411 As a result, the petition held, the designation of “Jewish” is not 
merely limited to Jewish-Israeli citizens and therefore another national classification is 
necessary. This petition was predictably rejected by the Jerusalem District Court Judge 
Noam Sohlberg on the grounds that the matter was “not justiciable.” Significantly, for 
Justice Sohlberg, the fact that the appeal included Jews, Arabs and Druze citizens, among 
others, rendered it un-justiciable. Unlike the Tamarin petition, which the Supreme Court 
had agreed to consider, the implications of Sohlberg’s verdict would be to include non-
Jews in the ‘Israeli’ nation. He writes: 
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I don’t think we can treat the two cases similarly …. In the present case, people 
of many different religions, cultures and nationalities, Jews, Arabs, Druze and 
others, have joined together. This was not true in the previous case, which 
involved only a Jew. It is not at all the same to recognize Israeli nationality for a 
Jew as it is for members of other nations.412 
 
This may imply that Justice Sohlberg may have reached a different conclusion had all of 
the applicants been Jewish. However, the Zionist national consensus to which he 
subscribes prevents him from considering non-Jews as belonging to an ‘Israeli’ nation. 
The ‘Jewish’ and ‘Israeli’ are synthesized to such a degree in the Zionist framework that 
the acknowledgment of the latter by the court would be equivalent to it “creat[ing] 
something out of nothing.”413 In hearing the appeal of the petition in 2010, the Supreme 
Court fiercely rejected Justice Sohlberg’s argument that the petition was “not justiciable,” 
but it also strongly indicated that it was likely to refuse the appeal.  
The degree to which the Israeli Knesset and courts can exercise their authority on 
the question of the relationship between a ‘Jewish’ and an ‘Israeli’ nationality was also 
pointed to by Barak. Bernard Avishai explains: 
In May 2006, Barak’s court in effect answered the petition, with a ruling in an 
entirely different case. The suit in question challenged army deferrals for ultra-
Orthodox students – a clear case of inequality. Barak declared, rather clumsily, 
that ‘there is room for the idea that a law or Basic Law that denies Israel’s 
character as Jewish or democratic state is unconstitutional’. Many experts 
interpreted this to mean that the High Court could abolish a law, or even a Basic 
Law, if it impairs Israel’s Jewish character, even if equality is at stake. …. 
Indeed, to protect the Jewishness of Israel, the Knesset could do pretty much 
what it wanted.414     
 
The refocus of the Israeli political and legal establishment on preserving the Jewishness 
of the state has recently been met with a similar international refocus on the same. 
                                                
412 Sohlberg quoted in ibid. 
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Jonathan Cook explains that in May 2011, American President Barak Obama became the 
first US president to formally affirm Israel’s self-definition as ‘a Jewish State and the 
homeland for the Jewish people’.415 In July of the same year the New York Times reported 
that the Obama Administration is “currently working behind the scenes to press key allies 
to adopt a formula that would call on Israel and the Palestinians to resume negotiations 
on the basis of the 1967-lines and — for the first time in Mideast peacemaking — spell 
out international expectations that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish State.”416 
What comes to the fore is that an issue absent from both the 1993 Oslo Accords that set 
into motion the diplomatic process for a two-state settlement and the failed 2000 Camp 
David Summit, and which was first introduced only at the 2007 Annapolis Conference, 
has now risen to the level of other long-standing and internationally recognized final-
status issues including illegal Jewish settlements, the return of refugees, recognized 
borders and the status of Jerusalem.417 As Cook points out, rather unlike other nation-
states, today’s Israel is not asking its Palestinian counterparts to recognize its territorial 
borders, sovereignty or even its democratic identity. Instead, even its liberal 
commentators are strictly asking for formal recognition of its ‘Jewish’ character. 
10. Summary and conclusions 
This chapter makes the link that the matrix of European colonialism within which the 
Jewish national movement burgeoned and where notions of liberal citizenship first took 
root have set the stage for the multifaceted racial discrimination and exclusion faced by 
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non-Jewish citizens and subjects today. Our above examination of the Law of Return 
(1950) and the Citizenship Law (1952), which together form the substructure upon which 
the Israeli logic of exclusion is based, reveals how the colonial logic of pre-1948 Zionism 
resurfaces in contemporary Israeli citizenship structures. As I have shown, these texts 
were designed and interpreted by law and policy-makers to be ‘indigenous’ in that they 
were not indiscriminately subjected to the same canons of interpretation as English and 
Mandatory law. Part of the assertion of independence and sovereignty of the newly 
established State was the need to engineer a uniquely ‘Israeli’ interpretation of imported 
Western legal concepts to match the specific aims and circumstances of the Zionist 
project. Using historical and archival material I have shown that, with this objective, the 
concept of ‘return’ gained particular prominence in Israeli citizenship and nationality 
regulations. Though Israel is certainly not the first state in the world to employ the notion 
of return in a constitutional capacity, as the first undertaking of Zionist lawmakers in the 
new Jewish State, the Law of Return (1950) reversed this understanding of return into the 
form of a positive right compelling Jews to immigrate. Serving as an original 
immigration law, and after a couple of years when combined with the Citizenship Law 
(1952) to determine access to Israeli citizenship, return has effectively transformed into a 
modern legal concept. Here largely secular and liberal Zionist law and policy-makers 
gave immediate recourse to religious practice and law for the definition of the State’s 
body politic. 
Importantly, the Israeli implementation and practice of return meant that all Jews 
– including those Jews who are born in the country – are included in the national body by 
virtue of the principle of return. This meant that even the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine 
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in the country on the event of the creation of the State of Israel are conferred nationality 
through the concept of return. In effect, the Israeli constitutional order is structured in a 
manner that broadens the category of the ‘Jewish immigrant’, placing this figure on the 
top of the constitutional process. A country primarily aimed at ingathering Jewish exiles, 
the immigrant has been placed at the center of the Israeli constitutional equation. The 
assimilation of the Jew born in the country prior to its establishment and the Jew born 
elsewhere and entering via migration (not into the category of the ‘original inhabitant’ 
but instead into that of the new ‘immigrant’) is key to understanding how the concept of 
return functions. The simultaneous application of jus sanguinis and jus soli creates a kind 
of legal circle guaranteeing sole Jewish inclusion: if a Jewish immigrant does not qualify 
for Israeli nationality through one legal method, she/he is automatic covered through the 
other. In effect, this is an inclusion that is denied to non-Jewish Arabs already living in 
the country, the region and abroad. With this analytical contribution, I contend that 
‘return’ reverses the standard practice in Western liberal democratic societies, placing the 
‘Jewish immigrant’ at the center of Israeli politics. Hence, set apart from legal efforts and 
political trends restricting Western immigration systems and nationality laws, the 
political survival of the State of Israel actually depends on open immigration given its 
existing structures enabling automatic citizenship and inclusion for Jews. 
 The core findings in this chapter outline the mechanisms that account for how the 
matrix of inclusion into citizenship in Israel is less geared toward the citizen, and more 
towards determining immigration in a manner that enables Jewish entry and settlement. 
Using the Israeli logic of exclusion as a looking glass, I hold that the current reality in the 
Jewish State elucidates the global logic of exclusion and the internationalization of 
	 222	
citizenship reduction and revocation. Unlocking the placement of the figure of the citizen 
in the Israeli constitutional order helps us understand the rising contemporary political 
trajectory in Western states where the citizen is being stretched and inverted with the 
more fluid figure of the ‘immigrant’. Stateless citizenship in Israel and the placement of 
the temporary figure of the ‘immigrant’ at the center of politics surfaces as a microcosm 
of growing civic exclusions in ‘core’ liberal democratic states. With these observations, I 
argue that we are in the midst of a transition in Western citizenship, towards an 
interrogated and restricted model of stateless citizenship.  
As in the case of Israel, these transitions in citizenship restriction are maintained 
and propelled by the discourses and structures of citizenship itself. Culminating in what 
the next and final chapter describes as the interrogation of the citizen in liberal 
democratic states and the purported internationalization of citizenship restrictions, I assert 
that we are in a historical-political context where the proliferation of efforts by Western 
against the inclusion of ‘undesirable’ outsiders have broadened to include the figure of 
the citizen. In other words, figure of the citizen is being interrogated in Western liberal 
democratic societies, assuming features traditionally associated with the immigrant. 
Overall, I hold that the existing incorporation regime in Israel forms a useful analytical 
context for understanding the upturn in Western citizenship restrictions. Put differently, a 
troubling legal and political condition is developing where liberal citizenship in the West 
is starting to resemble exclusions in the Israeli paradigm of stateless citizenship. 
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Chapter Five | Interrogating the Citizen: The Internationalization of 
Citizenship Restrictions 
 
“[T]he Security State has an interest in having citizens – who it must assure the protection of – 
remain in uncertainty with regards to what threatens them, because uncertainty and terror walk 
hand in hand. … From the perspective of security, the enemy must – on the contrary – remain 
vague, so that anyone – at home, but also beyond – can be identified as such.” 
Giorgio Agamben, “De l’Etat de droit à l’Etat de sécurité,” 2015  
 
 
“I come to Europe to feel like a human being.” 
Aruba al-Rifai, 44-year old civil servant from Damascus, Syria418  
 
 
“[B]anishment is the same as death with respect to the body politic.” 
         Cesare Beccaria, eighteenth century Italian jurist419 
 
1. Introduction 
As we have seen, the pre-state construction of citizenship in Palestine as separate and 
unequal for Arabs and Jews was designed against the backdrop of international networks 
of restriction and control. Embedded within the historical matrix of Palestinian 
citizenship, these exclusions laid a blueprint for the differential citizenship regime that 
exists today in Israel. This study contends that the citizenship and nationality regime in 
Israel since 1948 has continued its interactions with these global networks of restriction 
and control. The significance of the Israeli case, however, is that unlike liberal 
democratic states in the West, its key features of nation-statehood, including final 
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territorial borders, notion of ‘peoplehood’, and sovereignty largely remain incomplete 
and unresolved; all of which is revealed in the dynamics of its citizenship regime.  
This study has examined how restrictions, redefinitions and controls of citizenship 
in Israel today serve as a looking glass for what is happening to citizenship globally. 
Together, the previous chapters have outlined historical and contemporary practices and 
dynamics of the colonial logic of Israeli democracy and liberal citizenship. Working from 
the analytical model of stateless citizenship, the preceding chapters have expressed that 
the contemporary Israeli constitutional arrangements that Otherize political subjects do so 
not through ‘exclusion from’, but instead within and through ‘inclusion in’ the citizenship 
regime. It is the granting of citizenship, the actual inclusion within the Israeli citizenship 
regime, which produces the inherent contradictions in any non-Jewish membership in the 
Israeli political and social regime. Explained above, the framework of stateless 
citizenship extends a model of the state of exception offered by Agamben. It points our 
analytical gaze to the condition that in Israel the modern paradigm of citizenship is 
actively reversed. Although all citizenship regimes are inherently exclusionary, they 
nevertheless remain traditionally a mechanism for inclusion in the rubric of state 
representation, accountability, protection and some form of social or national 
membership. As I have outlined, in the case of Israel, this logic of inclusion is placed on 
its head and its inclusive exclusionary mechanisms are inverted. It is non-Jewish (or 
Palestinian-Arab) inclusion within the Zionist citizenship regime that constitutes their 
multifaceted exclusion. This makes the condition of Palestinian-Arab citizens a reversal 
of the classical relation of exception in the Western model of citizenship.  
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The dynamics of this inversion became clear with my examination of the Law of 
Return in the previous chapter. The constitutional arrangement of return inverts the 
image of the citizen with the figure of the immigrant or guest. The simultaneous 
application of jus sanguinis and jus soli through this setup creates a kind of legal circle 
guaranteeing exclusive Jewish inclusion. If a Jewish immigrant does not qualify for 
Israeli nationality through one legal method, they are automatic covered through the 
other. Contrary to consistent efforts and trends restricting Western immigration systems 
and nationality laws, the political survival of the State of Israel depends on open 
immigration and automatic citizenship for Jews. For Israel, the desired, preferred, and 
most qualified political subject is first and foremost the ‘Jewish immigrant’. Even those 
Jews born in the country were at one point granted civil status through return; equal to 
that of those who immigrating to the country on the basis of this law. As such, the notion 
of return serves the function of overturning the classical practice in Western liberal 
democratic societies by rendering the ‘Jewish immigrant’ as the preeminent figure of 
Israeli politics. Placed at the center of the Israeli constitutional equation, the immigrant 
guest arises as the ‘real’ citizen in Israel. Evidently, this specific use of the imported and 
adopted Western parliamentary structures and parameters of statehood and belonging by 
Israel has resulted in a unique liberal legal and political culture within the Jewish State. 
Indeed, the various experiences in the drafting of a proposed constitution for 
Israel that I have outlined indicated that there are key limitations in its appropriation or 
reproduction of Western parliamentary structures and parameters of statehood and 
belonging. Israel has interacted with global networks and processes of restriction and 
control but its ability to interrogate the figure of the citizen in such a unique manner is 
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precisely because as a nation-state it is a novel constitutional phenomenon. To maintain 
the particular character of the state as ‘Jewish’, Israeli lawmakers re-read, re-formulated 
and re-used the principles and discourses of liberal citizenship rights from Western 
constitutional structures. With this, Israel practices a unique relation of exception when it 
comes to the discourse and formulation of its citizenship and nationality regime. 
This study has employed stateless citizenship as a theoretical starting point 
through which to consider and examine the closure or thinning down of citizenship more 
broadly. With discourses, practices and legislation of civil and national identity in Israel 
since statehood as a paradigm I examine what may be called the growing 
internationalization of citizenship restriction. Similar to the paradigm of stateless 
citizenship where civic subjects are excluded through their inclusion into Israeli 
citizenship structures, citizens in the West are also facing increasing exclusions via the 
very mechanisms of citizenship. The contemporary liberal debates and practices in 
Western societies associated with the design and restricted provision of citizenship are 
becoming increasingly important sites of control and power. Indeed, major trends within 
Western liberal citizenship has involved the development of new calls for citizenship 
inclusion, representation and protection. Processes of (dis)entanglement among 
interacting intellectual and political actors in the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ become relevant. 
With these processes, ideas of critically entangled histories, exchange and continuities of 
logics of exclusion enable us to analyze the formation and dissolution of shared national, 
intellectual, cultural and juridico-political boundaries. As mentioned, generalizations of 
legal and political practices of exclusion can reveal the broader contours of exclusionary 
citizenship structures and landscapes. Having examined the Israeli articulation of 
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exclusion, we can then begin to piece out historical logics of exclusion and their 
contemporary manifestations with respect to citizenship in Europe and North America. 
Far from the claim that the closure of citizenship in Israel is simply a replica of global 
citizenship structures, I am not placing Israel alongside a family of liberal democratic 
nations. Rather, what I point to are global-political interactions on the content, structures 
and boundaries of citizenship. Having delineated the case of Israel, I look at Europe and 
North America to both reveal their respective and dominant characteristics and style, as 
well as attend to their shared coordinates of origination. In doing so, I redirect the 
traditional colonial gaze from the ‘periphery’ to the ‘core'. 
 This chapter attempts to broadly point to troubling developments and trends in 
Western citizenship regimes. The inversion of the figure of the ‘citizen’ in the Israeli 
constitutional order with that of the ‘immigrant’ is employed to problematize growing 
contemporary political practices around civic inclusion employed by Western states. 
What the Israeli looking glass indicates is that, in the West, the citizen is being stretched 
closer to that of the non-citizen with and formerly solidified rights and protections 
diluted. The interrogated figure of the citizen is increasingly assuming features 
traditionally associated with the immigrant. These are key transformations that are 
conducted within the structural matrix of citizenship itself. Working from Israeli 
constitutional efforts against ‘undesirable insiders’, we are able to unpack a Western 
logic of exclusion where efforts against ‘undesirable outsiders’ have been broadened to 
include the figure of the citizen subject. 
With the above aim, this chapter begins by discussing the current global 
thickening of borders and its effects in (re)drawing and (re)shaping the boundaries of the 
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spaces of citizenship. I outline various mechanisms and proposed solutions for exclusion 
and restriction in European and North American states in the context of and migration 
and a perceived rise in transnational terrorism. In particular, I look at efforts in the wake 
of the 2014-2015 Middle East and North African refugee and migration crisis and 
examine and the ways in which nationality and citizenship structures were mobilized and 
interrogated. To this end, I juxtapose events in France, Britain and Canada, with 
references to recent developments around citizenship restriction in Denmark, Australia, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland, to outline the ways in which the structures, practices 
and discourse of liberal citizenship have been employed to exclude citizens from within. 
Together, considerations of France, Britain and Canada indicate similar connections 
among juridico-political cultures, notions of foreign allegiance, concerns of terror-related 
activity in home-societies, and the path towards the loss of citizenship. Denationalization 
and the restriction and the widening borders for citizenship revocation appears to be 
inflicted both as punishment for implied foreign allegiance but also as an attempt to 
protect said nation-states. As per Christian Joppke’s observation, “only a retributive or 
punitive rationale is compatible with the constitutional importance of citizenship.”420 
Working in conjunction with practices of exclusion against minority citizen communities, 
the changes cited in these juxtapositions indicate a thinning down of citizenship 
structures. One that renders citizenship itself with more conditional and unstable 
dynamics. With these comparisons, I aim to show that what has appeared as concerns 
about foreign elements with allegiances abroad is, in practice and theory, discussions 
about figure of the citizen.  
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From there I posit that there is a process of a desacralization of citizenship. 
Citizenship arrangements and structures are diluted meaning that the substantive benefits 
accumulating from citizenship have been thinned down, prompting key transitions in 
citizenship. Part of this desacralization of citizenship has meant two separate yet related 
developments. First, citizenship itself is being uprooted from its classical protections and 
replanted in closer proximity to the more temporary figure of the immigrant, or resident. 
And second, given this closer proximity the structures and arrangements of citizenship 
have themselves been employed in the exclusion of the legal subject from the inside that 
formal suspension and revocation is not even necessary. With the second development, 
restrictions in citizenship structures and networks have been able to build on existing 
political and legal practices of exclusion against immigrant and racialized minority 
citizen communities. All in all, given an emphasis where the interrogated and restricted 
figure of the citizen is becoming more common, this chapter concludes that today the 
gaze of the liberal democratic state appears to be focused on enabling itself legally and 
politically to instead create stateless citizens. 
2. The closing north 
For the most part, debates in Europe since the 1990s around migration and national 
citizenship have largely been preoccupied with questions of the undermining effects of 
the former on the latter. Scholars such as Soysal (1994) have examined whether national 
citizenship is transforming into other kinds of belonging in the wake of increased 
migration, Castles and Davidson have questioned the practical necessity of civic 
membership in the form of national citizenship in the practice and access to socio-
economic, cultural and political rights and protections, while others such as Kymlicka 
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have considered transformations in national identity and belonging in the face of 
increased migration and heterogeneity of home-societies.421 Since the start of the twenty-
first century we have been, as Eleonore Kofman explains, witnessing the “reconfiguration 
of citizenship” where states are surfacing as managers of citizenship: 
[The] expansion and contraction of rights have occurred within a managerialist 
approach [by states] which, though recognizing the need for immigration, applies 
an economic and political calculus not only to labor migration but also to forms 
of migration more closely aligned to normative principles and human rights, such 
as family formation and reunification and asylum.422 
 
With these political calculations, the boundaries of the spaces of citizenship have been 
(re)drawn, with states placing greater weight on the responsibilities and obligations of 
civic membership instead of its accompanying rights and protections. This has made 
citizenship arrangements today a contentious issue, as its structures play key functions in 
the determination of social policy, the proliferation of scales of governance, socio-
economic restructuring, democratic political participation and cultural integration. 
The past few decades have revealed the advancement of efforts by Western 
democratic states to delimit their national identities, moral frontiers and territorial borders 
against the ‘unwanted’ or ‘undesirable’ both within and without citizenship. Significant to 
our present study are the multifaceted delimitations faced by citizens themselves, those 
already included within the structures of belonging and representations. Initiatives 
                                                
421  See Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the 
 Politics of Belonging (New York: Routledge, 2000) andWill Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A 
 Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Other scholars of the past two 
 decades in the field that have examined how citizenship has been affected and transformed in the 
 wake of rising migration include Helga Leitner, “Reconfiguring the spatiality of power: the 
 construction of a supranational migration framework for the European Union,” Political Geography 
 16, 2 (1997): 123-143; Christian Joppke, ed., Challenge to the Nation State: Immigration in Western 
 Europe and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); L. Schuster and John  
 Solomos, “Rights and wrongs across European borders: Migrants, minorities and citizenship,” 
 Citizenship Studies 6, 1 (2002): 37-54. 
422  Eleonore Kofman, “Citizenship, Migration and the Reassertion of National Identity,” Citizenship 
 Studies, Vol. 9, No. 5 (November 2005): 453–467. 
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introduced by liberal democratic sovereigns, some of which we will examine below, have 
included the broadening and intensification of various intra-national and trans-national 
techniques of restriction, expulsion, revocation and containment. As I argue, this 
tightening and redrawing of the boundaries of inclusion by democratic states have taken 
shape, insofar as they have succeeded, through the active use of the principles, tools and 
discourse of citizenship. Continued inclusion in the arrangements of citizenship has 
become increasingly conditional to the multi-formed reaffirmation of state loyalty and 
national belonging. Working with and appropriating global economic networks, 
democratic decision-making processes and cultural values, efforts by sovereign states 
have largely resulted in the fortification of citizenship restrictions.423 The multifaceted 
endeavor to reallocate and reconstitute political subjects to their preferred sovereigns has, 
in the process, changed the way the figure of the citizen is incorporated into the body 
politic. Given this reality, I argue that the ongoing un-rooting of citizenship reveals the 
ways the relation of exclusion is being internalized. This has shifted the gaze of exclusion 
onto the figure of the citizen.  
In many Western liberal-democracies, the global thickening of borders played out 
most vividly in late 2014 and early 2015 with a rising number of refuges and migrants, 
mainly from the high-conflict areas of Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea and Sudan, among 
other places. Although most of these refugees and migrants have sought refuge in 
neighboring countries, including Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya and Turkey, many traveled 
through extreme conditions to Western states, mainly the European Union (EU), to seek 
asylum. Popularly referred to as the ‘European migration crisis’ – though certainly more 
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of a crisis in the said home societies devastated by over a decade of imperialist war, 
military occupation, socio-economic depravation, state failure and regional violence – 
millions of migrants traveled through Southeastern Europe and across the Mediterranean 
Sea for refuge. Taken together, the crisis witnessed the highest level of forcibly displaced 
people in Europe since World War II.  
For our purposes, two key treaties are relevant for understanding possibilities of 
movement in the EU. The first is the Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985, that led to the 
elimination of border checks among twenty-six European countries. Instead checks and 
control regulations were limited to the external Schengen.424 In this arrangement, 
individual states may, for reasons of public policy or national security, re-introduce 
internal border checks for a temporary period.425 Next there is the Dublin Convention, or 
Regulation, formally put into force in 1997, that determines the individual member state 
of the EU that is responsible for an asylum application.426 Designed to thwart the practice 
by both asylum applicants who request status in more than one EU member state (dubbed 
“asylum-shopping”), and that where EU member states refuse to take responsibility for 
an asylum seeker (called “asylum orbiting”), the Dublin Convention dictates that the first 
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 benefits of increased mobility no doubt played a role – but because of the political value to creating a 
 borderless Europe in which European citizens can travel freely.” See “Freedom of Movement Inside 
 ‘Fortress Europe’,” Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity, eds. Elia Zureik 
 and Mark Salter (Portland: Willan, 2005), 237, 242. 
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member state that a refugee enters and within which they are fingerprinted is responsible 
for their application.427 In the context of refugees in Europe today it has become 
exceedingly clear that the Dublin Regulations impose an uneven responsibility on 
peripheral EU member states. This is particularly the case for Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Hungary, as asylum seekers can be legally transferred back to the first member state they 
arrived should they continue to migrate. 
The current political period of migration and statelessness and observations of the 
uneven division of the burden of responsibility for incoming asylum seekers has 
produced a familiar antagonistic and exclusionary logic of membership and belonging.428 
For the most part, and in the face of increasing migration and 
heterogeneity, Western nation-states struggled to attain and maintain culturally 
homogenous identities. This drive was often revealed in a range of racist and nationalist 
legal and political agendas. Largely working against the trends of increasingly 
interconnected global communities, these agendas for homogeneity have often been 
enabled through, justified and enmeshed with active reference to liberal principles and 
sensibilities.  
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3. Smugglers as travel agents, states as human traffic managers 
Prior to examining the specific changes in Western citizenship structures reminiscent of 
Israeli stateless citizenship, we ought to look briefly at the political and social context of 
the currents of restriction and control that intensified with the said migration crisis. 
Uncoordinated efforts among liberal democratic states in the West led to the rising 
importance of nationality and citizenship in the wake of the recent migration flows. 
Particularly in Europe, but also North America and Australia, political calculations on the 
future travel of migrants have, in addition to cases of local initiatives and efforts to 
welcome and integrate incoming migrants,429 also swung toward brutality with the 
erection of new fences, border restrictions and popular fear mongering. Regardless of the 
latter trends in new forms of exclusion, the heightened level of violence in their home 
societies continues to propel refugees and asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
North Africa, and other places to attempt to reach Europe. The policies of exclusion 
followed by most European states, the lack of effective refugee resettlement 
arrangements and access to humanitarian visas in the United States, Canada, and 
Australia, including Russia and the Gulf countries, effectively leave migrants with little 
choice but to risk their lives for a chance at asylum.  
                                                
429  Reported by The Guardian in January 2016, prominent academics from the universities of Oxford, 
 Princeton, Harvard, Cornell and Copenhagen made a submission to the Nobel Committee to award the 
 eminent Peace Prize to the inhabitants of the Greek islands of Lesbos, Kos, Chíos, Samos, Rhodes and 
 Leros. Though yet to be finalized at the time of writing this chapter, it was reported that in their 
 nomination letter the academic explained: “On remote Greek islands, grandmothers have sung 
 terrified little babies to sleep, while teachers, pensioners and students have spent months offering 
 food, shelter, clothing and comfort to refugees who have risked their lives to flee war and terror.” 
 Daniel Boffey, “Greek islanders to be nominated for Nobel peace prize,” The Guardian, January 24, 
 2016, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/24/greek-islanders-to-be-
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This migration has largely been conducted by sea, with boats as a dangerous but 
also the most economical option. Boats transported more than a million refugees by 2015 
helter-skelter to the European periphery, mainly in Greece and Italy, but also Spain, 
Malta and Cyprus. After travel by sea, movement on foot by land through extreme 
conditions via the Turkish-Bulgarian border has been the most accessible and affordable 
option for populations fleeing instability and conflict. In this context, and contrary to the 
borderless model of migration imagined for European member states, Western liberal 
democracies have begun to function as ‘people-containers’. Key to managing the 
trafficking of people is the rising securitization and militarization of the refugee and 
migration crisis. Policymakers in Europe and the United States have employed the rise of 
migration and existing public fears of terror-related activity in Western societies to seek 
greater law-enforcement powers, including the use of military weaponry, the building of 
security barriers and mass surveillance of home populations.  
In Europe, the militarization of the 2015 ‘migration crisis’ took the form of 
closing various frontiers of movement and essentially cutting certain member states out 
of the fraternity.430 A key stop for asylum seekers on the transit route to central and 
northern European states, Macedonia (itself not a member of the European Union) 
stationed its military troops carrying teargas and rubber-bullets to reinforce its southern 
frontier, standing alongside Slovene and Polish soldiers armed with water cannons and 
armored personnel.431 A similar pattern formed, though unevenly, along the eastern 
                                                
430  Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reports that said Macedonia had commenced the construction of a 
 physical obstacle along its southern border with Greece. Patrick Kingsley. “Aid groups say Balkan 
 states blocking refugees based on nationality,” The Guardian, November 19, 2015, retrieved from: 
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periphery of Europe. While Serbia spoke openly at the time against building a barrier, 
Slovenia had begun preparing one so as to control the physical flow of refugees. 
Meanwhile, Hungary had completed work on a fence in mid-September 2015 thereby 
creating a logjam of refugees in Greece by re-directing the traffic of the refugee route 
westwards into Croatia. The precarious situation in Greece deserves particular mention 
here. The militarization and securitization of the refugee crisis, with member states acting 
as human traffic managers, ushered refugees into a country that was internally 
disorganized, politically unstable and transitioning, economically bankrupt, and facing 
dire housing and employment crises even in the absence of the current rise of asylum 
seekers. The creation of militarized barriers among member states in the southern and 
eastern peripheries of Europe not only intensified the existing instabilities within the 
state, but also transformed the crisis into a constant and stationary problem.432 It formed a 
chaos that did not move as people were stuck, effectively turning entire regions into de 
facto refugee camps.433  
Although the rest of Europe was not directly building physical barriers, measures 
were nonetheless taken to enable and support such developments indirectly by putting 
pressure on peripheral nations to limit the traffic of refugee movement into region. Since 
the rise of this ‘crisis’, NATO forces intervened by returning migrants trying to reach 
                                                                                                                                            
refugee-march-abruptly-cut-short.  
432  Interestingly, the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz reported in this period that both Hungary and 
 Bulgaria made inquiries to Israel about the design and construction of its border barrier with Egypt. 
 Taking from the Israeli experience and expertise with barrier-construction in the occupied Palestinian 
 territory, these two European countries looked into the possibility of erecting towering steel security 
 fences along parts of their borders to stifle heightened refugee migration. Here too, Israel serves as an 
 example for Europe on effectively preventing population movement. See Dan Williams, “Amid 
 Migrant Crisis, Europeans Interested in Israeli Border Barriers,” Haaretz, September 3, 2015, 
 retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/1.674381. 
433  See Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans, Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild, “The EU's Response to the 
 Refugee Crisis: Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities,” Centre for European Policy Studies 
 Essay, No. 20/16 (December 2015): 1-22.  
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Europe from Turkey in the Aegean Sea. Interception by NATO forces also included 
identifying smugglers taking migrants to Greece and transferring this information to 
Turkish officials to enable interception of these flows before reaching the southern shores 
of Europe. When it comes to strategies of interception by sea, Australia has, along with 
other peripheral countries pushed back boats full of migrants. In its 2015 Human Rights 
Report, Amnesty International cited Australia as one of at least thirty countries with a 
“turn-back policy” that illegally forces refugees to return to countries of conflict by sea 
where they would be in direct danger.434 Of course, given the physical shape of most of 
these migrant boats they were more likely to sink in the journey back, making them better 
described as “floating coffins”.435 In the United States, the militarization of the migrant 
crisis took the form of the denunciation of particularly Syrian refugees by some 
government officials (and, of course, President Donald Trump) as a security threat. This 
was done despite the fact that the limited numbers granted asylum were already heavily 
vetted with an intensive two-year screening process. This is combined with various 
background checks, intense surveillance interviews and the collection of their biometric 
data.436  
 Coupled with heightened militarization and securitization of liberal democratic 
societies was the adoption of reactionary policies in response to the refugee crisis. Acting 
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 Amnesty says,” The Guardian, February 24, 2016, retrieved from: 
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as a kind of human traffic manager of refugees, a key task among state officials was 
finding acceptable ways to return fleeing nationals to their countries of origin. In early 
2016, the Swedish Ministry of Interior had prepared to reject and forcibly deport up to 
80,000 asylum applicants, arranging charter flights to expel refused claimants to their 
home societies. Having received more than 160,000 asylum applications the year before, 
the greatest number of claims in the EU as a proportion of the population, the Swedish 
government began cooperating with countries such as Germany to expedite the 
deportations.437 Similarly, in that same year, hundreds of undocumented families in the 
United States were announced as potentially being rounded up and immediately 
deported.438 Meanwhile, in the Welsh capital of Cardiff, reports came in that asylum 
seekers, who were not legally permitted to work nor given any money, were issued 
brightly colored wristbands they were forced to wear at all times. Dressed in what are 
considered by many asylum seekers as the garments of an ‘outcast’, the arriving migrants 
were housed in Clearsprings Ready Homes, a private firm contracted by the state, and 
told that the wristbands were mandatory to receive their allotted three meals per day.439 
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Following similar moves in Switzerland and southern Germany, Denmark also 
enabled border police to forcefully confiscate from migrants any non-essential items 
worth more than around one thousand pounds and that have no sentimental value to their 
owner. Though this legal policy was compared to the rules applied to Danish citizens on 
welfare support, it is important to point out that the actual searching of a Danish citizen 
was only legal if the municipality had a suspicion of fraud and required a court 
permission. But no court permission is required for the forceful searching of refugees. 
Denmark accepted about 20,000 asylum seekers in 2015, making around two percent of 
the total figure to arrive in Europe that year. To deter further potential asylum seekers in 
that period, Denmark’s Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing imposed 
greater border controls to force back refugees. The government even went so far as to 
place Arabic and English advertisements in four Lebanese newspapers listing a range of 
factors that would make Denmark an undesirable destination for potential refugees, 
including the difficulties of being granted asylum and new restrictions to entry.440 While 
Switzerland too had adopted similar policies forcing migrants to hand over possessions to 
help cover the costs for their support, it took the additional step of also claiming ten 
percent of any wages earned by refugees for up to ten years, or until they are able to 
repay 15,000 Swiss Francs in costs.441 
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Overall, the rising importance of nationality and citizenship has created absurd 
logics and contemporary techniques of exclusion. This has particularly been the case in 
cases were Western border officials are dealing with asylum seekers that either have no 
recognized nationality, or multiple yet incomplete nationalities. For example, in the case 
of Syrian-born Palestinians, various European cities utilized different procedures. Some 
local migration officers registered Syrian-born Palestinians as Syrians, as was the case in 
Germany. Other European states detained Syrian-born Palestinians until their citizenship 
status was determined. Meanwhile, Macedonian border authorities adopted more 
regional-based form of exclusion by only allowing those from cities they considered to be 
‘affected by war’ to cross the border from Greece. As such, those Syrians and Iraqis (and 
Syrian- and Iraqi-Palestinians) from cities such as Aleppo could enter while those from 
the capital Damascus or the Iraqi capital of Baghdad were being stopped. 
 What the next section examines is how intense and self-reinforcing trends in 
techniques of closure and exclusion have since formed and intensified links between 
various types of rights violations. As Western liberal democracies violate the rights of 
non-citizens in addressing refugees or terror-related insecurities at home, their ability to 
uphold the broader set of civic rights is similarly compromised. This study holds that the 
range of measures taken against incoming migrants, some of which are further examined 
below, have revealed that debates in the West about refugees and asylum seekers are in 
both practice and theory also a discussion on citizenship. The gaze toward ‘undesirable 
outsiders’ has been widened to include ‘undesirable insiders’. With Israeli stateless 
citizenship as an analytical paradigm, we consider below how rising logics of exclusion 
in the existing juridico-political arrangements in the West that apply to refugees and 
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migrants have formed a changing and interrogated figure of the citizen. The moral 
frontiers, territorial boundaries and societal values affected by migration trends are 
becoming increasingly concerned with citizenship structures alongside conventions 
around refugee intake. Even in the wake of heightened asylum claims, many Western 
states appeared less concerned with changing existing legal and political arrangements 
for refugees – as they were already designed to effectively exclude stateless persons – 
than they were transforming established citizenship regimes. As apparent in the examples 
given below, the response to notable and increased flows of migration and asylum has 
largely transitioned to liberal democratic states mobilizing citizenship structures to 
instead give themselves greater powers to restrict access to and enable the revocation of 
citizenship. Overall, rising migration and an influx of asylum seekers has today shifted 
the gaze of liberal democratic states onto the figure of the citizen, resulting in tightened, 
revoked and thinned down citizenship arrangements. This is where Israel becomes a 
particularly useful lens through which to make sense of practices that exclude citizens 
through citizenship structures. Surfacing as the ‘new guest’, the citizen has been 
projected as the ‘Other’ in contemporary liberal democratic regimes now needing to be 
internally excluded. 
4. Interrogations of liberal citizenship: France, Britain, and Canada 
The concept of citizenship is comprised of different articulations of membership and its 
accompanying rights, each of which reflect an analysis of the various relations within that 
state. For this reason, changing notions of citizenship becomes a valuable prism through 
which to analyze transitions in the conceptions of statehood. Broadly understood, a 
citizen is one that enjoys the full panoply of civil, economic, and political rights. Randall 
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Hansen explains, “as a horizontal status, citizenship [also] requires limits,” and “for most 
people and in most cases, the limits of the borders are the limits of citizenship.”442 
However, and relatedly, what we are witnessing is that the vertical parameters of 
citizenship are also changing. Changes in citizenship rights and experiments made with 
citizenship structures become clear when we begin to examine recent efforts by Western 
liberal democratic states. They seek to both formally restrict access to citizenship and 
enable the total revocation of acquired citizenship by amending the spectrum of their 
civic incorporation laws.  
Ben Herzog clarifies the terminology of citizenship revocation, explaining that the 
practice of its termination includes terms such as “… ‘expatriation,’ ‘denationalization,’ 
‘denaturalization,’ ‘renunciation,’ and ‘revocation’ of citizenship.”443 Here, expatriation 
is usually considered the voluntary decision and act of leaving one state for another, as is 
the relinquishment or renunciation of citizenship which are often voluntary acts to end 
the mutually recognized relationship with a state, usually pursued for political-ideological 
reasons or out of economic interests.444 In contrast, denationalization and the revocation 
of citizenship form different politics of implementation and logics of exclusion. Herzog 
explains that the practice of revoking citizenship was mainly introduced to eliminate dual 
citizenship, as multiple state loyalties and national ties were understood as challenging 
the idea of a comprehensive national logic.445 Citizenship was, he explains, expected to 
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be singular.446 As we will see, the contemporary tendency to resort to policies of 
citizenship restriction and revocation reflects a developing hegemonic national logic 
among liberal democratic states. Thus, the absence of full and exclusive loyalty to the 
nation-state – a loyalty that requires constant and changing forms of expression and 
declaration – generates a need to take away citizenship.447 
In this study, processes of (dis)entanglement are relevant. Notions of critically 
entangled histories, exchange and the continuity of logics of exclusion enable us to 
analyze the formation and dissolution of shared national, intellectual and political 
boundaries. Importantly, when examining these boundaries, we see that far from the 
arrangement of ideal types, generalizations of legal and political practices of exclusion 
help reveal the broader contours of emerging restrictive citizenship structures and 
landscapes. The effect of this climate is the process of a desacralization of citizenship. 
Explained earlier, this process involves the weakening of arrangements and structures of 
citizenship, with substantive benefits accumulating from citizenship being increasingly 
thinned down. When considering the mechanisms and proposed solutions for exclusion 
and restriction to manage rising migration, what quickly becomes apparent is that along 
with a global refugee crisis has surfaced broader transitions in citizenship. In this chapter, 
I situate some of these broader shifts in citizenship structures by employing the analytical 
model of stateless citizenship. I argue that the Israeli logic of exclusion is a looking glass 
through which we can further detect and problematize the increasing Western thinning 
out of citizenship. To this end, I seek to place Israeli practices in nationality and 
citizenship restriction in juxtaposition with the transformations in the liberal democratic 
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examples given below, so as to reveal the troubling forms these growing contemporary 
restrictions can assume. 
4.1 France: Excluding the citizen from within 
The proliferation of anti-terror legislation in France, catalyzed by two terrorist attacks in 
Paris in January and November 2015, reflects the image of a state increasingly obsessed 
with security, shifting its gaze onto the figure of the citizen. In examining the recent past 
of French anti-terror legislation, the word ‘proliferation’ proves not to be an 
exaggeration. In 2015, the denationalization procedure448 had been used against five bi-
national citizens who had been condemned for terrorism,449 and in the aftermath of the 
extensive terrorist attacks on November 13, the executive branch of government had at 
the time proposed widening the ambit of this existing denationalization procedure to 
French-born bi-national citizens.450 Joppke observes that 
[So] deeply held was the idea, enshrined in Article 1 of the French Constitution, 
of ‘the equality before the law of all its citizens regardless of origin, race, or 
religion,’ that the final text of the citizenship stripping bill, passed by the 
National Assembly in early February 2016, omitted the reference to dual 
nationals, even though everybody knew that only they could be affected by it.451 
 
As the French Parliament and Senate could not later agree on a joint text, President 
François Hollande withdrew this highly debated proposal for constitutional amendment in 
late March 2016. Broadening the logic of exclusion to include all dual-nationality citizens 
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should they be convicted of terrorism (including those born in France) would have further 
entrenched the existing denationalization procedure. Broadly, it is an indication of the 
punitive character of citizenship revocation, particularly as it applies to racialized 
minority communities. 
Moreover, earlier that year, another law tremendously increasing the powers and 
resources of intelligence and surveillance services in the collection of private data of the 
French public was passed, also partly due to the terrorist attacks of January.452 Useful for 
our excursus and explained below, on November 13th 2014, exactly one year before the 
2015 attacks in Paris, a procedure for a prohibition on leaving the French territory was 
implemented.453 Employed by French policy-makers as a privileged channel for the 
suppression of terrorist threats, the efficiency of such regulations were questioned by 
several scholars and political analysts. They argued that these practices erode 
fundamental rights and liberties, such as the freedoms of movement, association, 
demonstration, and the right to privacy. As a preferable solution, critical observers have 
instead called for more social integration in the socio-economically deprived and 
ghettoized banlieues. Rather than discussing their cost-efficiency and bringing a 
definitive answer on whether these measures are an appropriate response to transnational 
terrorism, what matters for my purposes is that through these laws transpires the state’s 
obsession with the citizen. A constant presumption of the citizen’s guilt is revealed and a 
recurring perception of the citizen inside as a potential enemy in need of interrogation. As 
                                                
452 Government of France, Law No. 2015-912, “Relative au renseignement,” July 24, 2015, retrieved 
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I explain, these amendments are tools for total control by the French sovereign of the 
citizen as the central figure of the body politic. This not only undermines the principle of 
a presumption of innocence, but it also intensifies and transitions the process and tools of 
sanction as ones exercised through the very structures of citizenship.454 Key to the 
argument of my study, such developments indicate a softening of the distinction between 
the citizen-national and foreign-Other in the eyes of the state. In essence, the transition in 
citizenship to which we are witness is resulting in the increasingly interrogated figure of 
the citizen in Western states. 
The application of an Israeli logic of ‘exclusive inclusion’ for the French citizen, 
traditionally the most included figure of the body politic, appears with the above 
provisions concerning the prohibition on leaving its national territory. As mentioned, 
Law 2014-1353 formed a new section in the French code regarding internal security 
(code de la sécurité intérieure). The added Article L224-1 of this code enables the 
prevention of any French citizen from leaving the French territory should there be 
“serious reasons” to think that this individual may take part in terrorist activities abroad, 
or upon return on the territory.455 Evidently, such a law is a serious limitation on the 
freedom of movement and of leaving one's country, recognized in several international 
treaties to which France is a party. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) provides that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his 
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own.”456 Moreover, the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) gives an almost identical provision, asserting that “Everyone shall be free to 
leave any country, including his own.”457 The limited effect of these covenants on the 
provision of fundamental liberties in Western democratic is outlined in John Torpey's 
account of the state monopolization of the legitimate means of movement:  
The right to leave and return to one’s country is a prerogative that has come to be 
widely accepted in international human rights law. […] The very enunciation of 
such rights, it should be noted, indicated the extent to which states and the state 
system have expropriated and monopolized the legitimate means of movement.458  
 
Indeed, even the ECHR acknowledges the non-binding features of these provisions for 
nation states, accepting that some restrictions may legitimately be placed on the exercise 
of the right to movement should it be “in accordance with law and … necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security.”459 A related provision also found 
in Article L224-1 is that the political subject prohibited from leaving the territory is also 
legally obliged to return all travel documents (passport and/or national identity card) that 
enables movement within the Schengen area to the French authorities. In exchange, 
citizens exposed to these provisions are provided a receipt proving their identity in the 
country. With this, a jail sentence is included as a possible recourse for the state should 
the individual fail to comply with the obligation to ‘return’ said documents to the state.460  
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For all intents and purposes, the proposed Law 2014-1353 can be said to 
constitute a sanction inasmuch as it is a temporary adjournment of a fundamental right. 
This is similar to the sanction of imprisonment as the suspension of the freedom to 
movement, and the sanction of illegibility as the cancellation of the right to be elected. 
However, such verdicts are usually assigned at the end of a process of judgment, resulting 
from the commission of illegal action. Clearly, this is not the case for the proposed 
French prohibition on leaving the territory. Instead, it enables the enactment of a sanction 
once “there are serious reasons to think that [the individual] is planning” to take part in 
terrorist activities either abroad or upon return in the French territory.461  
The implied purpose of the law is to anticipate, as much as possible, terror-related 
‘radicalization’ abroad and ultimately terror attacks in home-societies. But the wording of 
the law as “serious reasons” for such suspicion is vague and left undefined, leaving 
unclear the minimal level of reliability of information justifying to the decision.462 That 
said, the key implications of this law is its contribution to the global upturn in citizenship 
restriction and revocation. This is relevant to my observation of the contemporary 
evolution of citizenship and the transition to a desacralization of its arrangements. In 
other words, Law 2014-1353 renders the dilution of citizenship a key part of the sanction 
itself. 
With this law, the citizen is legally limited by the state to the territory (and not 
simply deported) through and by virtue of their citizenship. Israeli stateless citizenship 
becomes useful as a looking glass because here too the inclusive mechanisms and 
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protective logic of citizenship are inversed. Citizenship structures become the actual 
mechanisms for exclusion of the citizen. This is particularly relevant as, by now, 
denationalization is a legal (and since enacted) recourse of action for the French state in 
the effort to address unwanted political and cultural changes in their home-society. 
Reminiscent of the exclusive-inclusion of the Israeli incorporation regime, and even 
without denationalization, the legal and political transitions in French citizenship render 
an interrogated citizen through the very arrangements of the citizenship regime. 
Citizenship structures themselves become mobilized to limit and exclude the citizen. In 
this process, the citizen becomes stretched and inverted with the more unstable figure of 
the immigrant. 
Further, as explained above, since terrorist infractions are supposed to take place 
abroad, or after the return on the French territory, these acts can only be pre-supposed. 
The notion of preparatory acts itself becomes blurred here, as there is no certitude that the 
acts are indeed preparatory of a potential terrorist undertaking. For Christine Lazerges, 
Head of the French National Advisory Commission for Human Rights, this arrangement 
effectively becomes a “preparation of the preparation” stage for the said illegal 
infraction.463 Extending this argument, we see that the prohibition on leaving the territory 
for French citizens is also a kind of preparation of the preparation to transform the 
citizen into the foreign-Other, prior to the actual transition. In effect, actual 
denationalization is rendered superfluous; it is both avoidable and unnecessary. Instead, 
because of their citizenship, this central figure of the body politic is placed in a condition 
where they are excluded through their very inclusion. This is similar to the logic of 
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stateless citizenship as civic structures are used to dilute and restrict their rights and 
protections. The citizen is exposed to a logic of exclusion classically reserved for a non-
citizen, a temporary figure or foreigner without (or prior to) actually becoming one. 
The rationale of the law is that, since the individual subject to terrorist ideology 
and training abroad has, as a citizen, the right and ability to return to the territory where 
they may be a potential threat, it is necessary to anticipate and to prevent the departure of 
the individual in the very first place. As opposed to the migrant coming from the outside 
and prevented from entering, the citizen coming from the inside is prevented from 
leaving. This reverse in the logic of civic inclusion, one that rather strongly corresponds 
to the paradigm of stateless citizenship in Israel, makes Law 2014-1353 a central 
contribution to broadening of the category of undesirable outsiders. Or, rather, 
undesirable insiders. In both cases, juridico-political exclusion comes not in the form of 
deportation or denationalization, but rather a prohibition on exit from the sovereign 
territory through the affirmation of said membership. Rather than enabling freedoms and 
protections, civic affiliation with the state is explicitly cited to ensure restriction and 
exclusion. The risk of the foreign-Other, traditionally associated with the fluid figure of 
the ‘immigrant’ is also conferred onto select citizen subjects. And far from being 
managed at the actual border – what Hansen has called “the limits of citizenship” – the 
‘risk’ is instead dealt with inside the territory with the mobilization of citizenship. With 
this, the right and access to the nation-state is rendered a key part of the practice of 
punishment and exclusion. Overall, using the metaphor of the state as a body, the aim 
becomes no longer to merely prevent infection from foreign agents, from dangerous and 
outside Others, but rather to detect and neutralize dangerous cells inside the body politic. 
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For this reason, Law 2014-1353 and the prohibition on leaving the French territory lies at 
the crossing point between state control on mobility and the generalized suspicion 
between sovereign and subject. Within this juxtaposition, it renders an interrogated figure 
of the citizen by inscribing it features usually associated with the migrant.  
 
4.2 Britain: Diminishing the proximity between citizen and stateless 
The rise of techniques and mechanisms of citizenship deprivation in Britain has been 
particularly applied to those suspected or at risk of being involved in what is considered 
extremist activity or terrorist training overseas. As it stands, British nationality law 
provides for six various categories of British nationality and citizenship status, of which 
‘British citizen’ is the most common. Juridico-political amendments enabling sovereign 
power of deprivation of citizenship applies to all of these types. The citizenship 
revocation conventions in the British Nationality Act 1981 (BNA) were amended in 
2002, 2006 and in 2014. Prior to the first amendment in 2002, British law enabled the 
revocation of citizenship acquired through “fraud or misrepresentation; where a 
naturalized citizen was convicted and sentenced to at least a year’s imprisonment within 
five years of naturalization; or where the citizen had demonstrated disloyalty, disaffection 
or assistance to the enemy in wartime.”464 Far from automatic, the revocation of 
citizenship in this time placed the onus on the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (also referred to as the Home Secretary) to attest that the continued provision 
of citizenship worked against the interests of the public good. With the 2002 amendments 
to the BNA, implemented in April 2003, the boundaries of citizenship revocation were 
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broadened to include birthright citizens, replacing existing grounds for deprivation with 
behavior “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests” of the United Kingdom.465 After the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the launch of the 2001 
Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq Wars, a 2006 amendment to the BNA was enacted further 
widening the parameters for citizenship revocation.466 It enabled the deprivation of 
British citizenship through the mere subjective belief of the Home Secretary that such a 
measure would be “conducive to the public good.”467 With this amendment, the prior 
onus of thoroughly attesting that the continued provision of citizenship is detrimental was 
removed. This measure was a key step in the desacralization of civic structures and the 
interrogation and restriction of the figure of the citizen. 
 Contemporary changes affecting the depth of citizenship rights and the scale of 
citizenship structures forming its aforementioned vertical parameters become clear when 
we examine a 2014 reform to the BNA. With this amendment, the dividing line between 
the citizen-national and foreign-Other is blurred, conferring onto the former the unstable 
and fluid features traditionally associated with the latter. In a 2013 Supreme Court 
Decision in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Al-Jedda, it was ruled that the 
revocation of citizenship in the absence another nationality breaches the international 
prohibition on creating statelessness, and rendering persons stateless.468 The Convention 
on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961, to which Britain is a signatory, addresses the 
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implications of denationalizations for mono-nationals.469 Key Articles in this convention 
prohibit any denationalization of individuals that generates statelessness. However, this 
injunction is adjusted and excepted in Article 8 (3) enabling citizenship revocation in 
cases of fraud, and in cases where the individual’s conduct “seriously prejudicial to the 
vital interests of the state”.470 Relevant for our purposes, this adjustment to the general 
principle of this law preventing the creation of statelessness therefore enables (and 
invites) democratic nation-states to create additional laws. Ones that outline the 
parameters of both ‘vital state interests’ and ‘citizen-like’ behavior. Audrey Macklin 
notes that Britain, upon entering this Convention, expressly retained its existing right 
under its domestic law to produce statelessness through these grounds.471  
As an Iraqi-born naturalized UK citizen, Hilal al-Jedda had his British citizenship 
revoked in 2007 while out of the country with the claim that he was also an Iraqi citizen. 
However, as dual citizenship was not allowed in Iraqi nationality law under former 
President Saddam Hussein, al-Jedda had renounced his Iraqi citizenship upon having 
obtained UK nationality. With the 2006 amendments to Iraqi law under US-occupation 
enabling the reclamation of citizenship for those who had lost their status under Saddam 
Hussein, the British Home Secretary asserted that al-Jedda was, as a naturalized UK-
citizen, able to legitimately reclaim his previous Iraqi citizenship.472 The British 
government went so far as to argue that the failure or unwillingness of al-Jedda to claim 
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his lost Iraqi nationality rendered him the source of his own statelessness.473 With the 
intervention of the UK Supreme Court, overturning the Home Secretary’s decision and 
reinstating his revoked British citizenship, the citizenship status of al-Jedda was 
nevertheless revoked once again by the Home Secretary.474 The al-Jedda case compelled 
the British government to once again change the BNA in 2014, giving itself the legal 
power through the Home Secretary to create stateless persons even outside of the cases 
of fraud. This means that a person acquiring British citizenship through naturalization is 
vulnerable to its revocation even with the result of statelessness. Such a measure is 
justified if it is conducive to the public good to deprive them of their status given 
participation in conduct “seriously prejudicial” to the UK’s vital interests. Revocation is 
also accepted if the Home Secretary has reasonable grounds to believe that they could 
acquire another nationality. In this context, ‘conducive to the public good’ is considered 
behavior against the public interest in the form of involvement in terrorism, serious 
organized crime, espionage, war crimes or unacceptable conduct. With this amendment, 
the Home Secretary also has the power to issue, seize and refuse to issue these 
individuals with British passports.475  
In May 2014, Minister of Immigration and Security James Brokenshire provided 
figures for the number of deprivation orders issued since 2006. He argued that the figures 
reflect an “extremely sparing” use of the broadened powers of the Home Secretary to 
revoke citizenship even with the result of having created statelessness. Brokenshire 
continued to note that twenty-seven citizenship revocations were implemented on the 
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grounds of violating the pubic good, while twenty-six deprivations were enabled for 
reasons of fraud, false representations or concealment of material fact grounds.476 Let us 
put aside the troubling fact that almost as many British citizens were denationalized for 
reasons of fraud as there were citizens denationalized because of the subjective belief of 
the Home Secretary that their exclusion contributes to the public good. What is 
concerning is the manner in which the British government has implemented its legal 
power to denationalize and create statelessness. 
In the vast majority of cases, the Home Secretary implements her powers of 
citizenship revocation while the individual is abroad. An exclusion order is then issued to 
ban the ex-citizen from re-entering Britain so as to potentially appeal the decision. 
Indeed, this practice is an indication of the thinning down of citizenship structures and 
the inversion of the figure of the citizen with that of the immigrant. With borders acting 
as the horizontal limits of citizenship, once outside of the territory of the nation-state, the 
state is neither obliged nor has jurisdiction to protect or represent the ex-citizen, now 
foreign-Other. Absolving democratic states of any obligation to protest if its former 
national is exposed to state violence from another country, or even killed, 
denationalization appears to surface as a closer proximity to violent death. The direct link 
between the transition from citizenship to statelessness as a political presage to death is 
elucidated in cases where British nationals stripped of their citizenship while abroad are 
subsequently executed by American drone strikes. Former British citizens Bilal al-
Berjawi, a British-Lebanese citizen who came to the UK as a child and was raised in 
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London, and British-born Mohamed Sakr, who also held Egyptian nationality, were 
denaturalized while traveling to Somalia in 2009.477 Subjects of extensive surveillance by 
British intelligence, the revocation of their British nationality rendered them legitimate 
targets in an American military operation, leaving both Berjawi and Sakr killed through 
two separate US-led drone strikes.478 With this arrangement, legislation enabling the 
British government to subjectively determine whether an individual qualifies for 
denationalization is essentially legislation enabling the government to determine who gets 
to live.479  
Bizarrely, even in circumstances where the British government has not 
denationalized their citizens prior to their targeted killing through remotely piloted 
aircrafts, the thinning and desacralization of citizenship through subjective revocation 
nevertheless enables its legal justification. On August 21, 2015, an unprecedented 
government authorized targeted airstrike in al-Raqqa, Syria killed two Britons fighting 
with Islamic State. The Hellfire missile fired from the Reaper drone executing the two 
nationals was operated by a pilot some three-thousand miles away at the Royal Air 
Force’s base in Lincolnshire, England, and while the target of the attack was 21-year old 
British national Reyaad Khan, 26-year old Ruhul Amin from Aberdeen simply happened 
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to be in the vehicle at the time. Three days after this unprecedented airstrike, another 
British national, Junaid Hussain, was killed in a US-led drone strike.480 Despite not 
having denationalized these individuals prior to their killing, former British Prime 
Minister David Cameron responded with the contention that the killings were “entirely 
lawful, necessary and proportionate,” reflecting Britain’s “inherent right to self-
protection” on grounds of national security.481 Similar arguments were made by the 
British government months later when on November 12, 2015, Mohammed Emwazi 
(known as ‘Jihadi John’) was killed. A British national and allegedly the person seen in 
several videos produced by the Islamic militant group ISIS showing the beheadings of a 
number of captives, Emwazi was hit by two targeted US drone attacks along with a 
British drone also in in al-Raqqa. Responding to this targeted killing, Cameron claimed 
that the attack was “an act of self-defence,” requiring military action.482 The logic of 
exclusion holds that given said threat to British citizens, the state is not obliged to uphold 
the social contract in relation to these killed individuals, nor does it have jurisdiction to 
arrest them in foreign battlefields. And given that these persons are unlikely to 
voluntarily return to the United Kingdom, there is “no other means to stop” these 
nationals, other than targeted killing abroad.483 
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Taken together, citizenship revocation becomes a political presage to death, 
enabling the (apparently likely) violent killing of these individuals abroad as they are no 
longer citizens of that state. Working from Agamben’s Roman figure of Homo Sacer, 
whose inclusion into the sovereign violence of the law is maintained through exclusion 
from its protections and representation, Macklin explains that “a citizen stripped of 
nationality and banished from the territory is, for all intents and purposes, dead to the 
state. […]  Killing them is not murder.”484 But in cases where citizenship has not yet been 
revoked, the state’s deliberate execution of these citizens abroad is still not a violation of 
the social contract. Nor does it appear to violate that one-to-one mutually recognized 
relationship among states and autonomous legal subjects. Significant for our purposes is 
that even in situations where denationalization has not taken place (or rather, has yet to 
occur), citizenship structures in democratic states have transitioned to a place where the 
deliberate killing of citizens is nevertheless justified.  
 Using Israeli stateless citizenship as an analytical paradigm, this arrangement 
reveals itself as an indicator of a closer proximity between the traditionally oppositional 
categories of inside and outside, citizen and stateless. Citizenship structures and 
arrangements are themselves used in this exclusion of the civic subject from the inside so 
that formal revocation is not even required. This reconfiguration of the British 
citizenship regime works in conjunction with and accelerates existing political and legal 
practices of exclusion against immigrant and targeted minority citizen communities. In 
doing so, the broadening of these logics of exclusion enable the active use of discourses 
and structures of citizenship itself to exclude citizens from within. In the case of Britain, 
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this is a result of the adoption of an Israeli logic of exclusive-inclusion. Where previously 
liberal democratic states were concerned with the creation of citizens, today the gaze of 
the state appears to be focused on enabling itself legally and politically to instead create 
stateless citizens. Contemporary arrangements for the central figure of the body politic, 
the citizen, have been diluted, thinned down and restricted to such an extent that formal 
denationalization – despite widening powers to actually create statelessness – appears no 
longer to be a necessary precursor to targeted killing by their state representative. Key to 
what is theorized here as a broader transition to a desacralization of citizenship is that the 
citizen is exposed to a logic of exclusion classically reserved for a non-citizen, a 
temporary figure or foreigner, without (or prior to) actually becoming one. 
 
4.3 Canada: Transitioning from citizen to stranger 
The suggestion that citizenship arrangements have themselves become mobilized in the 
exclusion of the civic subject from the inside that formal suspension and revocation is not 
even necessary becomes clearer in the case of Canada’s Citizenship Act (1947). 
Amendments proposed and sanctioned by the Conservative government in June 2014 
through Bill C-24 and later repealed through Bill C-6 by the Liberal government in May 
2017, reveal the ways in which governments increasingly formulate citizenship in a 
manner that is more conditional and temporary. Applied in the period between the two 
governments, Bill C-24 guaranteed that citizenship will not be revoked if it would render 
an individual stateless. Despite this, it employed citizenship revocation as an openly 
punitive action. When introducing this amendment to Canadian citizenship law, former 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Chris Alexander declared that “it would remind 
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individuals that citizenship is not a right, it’s a privilege,” given its expansion of 
executive powers to denationalize birthright and naturalized citizens.485 While making it 
more difficult to attain citizenship, what is relevant for our purposes are rather those 
provisions in this law that desacralize citizenship. The citizen becomes exposed to a logic 
of exclusion classically reserved for a non-citizen and the structures of citizenship 
themselves become part of that sanction. 
 First, Bill C-24 excluded the targeted citizen from the existing structures of 
citizenship by reducing the forms of procedural participation by the individual whose 
status is in question. Citizens facing possible citizenship revocation were not provided 
protection by citizenship arrangements. Similar to the British case cited above, prior to 
the actual completion of the denationalization process, the Bill already excluded the 
targeted individual from avenues of citizen participation. Moreover, the amendment 
introduced by Bill C-24 brought in the lack of intent to reside permanently in Canada for 
naturalized citizens as a factor for denationalization. It included additional caveats 
requiring that the individual “intends, if granted citizenship, to continue to reside in 
Canada,” and that this intention ought to be continuous from the date of application until 
taking the oath of citizenship.486 On this proposed change, Macklin explains that 
This provision not only authorizes an officer to reject an applicant where the 
officer believes that the applicant lacks the requisite future intent, it also 
empowers the Minister to revoke citizenship on the basis of past 
misrepresentation of future intent. […] Where the Minister identifies a 
naturalized citizen who appears to reside outside Canada, the Minister can allege 
                                                
485  Government of Canada, “Speaking notes for Chris Alexander, Canada's Citizenship and Immigration 
 Minister at a News Conference to Announce the Tabling of Bill C-24: The Strengthening Canadian 
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that the citizen’s post-citizenship departure evinces a pre-citizenship lack of 
intention to continue residing in Canada once citizenship was granted.487 
 
The absence of an ‘intent to reside’ in Canada can be seen as misrepresentation or 
concealment of key facts in their citizenship application. This means that, presumably, 
future decisions to live outside of Canada in a country where one is not a citizen for 
whatever employment or personal reasons could have been retroactively constituted as 
reasons for citizenship revocation under the heading of misrepresentation, concealment 
and fraud. Overall, once sanctioned by the Conservative government, Bill C-24 worked 
through existing citizenship structures to actually remove the classical protections 
associated with citizenship status. It re-drew and reduced the boundaries between the 
figure of the citizen and that of the ‘immigrant’. Macklin points out that “access to 
judicial review for citizenship revocation is subject to the same uniquely restrictive terms 
that apply to immigration decisions.” 488 This implied that citizenship revocation 
“warrants no greater judicial attention or accountability than loss of immigration 
status.”489 Thus, at the time, the Canadian adoption of Bill C-24 revealed the ways in 
which the broader trend towards the interrogation of citizenship structures had instilled 
onto the citizen features of the temporary figure of the ‘immigrant’ or ‘resident’. With 
such a formulation, citizenship revocation in Canada would naturally pivot into direct 
exclusion and expulsion from state structures and, indeed, the territory itself. Once 
denationalized under this Bill, the former citizen would become a ‘foreign national’ now 
vulnerable to expulsion by the discretion of the Minister. As Macklin expresses, this 
                                                
487  Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation,” 24. Emphasis added. 
488  Ibid., 27. 
489  Ibid. 
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“cement[s] its historical link to banishment as punishment.”490  
As mentioned, Bill C-24 was later repealed through legislative changes adopted 
by the Liberal Government with amendments through Bill C-6 which received Royal 
Assent on June 19, 2017. Among other items, this amendment repealed the revocation of 
citizenship from dual citizens convicted of treason, spying and terrorism-related offences, 
as well as the provision requiring applicants to intend to continue to live in Canada if and 
once granted citizenship.491 While this indicates that the thinning down of citizenship is, 
in such cases, also contested, what is significant for the purposes of this study is the 
broader context of citizenship revocations. The paradigm of stateless citizenship 
emphasizes in the Canadian experience the mobilization of citizenship structures by the 
state to exclude the citizen. In its temporary application by the Conservative government, 
the provisions of Bill C-24 illustrated the weakening of citizenship through the very 
structures of citizenship itself. Although repealed, experimentation with such 
amendments to citizenship law, coupled with the possibility of banishment from the state 
once complete, reaffirm my earlier characterization of modern liberal citizenship as 
exclusion. What these observations and transitions in liberal democratic citizenship 
regimes bring to the fore are considerations of whether citizenship is, or can be, 
genuinely inclusive, even of its own subjects. By focusing our analytical gaze on the 
exclusions that exist within and through citizenship, the Israeli looking glass points to the 
ways in which the figure of the citizen is increasingly being relegated from the center to a 
marginal figure of politics. 
                                                
490  Ibid. 




5. Citizenship as an enhanced conditional status 
Together, the juxtaposition of France, Britain and Canada indicate similar connections 
among citizenship laws, notions of foreign allegiance, concerns of terror-related activity 
in home-societies, and the path towards the loss of citizenship. The proposed, passed and 
amended parameters of citizenship that we have examined all result in greater restrictions 
in, access to, and possibility of a revocation of citizenship. What has appeared as 
discussions and concerns about foreign elements with allegiances abroad and with the 
intention to harm home-societies are, in practice and theory, apprehensions and 
interrogations of the figure of the citizen.  
Of course, this excursus is not claiming a cause and effect vis-à-vis the exclusions 
outlined in the previous chapters that make up the Israeli incorporation regime. Nor am I 
arguing that the closure of citizenship in Israel is simply a replica of global citizenship 
structures, placing Israel alongside a family of liberal democratic nations. Instead, using 
Israel as an analytical lens we can detect and juxtapose the ways in which the figure of 
the citizen has been relegated to a marginal figure of politics in the above cases. Having 
unlocked the placement of the figure of the citizen in the Israeli constitutional order in the 
previous chapters, we can therefore extract the implications of a rising contemporary 
political trajectory where the citizen is being inverted with the more unstable figure of the 
‘immigrant’. What is apparent across the cited examples is that discourse about the 
foreign threat of migration and/or terrorist activity has altered the gaze of liberal 
democratic states onto structures and arrangements concerning the citizen. And this has 
effectively resulted in experimentations with tightened and thinned down citizenship 
regimes. 
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Numerous other Western liberal democracies are also contributing to these rising 
global networks of restriction and control, producing the mentioned proliferation of 
citizenship revocation. We are repeatedly witnessing precedent-setting decisions around 
nationality revocation by Western states, where existing laws around said citizenship 
restriction are now being actively broadened. In July 2015, Denmark revoked the 
citizenship of fifty-five year old Danish-Moroccan Sam Mansoor, convicted for 
terrorism-related charges. The sentence included expulsion from the country with no 
possibility of return. This revocation is historic for Denmark as it is the first time the state 
has severed its links with any Danish national for illegal activity.492 In November 2015, 
the ruling government coalition in Australia agreed to changes proposed by a multiparty 
parliamentary committee to support legislation to strip dual nationals of their Australian 
citizenship if involved in and convicted on terror-related offences. In the Netherlands, the 
Senate approved in March 2016 a legislative proposal broadening the grounds for the 
revocation of Dutch citizenship under its Nationality Act. It expanded the powers of the 
Minister of Security and Justice to revoke the citizenship of anyone with a criminal 
conviction for aiding the commission or preparation of a terrorist act. In the case of 
Switzerland, its citizenship law allows the revocation of nationality for dual citizens if 
their actions have a significantly detrimental effect on the interests or reputation of the 
country. Yet, it was only in May 2016 – the first time since the over sixty-year existence 
of the law – that the State Secretariat for Migration sought to revoke the citizenship of a 
nineteen year old Swiss-Italian alleged to have joined the Islamic State terror group in 
                                                
492  Library of Congress, “Denmark: Court Strips Terrorist of Danish Citizenship,” June 13, 2016, 
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Syria.493 Since 2014, at least twenty-two countries in Europe alone have denationalized 
their citizens for terrorism or other activity contrary to the public interest, including 
Belgium, Germany, Greece and Spain.494  
Far from a new trend, the contemporary evolution of citizenship in the direction 
of restricted structures and the transition to a desacralization of its arrangements appear 
more expressly to us as an acceleration of processes already in place. Together, various 
processes cited surrounding citizenship in the above states signal an inversion in the 
classical logic of inclusion in citizenship – thereby reflecting the contemporary Israeli 
practice of stateless citizenship. The above observations point out what is at stake in these 
juridico-political decisions and amendments. They relocate liberal democratic citizenship 
regimes in Western states in closer proximity to those present and currently functioning 
in the Israeli incorporation regime. The implications of these transitions in Western 
citizenship towards a more interrogated and restricted model of citizenhood indicate a 
disturbing trend. They point to a possibility where liberal democratic citizenship in 
Europe and North America adopts a logic of exclusion that reflects the more conditional 
and unstable arrangements present in Israeli stateless citizenship. 
6. Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has outlined legal and political trends within Western nation-states that have 
(re)shaped and (re)drawn the parameters of citizenship inclusion, representation and 
                                                
493  “Suspected terrorist could lose Swiss passport,” Swiss Info, May 11, 2016, retrieved from: 
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protection. Pointing to uncoordinated efforts among Western states to deal with recent 
migration flows and terror-related activity, we have shown how the intense and self-
reinforcing trends in techniques of closure and exclusion have created links between 
various forms of rights violations. Played largely on the bodies of marginalized 
immigrant, refugee and racialized minority citizen communities, these changes have also 
transformed the structures of citizenship itself, widening the possibilities for a broader 
application of restrictions. Despite their citizenship – indeed, through it – the central 
figure of the body politic is placed in a juridico-political condition where they are 
excluded through their very inclusion. Elucidated through the model of stateless 
citizenship, the above cases reveal a similar thinning down and restriction of citizenship 
rights and protections. Part of a global transition to a desacralization of citizenship, the 
citizen appears today to be exposed to a logic of exclusion that was classically reserved 
for a non-citizen or foreigner, without actually becoming one.  
As the Conclusion of this study summarizes, where previously liberal democratic 
states were concerned with the creation of citizens, today the gaze of the state appears to 
be focused on creating not only stateless persons, but also stateless citizens. For this 
reason, and putting together the above observations, this study is able to place the 
existing incorporation regime in Israel as a lens for understanding the global upturn in 
citizenship restriction and revocation. We are witnessing key transitions in citizenship 
whereby the citizen is being interrogated and restricted through the actual arrangements 
and structures of citizenship. These transitions, including their potential dangers, are 
detectable through a logic of exclusion that continues to shape Israel’s constitutional 
order. Not least, they are creating a problematic legal and political condition where the 
	 267	
mechanisms of liberal citizenship in the West is starting to resemble exclusions present in 
the Israeli paradigm of stateless citizenship. 
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Conclusion | Israel as a Model of Citizenship Closure 
1. Global-political circulation of citizenship restriction 
As the Israeli logic of exclusion, stateless citizenship shows how the design of Israel’s 
incorporation regime demarcates non-Jewish Arab access to citizenship rights and 
representation. This is done while repudiating their status as citizens of that state, thus 
rendering this community stateless citizens. My previous work on this topic has outlined 
that in contrast to the state of exception, where those in the camp are excluded by not 
belonging to the state, as stateless citizens, non-Jewish citizens are excluded in the Israeli 
regime by being included. Palestinian-Arabs are not denationalized; they are not stripped 
of their Israeli citizenship, they do not exist outside of the law, and there is no suspension 
of the validity of the juridico-political order. It is the reverse. As I have explained, since 
they are recognized as Israeli citizens, international and domestic laws apply, and they 
have (limited) access to the institutions of the Israeli civic community, thereby making 
their relation to the state that of exclusive-inclusion. The statelessness of Arab citizens is 
characterized by the fact that though they possess a recognized and legally supported 
citizenship status in Israel, they are not represented by it at an ideological, existential, 
institutional and political level. The State of Israel is, by its self-definition, not theirs. 
This makes them stateless in that they have formal membership but, as non-Jews, are not 
a part of the self-definition of nor are they embodied by the Israeli State. As such, it is the 
granting of citizenship, the actual inclusion within the Israeli citizenship regime, which 
produces the inherent contradictions and paradoxes in any non-Jewish Arab membership 
in the Israeli political and social regime.  
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The model of stateless citizenship is the preliminary analysis upon which I have 
built the two central analytical tracks in this study. In Chapters Two, Three and Four, I 
outline the manner in which Israel mobilizes structures and arrangements of citizenship in 
the actual exclusion. It is through the bestowal of Israeli citizenship that non-Jews are 
‘made’ stateless; it is through inclusion within the Israeli citizenship regime that they are 
excluded. As I point out, the modern paradigm of citizenship, traditionally a mechanism 
for inclusion, is transformed. The relation of exception in the classical liberal model of 
citizenship is placed on its head and inclusive exclusionary mechanisms are inverted. 
This is because the Israeli incorporation regime has displaced the central figure of the 
‘citizen’ in the body politic, vesting it with features of the less stable and capricious 
‘immigrant’. Building on this, Chapter Five goes on to consider what these findings 
elucidate about broader transformations in citizenship restriction and revocation. I 
consider how the interrogation of the citizen within Israel can detect and reveal core and 
troubling directions in which the exclusionary policies embedded in Western liberal 
citizenship regimes are headed. Using citizenship in the Jewish State as a microcosm of 
broader developments around inclusion and exclusion, I posit that questions as to who is 
a real or a desired citizen on the part of ostensibly liberal democratic nation-states have 
shifted their gaze of exclusion onto the figure of the citizen. With this shift, I argue that 
we are witnessing a rising political trajectory where the citizen is assuming features 
closer to the more unstable figure of the ‘immigrant.’ In the discussions and assessments 
of the previous chapters, the interrogation of the figure of the citizen in Israel has helped 
illuminate broader transformations in citizenship restrictions occurring today in Europe 
and North America. Placing Israeli practices in nationality and citizenship restriction in 
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context with transformations in liberal democratic societies in the West enables us to look 
at whether overall transformations in liberal citizenship more broadly are afoot. 
Part of the contribution of this study has been that, far from the arrangement of 
ideal types, generalizations of legal and political practices of exclusion can be made to 
reveal the broader functions and changing proximities of citizenship landscapes. When 
examining regional articulations in Europe, North America and the Middle East, separate 
yet connected historical logics of exclusion begin to surface. As historically and 
ideologically related geopolitical areas with rooted, convoluted and tortured connections, 
I have attempted to disentangle and identify the prevailing modalities of the liberal 
variant of citizenship in these regions. And with this, the process of (dis)entanglement 
among interacting intellectual and political actors in the ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ begin to 
surface. Notions of critically entangled histories, exchange and continuities of logics of 
exclusion have enabled us in this study to analyze the formation and dissolution of shared 
national, intellectual, cultural and juridico-political boundaries.  
As I have stressed, restrictions in Israeli citizenship and nationality structures are 
not replicated in their precise form in the cited European and North American cases. 
Although Israeli stateless citizenship and the practices of citizenship revocation and 
restriction in Western states are a shared interrogation, they nonetheless remain a 
different type of interrogation. This is largely due to the particular ways in which 
racialized frameworks of inclusion work alongside Zionist settler-colonial practices to 
maintain the contemporary Israeli incorporation regime. Nonetheless, makes Israeli 
stateless citizenship an effective looking glass for understanding current changes in 
Western liberal democracies is that it emphasizes the varied forms of exclusive inclusion 
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that is being implemented. This outline of the respective and dominant mechanisms for 
citizenship restrictions in these regions both attends to their shared coordinates of 
origination and inverts the traditional colonial gaze from the ‘periphery’ to the ‘core'. 
Elaborated below, this study points out that Western states are playing with logics, paths 
and models of exclusion similar to existing practices in Israel. They are increasingly 
interrogating civic subjects through the restructuring of liberal democratic citizenship 
arrangements. Effectively, and worthy of concern, what is unfolding in liberal citizenship 
are restrictions that replicate exclusive-inclusions in the paradigm of stateless citizenship.  
 
2. ‘Undesirable insiders’ 
As this study points out, the exclusions embedded within Palestinian citizenship during 
the British Mandate laid a blueprint for the differential citizenship regime that today 
exists in Israel. Since 1948, the citizenship and nationality regime in Israel has continued 
its interactions with global networks of restriction and control. The significance of the 
Israeli case, however, has been that unlike liberal democratic states in the West, its major 
features of nation-statehood, including territorial borders, demography, and sovereignty 
largely are incomplete and unresolved; all of which is reflected in the kind of citizenship 
regime it supports. Part of what this study has explored is that restrictions in Israeli 
citizenship today are reminiscent of what is happening to citizenship at the ‘core’.  
As the previous chapters have shown, there was extensive European normative 
and legal influence on Israel’s projected nationality and citizenship regime. At the same 
time, when designing its citizenship arrangements a strong ‘Jewish character’ was also 
desired; an incredible task given that Jewish traditions were not a major source in the 
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referenced Western democratic and parliamentary structures. Produced for Israel’s 
contemporary body politic was an unprecedented constitutional structure: one that was 
seeped both in the Western (and largely Christian) tradition of modern and secular 
government, as well as in the basic principles of religious Jewish law. This has rendered 
Israel a novel constitutional phenomenon. As a result, despite being formed through the 
historical matrix of European colonialism and power, and influenced by their citizenship 
and nationality regulations, the constitutional parameters of Israel’s particular logic of 
exclusion are unable to be fully replicated in existing Western liberal democratic states. 
This accounts for the existence of exclusions that are unique to Israel’s citizenship and 
nationality regime. 
To dissect this unique constitutional structure, my study has examined the Law of 
Return (1950) and the Citizenship Law (1952). Together, these two laws form the 
substructure upon which a whole arrangement of formal policies, informal practices and 
new legislation engineering Jewish dominance within the State of Israel, are based. 
Focusing on the particular function of the Law of Return (1950) to both clothe the Jewish 
historical experience in legal form and act as a legal precursor that actually constitutes the 
Jewish State, I have shown the ways in which Israel has (re)shaped and (re)drawn the 
proximity between the figure of the citizen and the immigrant. 
My analysis of the conceptual and legal role of the notion of return reveals it as 
an original method of acquiring Israeli nationality. It holds that because all Jews are 
covered by virtue of the principle of return, this also paradoxically includes those Jews 
who are born in the country. This means that even the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine in 
the country on the event of the creation of the State of Israel are conferred nationality 
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through the concept of return. With this arrangement, I have explained that the Israeli 
constitutional order is structured in a manner that broadens the category of the ‘Jewish 
immigrant’, placing this figure on the top of the constitutional process. My study shows 
that, as a country primarily aimed at ingathering Jewish exiles, the ‘immigrant’ or 
‘resident’ in the Jewish State is placed at the center of the Israeli constitutional equation. 
Simply put, and a product of the paradigm of stateless citizenship, the ‘desired’ citizen in 
Israel is therefore the figure of the Jewish immigrant, the newcomer or ‘guest’.  
Working from this exploration of the Law of Return and its associated 
constitutional arrangements, I hold that citizenship structures in the country are arranged 
in a manner where the figure of the citizen is being inverted. The matrix of inclusion into 
citizenship in Israel is less geared toward the citizen, and more towards determining 
immigration in a manner that enables Jewish entry and settlement. The Israeli 
incorporation regime inverts the image of the citizen with the figure of the immigrant or 
guest meaning that, for Israel, the central political subject is the Jewish immigrant. The 
notion of return thereby serves the function of reversing the practice in Western liberal 
democratic societies by rendering the ‘Jewish immigrant’ as the primary figure of Israeli 
politics. Overall, it is through the mechanisms of this Israeli incorporation regime that the 
proximity between the citizen and the immigrant is redefined.  
 
3. The creation of ‘stateless citizens’   
The context of stateless citizenship in Israel and the placement of the unstable figure of 
the ‘immigrant’ at the center of politics pushes us to problematize similar forms of civic 
exclusion in major liberal democratic states. My study has outlined various practices and 
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experiments with exclusion and citizenship restriction in European and North American 
states, particularly in the wake of the rising migration and asylum crises. The preceding 
chapters have pointed to a process of a desacralization of citizenship where arrangements 
and structures are diluted and the substantive benefits accumulating from citizenship have 
been thinned down. In doing so, I have employed the Israeli logic of exclusion to 
examine how the proliferation of efforts we have been witnessing in Western states 
against ‘undesirable outsiders’ have been broadened to include the figure of the citizen. 
Culminating from this study, we can make three separate yet related observations on the 
trajectory of citizenship, globally:  
First, as Western liberal democracies violate the rights of non-citizens in 
addressing refugees or terror-related insecurities at home, their ability to maintain a 
broader and existing set of rights and protections for citizens has also become 
compromised. This means that the range of measures taken against incoming migrants to 
which I have gestured in previous chapters were both conceptually and practically also a 
discussion on citizenship. Discourse about a ‘foreign threat’ has shifted the gaze of liberal 
democratic states onto structures and arrangements concerning the citizen. Put 
differently, the gaze toward ‘undesirable outsiders’ has been widened to include 
‘undesirable insiders’. 
Secondly, resulting from the state practices and processes of closure that have 
followed, established citizenship regimes are being transformed. These changes are going 
in the direction of increasingly tightened and thinned down citizenship structures. With 
these political calculations, citizenship itself is being uprooted from its classical 
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protections and replanted in closer proximity to the more temporary and unstable figure 
of the immigrant.  
And finally, building from the above two observations, this study has shown that, 
given this closer proximity between the traditionally oppositional categories of inside and 
outside, citizen and stateless, citizenship structures and arrangements have themselves 
been mobilized in this exclusion. The legal subject is restricted from the inside so that 
formal suspension is not even necessary. Contemporary arrangements for the central 
figure of the body politic, the citizen, have been thinned down to such an extent that 
actual revocation – despite widening state powers to actually create statelessness – 
appears no longer to be a necessary precursor to targeted exclusion, banishment, and even 
killing by their state representative. What this indicates is that global citizenship 
structures and arrangements are increasingly consenting to the stretching and thinning 
down of citizenship. The exclusion of the legal subject from the inside and within the 
arrangements of citizenship itself is part and parcel of the mentioned global transition to a 
desacralization of citizenship. 
 
The conclusions of this project illustrate practices of exclusive-inclusion in Western 
liberal citizenship that have formed a more interrogated and restricted model of 
citizenship. This transition has given rise to an Israeli logic of exclusive-inclusion. Where 
previously liberal democratic states were concerned with the creation of citizens, today 
the gaze of the state appears to be focused on enabling itself legally and politically to 
create not only stateless persons, but also stateless citizens. What is becoming apparent is 
that we are currently witnessing a transition in citizenship whereby the interrogation and 
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restriction figure of the citizen within the actual arrangements and structures of 
citizenship are becoming increasingly emphasized. This emphasis, including its 
multifaceted dangers, becomes clear to us when we employ Israel as a juridico-political 
looking glass through which we can understand how exclusion is entrenched in and 
practiced through citizenship. The proliferation of efforts by Western states to secure 
their societies and territorial borders against ‘undesirable outsiders’ outlined here are 
shown to have been broadened to include the figure of the citizen – the ‘undesirable 
insider’ – through citizenship arrangements themselves. A logic that is problematic in its 
similarities with that of exclusive-inclusion in Israel. 
In the end, these global trends are together creating a condition where liberal 
citizenship in the West is starting to resemble constitutional exclusions present in the 
Israeli paradigm of stateless citizenship. And in doing so, the effect of these juridico-
political practices and amendments is the dangerous (re)location of liberal democratic 
citizenship regimes in Western states in closer proximity to the unstable arrangements 
present in Israeli stateless citizenship. Stateless citizenship surfaces as a paradigm of the 
direction of future citizenship regimes. It signals the rise of an exclusive-inclusion, a 
reversal of the classical logic of belonging, representation and protection in liberal 
democracies. In this sense, and as posited in this study, the relocation of liberal 
citizenship in closer proximity to Israeli stateless citizenship also signals the rise of 
sophisticated policies of racialized inclusion in the West, and their respective systems of 
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